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Problems of Communism

Essay-Reviews

Roxane D. V. Sismanidis
Hugh Phillips

JULY-AUGUST 1991

Moscow and the Gulf War

Robert O. Freedman

Civil Society and Soviet Psychiatry

Peter Reddaway

The Future of Yugoslavia

Bogomil Ferfila

Slovenia's Independence

Carole Rogel

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Problems of Communism

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JULY-AUGUST 1991 VOL XL

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COVER: US Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze condemn Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in a press conference at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport on August 3, 1990. Photo by AP/Wide World Photos.

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Problems of Communism

Articles

Moscow and the Gulf War

Robert O. Freedman

In responding to the crisis on the Persian Gulf triggered by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, Moscow pursued a "minimax" strategy that entailed doing the minimum necessary to preserve US-Soviet relations and foster the development of Soviet ties with the Gulf states, with Egypt, and Syria, while at the same time maximizing the amount of influence Moscow could retain in Iraq. In supporting all 12 United Nations resolutions condemning and seeking to reverse Iraqi aggression, Moscow displayed "new thinking," but by withholding military means from the Allied coalition and plea-bargaining on behalf of Saddam Hussein, the USSR manifested self-interested "old thinking."

Yugoslavia: Confederation or Disintegration?

Bogomil Ferfila

The dissolution or disintegration of the Yugoslav federation marks the logical outcome of changes in Yugoslavia's economic, political, social, and cultural institutions since the ratification of the 1974 constitution. That constitution bred particularist tendencies and conflicts among the republics and autonomous provinces, fractionated the all-Yugoslav market, and fostered immobilism within federal institutions. In late 1990, the republics of Slovenia and Croatia devised a plan to overcome Yugoslavia's many problems through the creation of a confederal state structure. However, the plan was sabotaged by Serbia and its hard-line president, Slobodan Milošević. Secession thus remained the only option for Slovenia and Croatia, but it was viable in the short term only for the former, which could hope to benefit from marketizing economic reform and join integrational processes under way in Western Europe.

Slovenia's Independence: A Reversal of History

Carole Rogel

On December 23, 1990, the overwhelming majority of the population of the Yugoslav republic of Slovenia voted in favor of independence, thereby reversing the previous 200 years of Slovene history. From the beginning of their national awakening in the late 18th century, the Slovenes had linked their fate to the larger Southern Slav family. The Slovenes joined what came to be known as first Yugoslavia after World War I, and during World War II and its aftermath, Slovene partisans in Tito's camp subscribed to the idea of building a new Yugoslavia comprised of nations having equal rights united in a federal structure. It was the failure to realize this ideal, plus Yugoslavia's other serious political, economic, and environmental problems, that ultimately pushed the Slovene people to opt for independence.

Civil Society and Soviet Psychiatry

Peter Reddaway

Although in the age of *glasnost'* and *perestroyka* Soviet psychiatry has been subject to greater public scrutiny and the mentally ill have been accorded rights they had not previously enjoyed under Soviet rule, psychiatry is not yet contributing to the construction of a civil society in the Soviet Union. Classical theorists of civil society have argued that there is a substantial *interdependence* between civil society and the state. Moreover, civil society makes direct inputs into the polity and affairs of state, and is characterized by tolerance and viable, civilized relations between individuals and groups. However, the leadership of Soviet psychiatry remains beholden to the state, not to the citizenry; the profession as a whole remains unreconciled with society; there is very little legal order in the psychiatric system; and there is not much civility to the debates surrounding psychiatry. Although reformist elements within Soviet psychiatry are slowly establishing structures of their own through which to interact with the state and they are beginning to have some input into the legislative process, this progress could easily be reversed if chaotic evolutionary change turns into a revolution.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Essay-Reviews

China's International Security Policy

Roxane D. V. Sismanidis

Since 1978, China's leaders have pursued five principal foreign objectives: maintenance of a stable domestic and international environment, expansion of Chinese power and influence, integration of China into global affairs, reduction of threats to Chinese security, and the building of military power. A review of recent literature on this multifaceted policy shows that it was largely successful in the 1980's. However, the domestic and international fallout from the Tiananmen massacre, the fall of communism and the end of the cold war in Europe, instability in the Soviet Union, and the Persian Gulf war have changed China's internal and external environment and created new challenges for China in the 1990's. Nevertheless, given the economic exigencies it faces, China will most likely continue its pragmatic international security policy. New avenues to a major global role will be explored, in particular, strengthened ties with the Third World and cooperation with the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Glasnost' and the History of Soviet Foreign Policy

Hugh Phillips

Three Soviet works on Soviet foreign policy published during the early stages of *glasnost'* show that diplomatic history remains a highly politicized discipline in the USSR. In all three works, only the West is blamed for the poor state of relations between the capitalist world and the Soviet Union, there is little acknowledgment of the shortcomings of Soviet foreign policy, and none of the authors devotes attention to the process of developing and implementing Soviet foreign policy. Inasmuch as those historians who made their name in the pre-*glasnost'* era have been unable to break with their previous views, the writing of more objective treatments of Soviet foreign policy awaits the rise of a new generation of historians committed to historical truth for its own sake.

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Moscow and the Gulf War

Robert O. Freedman

One central characteristic of Soviet foreign policy in the era of Mikhail Gorbachev has been its dedication to the concept of "new thinking." The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the subsequent war between Iraq and an American-led multi-nation coalition put this concept to a major test. To what extent did Soviet behavior during the Gulf crisis reflect new thinking, and to what extent did it resemble the zero-sum game competition for influence that Moscow was engaged in with the United States in the Middle East in the pre-Gorbachev era?

Soviet "New Thinking"

There are five major principles of Soviet new thinking that seem to apply to the Third World in general and the Middle East in particular.[1] They may be summarized as follows:

- The danger of nuclear war impels the superpowers to realize that human survival should take precedence over the interests of states, classes, and ideologies.
- There is a need to abandon such concepts as "spheres of influence," "vital interests," "positions of strength," and the "zero-sum game" approach to the Third World.
- A new concept should lie at the heart of international relations—the "balance of interests," which would take into account the legitimate interests of the USSR, the United States, and regional powers.
- Primary reliance should be placed on political means for resolving regional conflicts, using the United Nations if at all possible.
- There is an organic connection between regional conflicts and confrontation between the superpowers, and hence, for détente to exist in US-Soviet relations, there is a need for joint action by the superpowers to settle the most serious regional conflicts, especially in the Middle East.

There is much that is new in new thinking as it is outlined above. First, the linkage between superpower relations and Third World conflicts is a marked departure from the Brezhnev period, when the Soviet leadership felt it could act freely in countries like Angola and Ethiopia without its actions having a major negative impact on détente. Second, the downgrading of Marxist-Leninist ideology in Gorbachev's approach to world affairs is a radical departure.

In most parts of the world, Soviet actions have in fact reflected the rhetoric of new thinking. Thus, in addition to acquiescing in the unification of Germany and the

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[1]On Soviet "new thinking," see Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World,* New York, Harper & Row, 1987, especially Chapters 3 and 5. See also G. A. Trofimenko, "New Realities and New Thinking," *SShA* (Moscow), No. 2, 1987, pp. 3–15; Yevgeniy Aleksandrov, "New Political Thinking: Genesis, Factors, Prospects," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 12, 1987, pp. 87–95; Radomir Bogdanov, "From the Balance of Forces to a Balance of Interests," ibid., No. 4, 1988, pp. 81–87; and Aleksandr Kislov, "New Political Thinking and Regional Conflicts," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, *MEiMO*), No. 8, 1988, pp. 39–47. Given Yevgeniy Primakov's role in the crisis under study, the interested reader should also see Ye. Primakov, V. Martynov, and G. Duligentskiy, "Some Problems of the New Thinking," ibid., No. 6, 1989, pp 5–18.

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collapse of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, Gorbachev withdrew the Soviet army from Afghanistan, and pulled back from such other Third World outposts as Angola, Ethiopia, and Vietnam. In general, in the 1987–90 period, the world witnessed the "retreat" of Soviet power from much of the Third World—although the Soviet Union sought to camouflage the retreat behind agreements under the auspices of the United Nations.

In one region of the Third World, however, Moscow not only did not retreat under Gorbachev; it became much more politically active. In the Middle East, and particularly in the Persian Gulf, in the period preceding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, one could both discern new thinking in action and perceive limits in its application.

Moscow and the Middle East

By August 1990, Moscow had sharply improved its relations with two erstwhile Middle Eastern enemies, Egypt and Israel. Gorbachev, recognizing that the Iran-Iraq war had brought the reintegration of Egypt into the Arab world despite Cairo's peace treaty with Israel, switched Soviet policy from one of trying to isolate Egypt from the other Arab states, to one of active cooperation with Egypt. In doing so, he hoped to help bring about an international conference on the Middle East to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict.[2]

There was an even sharper improvement in Soviet-Israeli relations: consular delegations were exchanged; "people-to-people" diplomacy involving athletic, cultural, religious, and academic exchanges flourished; and Moscow allowed the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews to Israel. Gorbachev's motivations for improving relations with Israel were twofold. He wanted to improve Moscow's chances of playing a major role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy, and to influence positively the United States, from which Moscow wanted both new arms control agreements and economic assistance.[3] The Soviet-Israeli rapprochement was facilitated by Moscow's new thinking. Specifically, the downplaying of ideology removed a major obstacle to the improvement of Soviet-Israeli relations, since "Zionism" was no longer portrayed as an implacable enemy of the USSR. The increasingly independent Soviet media responded not only by taking a more balanced view of Israel, but also by adopting a more balanced approach toward the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole. In addition, the new concept of a "balance of interests" was used by Gorbachev in an attempt to persuade the US and Israel to agree to include the Soviet Union in a Middle East peace conference.

As Soviet relations with pro-Western Egypt and Israel improved, Moscow's ties to Arab radicals, especially Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), worsened. Both Gorbachev and Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze emphasized to Syrian President Hafiz Assad that in the nuclear age, his conflict with Israel had to be solved politically and not by war. Assad was told he would not get the strategic parity with Israel he had long coveted, a setback that was one of the major factors inducing him to reestablish diplomatic relations with Egypt in December 1989.[4] At the same time, when PLO leader Yasser Arafat visited Moscow in April 1988, he was told that although the USSR still supported Palestinian desires for an independent state, Israel had an equal right to security.[5] Soviet influence appears to be one of the factors that, along with pressure from leaders of the *intifada* (the Palestinian uprising on the West Bank and in Gaza against Israel), induced Arafat and the Palestinian National Council to declare their support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in November and December 1988.[6]

Although Moscow's actions with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict clearly reflected new thinking, the role of new thinking in Soviet policy toward the Persian Gulf and especially the Iran-Iraq war was not quite so evident. To be sure, Gorbachev, utilizing Soviet-Kuwaiti relations as a model, sought to establish ties with the other conservative sheikhdoms of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Oman and the United Arab Emirates established diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1985, and Qatar followed suit in 1988. Saudi Arabia, however, while intensifying its diplomatic interactions with the USSR, resisted Moscow's efforts to establish full diplomatic relations, as did Bahrain. Although the Saudi leaders were positively influenced by Gorbachev's February 1988 announcement that he was pulling Soviet troops out of Afghanistan (an action completed in January 1989), the Saudis and other Arabs remained suspicious of the USSR because of its behavior in the latter stages of the Iran-Iraq war when, in clearly tilting toward Iran, Moscow seemed to be following the "old,"

[2]For an analysis of the change in Soviet-Egyptian relations, see Robert O. Freedman, *Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the Invasion of Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 278–79 and 299–301.

[3]The sharp improvement in Soviet-Israeli relations is discussed in Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet-Israeli Relations Under Gorbachev*, New York, Praeger, 1991.

[4]For an examination of the deterioration in the Soviet-Syrian relationship, see Freedman, *Moscow and the Middle East*, op. cit.

[5]Ibid., pp. 293–94.

[6]Ibid., pp. 302–04.

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not the "new" thinking in Soviet foreign policy.

Indeed, despite all the Soviet rhetoric about "new thinking" and "balance of interests" in addressing Third World problems, there was far more continuity than change in Soviet policy when one compares Gorbachev's policy toward Iran with that of his predecessors Leonid Brezhnev, Yuriy Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko.[7] All four Soviet leaders seesawed between Iran and Iraq: Brezhnev first tilted to Iran from 1980 to 1982, and then he and his successors Andropov and Chernenko tilted back to Iraq from 1982 to 1985; Gorbachev was to tilt to Iran in 1986, back to Iraq in the first six months of 1987, and then back to Iran again. In addition, like his predecessors, Gorbachev tried—and failed—to orchestrate an end to the Iran-Iraq war, a conflict that caused numerous problems for Soviet strategy in the Middle East by dividing the Arab world and enhancing the US political/military position in the Gulf. The ceasefire that ended the war in August 1988 was due to Iranian war-weariness and defeats in battle, not to Soviet diplomacy, although the weaponry supplied to Iraq by the USSR did play a role in the Iranian decision to accept the ceasefire.

To be sure, Gorbachev demonstrated more diplomatic flexibility than his predecessors in dealing with Iran. This flexibility, however, did not always work to Soviet advantage. For example, when Iran made a series of gestures to the USSR in 1986, such as agreeing to the reestablishment of direct flights between Moscow and Tehran, Moscow eagerly reciprocated, only to find out that Iran had exploited the Soviet drive for influence to mount major offensives against Iraq. Similarly, other Soviet initiatives backfired. Moscow sought to exploit the "Irangate" crisis (the revelation of secret US efforts to trade arms to Iran for American hostages) by denouncing Iran and championing the Arabs; it went so far as to agree to charter three Kuwaiti tankers to combat Iranian efforts to stop shipping in the Gulf. However, once the US moved to redeem itself for Irangate by reflagging 11 Kuwaiti tankers and by building up its naval armada in the Gulf, Moscow switched positions again, in an attempt to exploit the rise in US-Iranian tension to enhance its own position in Tehran. Gorbachev's peace initiative of July 3, 1987, which was marked by anti-American propaganda, and his efforts to delay the imposition of UN sanctions against Iran (after agreeing to UN Security Council Resolution 598) clearly reflected the pro-Iranian tilt in Soviet policy.

This policy alienated the Arab states of the Gulf, while initially winning the Soviet Union very little new influence in Iran. Indeed, when, in March 1988, the Iranian leadership blamed Moscow for supplying Iraq with the missiles it used to bombard Tehran, relations between the Soviet Union and Iran fell to their lowest point in the Gorbachev era. Soviet-Iranian relations were to improve, however, once the war came to an end and Moscow pulled its troops out of Afghanistan; they improved further following the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni in 1989. In June 1989, the two countries signed a major economic, political, and military agreement. Two years later, Moscow was supplying Iran with highly sophisticated MiG–29 aircraft.[8] The improvement of ties benefited both countries. For Iran, the USSR was a customer for its oil and natural gas exports as well as for

On June 22, 1989, Iranian leader Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sign a Long-Term Program of Trade and Economic Cooperation between the USSR and the Islamic Republic of Iran and a Declaration on the Principles of Relations and Friendly Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Iran.

—TASS from SOVFOTO.

[7]Soviet policy toward Iran under Gorbachev is discussed in Robert O. Freedman, "Gorbachev, Iran, and the Iran-Iraq War," in Nikki R. Keddie and Mark J. Gasiorowski, Eds., *Neither East Nor West: Iran, the Soviet Union and the United States*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 114–41. For a more positive view of Soviet policy during the Iran-Iraq war, see Gary Sick, "Slouching Toward Settlement: The Internationalization of the Iran-Iraq War, 1987–1988," in ibid., pp. 219–45.

[8](Fn. follows on p. 4.)

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its consumer goods. Second, the USSR had become Iran's only source for highly sophisticated combat aircraft. Finally, the USSR, even in its weakened economic and political state (a situation that, paradoxically, improved Soviet-Iranian relations by making Moscow less of a threat to Tehran), was regarded in Tehran as a political check against the United States—an important factor as Iranian-American relations remained strained, despite the rise to power of the pragmatic Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

For its part, Moscow valued Iran as a source of oil and natural gas and as a potential calming influence on the increasingly restive Muslims in the USSR, particularly the Shi'ites in Azerbaijan.[9] In addition, Moscow hoped Iran would use its influence with the Afghan rebels to help free Soviet prisoners of war. Finally, the Soviet Union felt that a close relationship with Iran would enhance the Soviet political position in the Persian Gulf, which, because of its oil reserves, was the most critical area in the Third World.

As Soviet-Iranian relations improved, Moscow's relationship with Iraq remained "businesslike" if not particularly cordial. The once-close Soviet-Iraqi relationship had waned in the late 1970's, and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Iran in 1980 caused serious problems for Soviet diplomacy by leading to a sharp improvement of the political/military position of the United States in the Persian Gulf. Although Moscow, which had cut off arms sales to Iraq at the start of the war, resumed such sales in 1982, its tilt to Iran in the latter stages of the war angered Baghdad, and by the time the war came to an end, Soviet influence in Iraq was clearly limited. Nonetheless, there remained major areas of mutual interest. Iraq depended primarily on Soviet military equipment, for which it paid either oil (which the USSR then sold abroad)[10] or hard currency. In addition, at the time Iraq invaded Kuwait, there were some 7,830 Soviet economic and military advisers working in Iraq in jobs that paid hard currency.[11]

In sum, on the eve of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Moscow's position in the Gulf can be said to have been far better than it was when Gorbachev took power in March 1985. Three more small Gulf sheikhdoms had established diplomatic relations with the USSR, Soviet relations with Kuwait had been improved by Moscow's chartering of Kuwaiti tankers, Soviet-Iranian relations had improved considerably, Moscow and Saudi Arabia had begun to interact diplomatically, and Soviet-Iraqi relations, while not particularly cordial, remained extensive.

Impact of the Iraqi Invasion

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, about which Baghdad reportedly failed to give Moscow advance notice, despite explicit provisions in the 1972 Soviet-Iraqi treaty requiring such notice,[12] posed a number of problems for Moscow. First, the invasion was a clear-cut case of aggression and a major violation of the new world order that Gorbachev was promoting. In addition, once the United States committed itself to Saudi Arabia's defense and began to build up its military forces in the desert kingdom, Moscow had to decide whether or not to support Washington actively, in order to preserve the momentum of superpower cooperation and continue to benefit from its improved relationship with the US. Then, there were issues of Arab politics. Egypt and Syria denounced the Iraqi invasion and pledged support to Saudi Arabia, as did the other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Jordan, newly-unified Yemen, the Sudan, and PLO leader Yasser Arafat sided with Saddam Hussein, while the North African states, except for Morocco (which backed Saudi Arabia), adopted a more neutral position. The question for Moscow was whether it should continue the Gorbachev policy of improving ties with the conservative Gulf regimes, many of whom had money that could be loaned to the USSR (as Kuwait had already done).[13] By backing the new Saudi-Syrian-Egyptian axis, which seemed likely to dominate the Arab world if Iraq was defeated, Moscow could prevent the US from becoming the sole superpower guarantor of the region.

A related consideration for Moscow was the status of Kuwait, with which the Soviet Union had established diplomatic relations in 1964 and to which it also had sold military equipment. Moscow had long held out Ku-

[8]Moscow Radio Peace and Progress, broadcasting to Iran in Persian on December 24, 1990, discussed the sale of MiG–29's in the larger context of Soviet-Iranian relations. Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Dec. 26, 1990, pp. 6–7. TASS had officially announced Iran's commissioning of a squadron of MiG–29's on October 8, 1990.

[9]During unrest on the border between Soviet Azerbaijan and Iran in January 1990, Rafsanjani was, in fact, a calming influence in the face of attempts by Islamic hard-liners in Tehran to exploit the crisis.

[10]According to testimony given before the USSR Supreme Soviet's International Affairs Committee on August 30, 1990, by Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov, Moscow reexported Iraqi oil to India, Bulgaria, Romania, and "other countries." Reported by TASS, Aug. 30, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 31, 1990, p. 10.

[11]TASS, Dec. 28, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 28, 1990, p. 9. According to *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Mar. 1, 1990, Iraq had accumulated a debt of 3.79 billion rubles to the USSR by November 1989.

[12]Yevgeniy Primakov interview, *Time* (New York), Mar. 4, 1991, p. 42.

[13]In May 1990, Kuwait had agreed to give Moscow a two-stage US$1 billion loan. See *Izvestiya*, Dec. 24, 1990, citing the Kuwaiti ambassador to the USSR.

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On July 9, 1984, Sheikh Salim al-Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah, minister of defense of Kuwait, is greeted by Chief of the Soviet General Staff Nikolay Ogarkov.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

wait as the model of a small Gulf state that enjoyed good relations with both superpowers, and had urged the other Gulf sheikhdoms to follow the Kuwaiti example of looking to both superpowers for support vis-à-vis powerful regional neighbors.[14] If Moscow now failed to oppose Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, it imperiled its expanding ties with the Gulf sheikhdoms. Conversely, an activist Soviet policy aimed at getting Iraq out of Kuwait might well be rewarded by a Saudi decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with the USSR.

Yet, the Iraqi connection was not negligible or happily dispensed with. Iraq paid hard currency for Soviet arms and for the thousands of Soviet advisers working in such areas as oil exploration and drilling, grain-elevator construction, and hydro-electric projects.[15] Between 200 and 1,000 of the 7,830 Soviet advisers were what Moscow called "military specialists";[16] indeed, given Soviet cutbacks around the world, Iraq was one of the few places left where such advisers could serve under relatively good conditions.[17] Moreover, in the view of the "old thinkers," who appeared to grow more influential in Moscow in the period from August 1990 to February 1991, Saddam Hussein was "standing up to the imperialists who wanted to dominate Middle East oil and who were building a major military position near the southern border of the USSR, just as Moscow was pulling out of Eastern Europe, thus decisively altering the balance of power against the USSR." Included in this group were hard-liners such as the *Soyuz* faction in the USSR Supreme Soviet, senior army officers, and officials of the Communist party.[18] In addition, some Soviet specialists on the Middle East argued that Iraq might emerge from the confrontation with enhanced prestige in the Arab world due to its linkage of its actions in Kuwait to the Palestinian cause, and that it was thus not in Moscow's interest to oppose Iraq.[19]

Three additional factors permeated Soviet thinking about how to react to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The first was what might be termed the "Afghanistan Syndrome." Shared by liberals and hard-liners alike, this was an aversion to sending any Soviet soldiers abroad to fight, lest they get mired down in a quagmire like the decade-long struggle in Afghanistan. A second consideration was the economic crisis that was gripping the USSR. Given Moscow's increasingly serious economic problems, with a shortage of food and goods in Soviet stores, there was little inclination to expend resources on a major commitment of Soviet troops to an anti-Iraqi war. Finally, there was the Muslim issue.

[14]See Freedman, *Moscow and the Middle East*, op. cit.

[15]Interview with Konstantin Katushev, Soviet Minister of Foreign Economic Relations, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Aug. 26, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 27, 1990, p. 27.

[16]Most Soviet officials, including Gorbachev, cited the lower figure. In an interview in the Aug. 16, 1990, *Izvestiya*, Lt. Gen. V. Nikityuk, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff, differentiated between "specialists" who "give assistance in mastering and operating military hardware supplied under contract" and "advisers" who "are called upon to resolve questions of building the armed forces." Trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 20, 1990, pp. 17–19. Interviews by the author with Soviet scholars and government officials in Moscow and Washington, however, elicited the higher figure. One of the points made by Nikityuk was that as a result of the work of the Soviet miliary advisers, the USSR had obtained "considerable amounts of foreign currency."

[17]Interview, Moscow, October 1990. Such service enabled Soviet specialists to accumulate hard currency for the purchase of cars, VCR's, and other commodities hard to get in the USSR.

[18]*Krasnaya Zvezda*, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, and *Pravda* reflected their position. By contrast, *Moscow News* and *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* reflected liberal viewpoints, calling for the USSR to help the international community punish Saddam Hussein. *Izvestiya*, the government newspaper, took a middle position in this debate, but many of its commentators, especially Aleksandr Bovin, supported the liberal position. For an analysis of the debate in the Supreme Soviet on Soviet intentions in the conflict, see Suzanne Crow, "Legislative Considerations and the Gulf Crisis," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Dec. 14, 1990, pp. 2–3.

[19]See, e.g, *Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 17, 1990.

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Although there were Muslims on both sides of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict, both Soviet governmental officials and academics feared a very negative reaction by the increasingly restive Muslims of Soviet Central Asia and Azerbaijan if Soviet soldiers were seen killing Muslims in Iraq.[20]

Moscow's "Minimax" Strategy

Given all these considerations—some of them mutually contradictory—Gorbachev developed what might be called a "minimax" strategy in the period from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, to the initiation of military action by the Allied coalition on January 16, 1991 (by US calendar—January 17, 1991, in the Middle East). This involved doing the minimum necessary to preserve US-Soviet relations and foster the development of Soviet ties with the GCC states, and with Egypt and Syria, while at the same time maximizing the amount of influence Moscow could retain in Iraq. The components of the strategy included supporting the United States on all 12 UN Security Council resolutions condemning Iraq, denouncing Iraq's seizure of Kuwait and its use of Western specialists as hostages, imposing an arms and economic embargo against Iraq, and supporting the ousted regime of Emir Jabir al-Ahmad al Jabir al-Sabah as the legitimate government of Kuwait. On the other hand, Moscow also strongly urged a peaceful settlement of the conflict, with the United Nations and the Arab world taking a leading role in the peace effort, and it consistently delayed action on UN resolutions authorizing the use of force against Iraq. In addition, Moscow refused to commit any of its own forces, even a symbolic hospital ship, to the anti-Iraqi coalition. Moscow also did not immediately move to withdraw its specialists, especially its military specialists, from Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait although Moscow was soon faced with the unpleasant possibility that its advisers would become hostages.

Following the Iraqi invasion, the Soviet government issued a statement on August 2 calling for the "urgent and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwaiti territory" and the full restoration of "the sovereignty, national independence, and territorial integrity of Kuwait"[21] and announced the suspension of the supply of military equipment to Iraq.[22] Moscow also joined the United States in approving UN Security Council Resolution 660 the same day, which demanded the unconditional and immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.[23] Soviet-American cooperation against the invasion was further underlined on August 3, when US Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze, meeting at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport, issued a joint statement condemning Iraq's "flagrant aggression" and calling on the world community to "take practical steps to respond to it," including "suspension of all weapons shipments to Iraq."[24] This joint Soviet-American statement, which an *Izvestiya* correspondent noted had shown that "the USSR and the United States have acted as allies in the international arena for the first time since World War II,"[25] was followed on August 6 by the adoption of UN Resolution 661, which imposed a trade and financial embargo on Iraq and occupied Kuwait, and called for the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.[26]

Neither the UN Security Council vote on sanctions nor the decision by the US the same day to deploy US troops to defend Saudi Arabia had any effect on Iraq, which on August 8, formally annexed Kuwait. This, in turn, led to another UN Security Council Resolution (No. 662), on August 9, declaring the annexation "null and void."[27] As tensions rose, the Arab League held a meeting in Cairo, where the majority, led by Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, voted to send troops to Saudi Arabia. A defiant Iraq responded to these moves against it by the world community by offering to link Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Saddam Hussein also moved to protect his flank by agreeing to make peace with Iran on Iranian terms (pulling out of occupied Iranian territory, returning Iranian prisoners of war, and accepting the mid-point of the Shatt al-Arab waterway as the border between Iraq and Iran). Finally, he moved to bring pressure on the countries imposing sanctions by stating that foreign citizens

[20]Interviews, Moscow, October 1990.

[21]TASS, Aug. 2, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 3, 1990, p. 23.

[22]TASS, Aug. 2, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 3, 1990, p. 24. One puzzle, still unanswered—related to the question of whether or not Moscow fully stopped sending military equipment to Iraq—is the case of the Soviet supply ship *Dmitriy Furmanov*, which was intercepted on its way to Jordan with military equipment that did not fit the Jordan table of organization and equipment and could have been used by Iraq. Given the fact that Jordan was a major transshipment point to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, there was suspicion that Moscow was secretly supplying Iraq. At this point, it is not clear whether it was a Soviet governmental effort to strengthen ties with Iraq, an independent move by the Soviet military (this was the view of Viktor Levin, speaking on Moscow TV on January 13, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 16, 1991, pp. 13–14), or an attempt by several Soviet officials to make some quick money. A Soviet colleague who specializes on the Middle East indicated to the author that it could have been a bureaucratic blunder.

[23]*The Washington Post*, Feb. 23, 1991, Summary of UN Resolutions on the Gulf Crisis (hereafter *Washington Post Summary*).

[24]*Izvestiya*, Aug. 5, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 8, 1990, p. 18.

[25]Ibid.

[26]*Washington Post Summary*.

[27]Ibid.

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in Iraq (initially this did not include Soviet citizens) would not be allowed to leave until the crisis ended, thus, in effect, making them hostages.

As these events unfolded, Moscow began to put some distance between itself and Washington regarding the crisis. On August 10, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement that criticized the US military buildup as well as Iraq's formal "annexation" of Kuwait as contributing to "an escalation of confrontation and a whipping up of passions . . . ."[28] Moscow called for "extinguishing the conflagration as quickly as possible, restoring the situation that existed before August 2, and drawing the parties involved into a political dialogue aimed at a peaceful settlement of disputed questions." The statement revealed that there had been an exchange of messages between the presidents of the USSR and Iraq to this end, and expressed dismay at the decision of Iraq, "a country to which we are linked by long-standing friendly relations," to annex Kuwait. Most striking in the statement was Moscow's emphasis on the United Nations and an apparent willingness to participate in actions decided by a revived UN Security Council Military Staff Committee (an idea to which Shevardnadze returned in his speech to the UN in late September).

As Iraq continued to defy the UN Security Council, the United States began to urge military action to enforce the sanctions through a naval blockade. Shevardnadze sought to delay such a move, urging the Arabs to take united action to foster a settlement, and calling for collective action through the United Nations Security Council as the proper procedure to settle the crisis.[29] In emphasizing the use of the UN, Moscow sought to slow the US move to war and enhance the Soviet position as a key member of the UN Security Council. Although the USSR joined together with the other members of the Security Council on August 18 to pass Resolution 664 demanding the immediate release of foreigners from Iraq and Kuwait,[30] it also welcomed Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Saddam Hammadi to Moscow for "consultations." Upon Hammadi's arrival, Soviet foreign ministry spokesman Yuri Gremitskikh firmly declared that Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait was a necessary element of any political settlement of the crisis in the region."[31] For his part, Shevardnadze claimed to find elements meriting "serious attention" in Saddam Hussein's linkage plan, which had been strongly rejected by the United States. The plan had involved the release of hostages in return for the withdrawal of US forces from Saudi Arabia and an end to the economic embargo against Iraq.[32]

One of Hammadi's goals was apparently to persuade Moscow to veto a pending Security Council resolution that called for enforcing economic sanctions through military action.[33] But when Saddam Hussein ignored an "urgent message" from Gorbachev exhorting the Iraqi leader to withdraw from Kuwait before the UN Security Council took "appropriate additional measures,"[34] the USSR, on August 25, voted along with the United States in support of UN Resolution 665, which called on UN members with ships in the region to enforce the sanctions by inspecting and verifying cargoes and destinations.[35]

There was further evidence of US-Soviet cooperation during this critical period. On August 22, TASS reported that a Soviet defense attaché in the United States by the name of Yakovlev had visited the Pentagon and "in response to the request of the US side, he gave some information about the USSR's cooperation with Iraq along military lines."[36] For his part, US President George Bush expressed pleasure at what he called "superb cooperation" on the part of the Soviets."[37]

Despite these signs of cooperation, it was clear as the time for the September Bush-Gorbachev summit in Helsinki approached that there were differences of opinion between the two superpowers. From the American point of view, the continued presence of Soviet advisers in Iraq, both civilian and military, was a violation of the spirit, if not the letter of the UN sanctions—a view, incidentally, that was shared by a number of reformers within the USSR.[38] In addition, Moscow's unwillingness to provide troops to the anti-Iraqi coalition or order its ships to participate in the naval blockade raised questions in the United States about the depth of the Soviet opposition to Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. Finally, Moscow's sympathetic view of Iraq's "linkage" proposal was an irritant in US-USSR relations.

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[28]*Izvestiya*, Aug. 10, 1991, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter, *CDSP*), Sept. 12, 1990, p. 5.

[29]TASS, Aug. 17, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 17, 1990, p. 18.

[30]*Washington Post Summary*.

[31]TASS, Aug. 20, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 21, 1990, p. 3.

[32]*Pravda*, Aug. 21, 1990. Moscow Radio, broadcasting in English on August 22, 1990, emphasized that the talks were not being undertaken to "appease the aggressor," but to "avoid a large-scale military collision with unpredictable consequences." See *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 23, 1990, p. 25.

[33]This was the view of Commentator M. Yusin in an article in *Izvestiya*, Aug. 23, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 23, 1990, pp. 13–15.

[34]*Izvestiya*, Aug. 24, 1990.

[35]*Washington Post Summary*.

[36]TASS, Aug. 22, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 23, 1990, p. 25.

[37]TASS, Aug. 23, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 23, 1990, pp. 18–19.

[38]Aleksandr Bovin, writing in *Izvestiya*, Sept. 5, 1990, noted that "condemning Iraq as an aggressor, while at the same time leaving in Iraq 193 officers who can assist in handling Soviet weapons and equipment is dubious logic." Trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 6, 1990, p. 23.

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For its part, Moscow was unhappy with what it saw as Bush's overeagerness to use force against Iraq, and a number of Soviet conservatives raised questions about the ultimate purpose of the massive US military buildup in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, Warsaw Pact Chief of Staff General Vladimir Lobov criticized the buildup as "drastically changing the strategic balance in the region," and since Iraq was only "200 kilometers from the borders of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan," he warned that the US would gain "an opportunity to exert pressure on events in this region."[39]

These issues were raised at the Helsinki summit. Bush, as he did throughout the crisis, sought both to allay Soviet concerns and to indicate publicly that he considered Moscow, whatever its internal political, economic, and nationality problems, a superpower worthy of respect. In their joint statement, Bush agreed to put the emphasis on a peaceful resolution of the crisis, while Gorbachev agreed to consider the possibility of "additional steps consistent with the UN charter," should the peaceful approach fail.[40] Bush also made a gesture toward the linkage that Saddam Hussein was demanding (and which Moscow was now tacitly supporting in its mediation efforts) by agreeing that once the Iraqi forces had withdrawn from Kuwait, it was essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Finally, Bush repeated in a joint news conference that he had made it clear to Gorbachev that the US had no intention of keeping American troops in the area "a day longer than is required."[41]

Although pleased at Bush's suggestion that Soviet cooperation in the crisis might incline the US President to recommend "as close cooperation in the economic field as possible," Gorbachev denied any inference that the Soviet Union could be "bought for dollars." Rather, he said, "I think that we are acting in a critical situation and are working to find a solution that would be satisfactory and, most important, would safeguard us all from an explosion. In this situation, cooperation —new cooperation in new forms—is becoming a normal element . . . ." The Soviet President also rejected Bush's appeal for withdrawal of Soviet advisers:

We are in fact talking not about advisers, but about specialists working under contract. Their number is being reduced. Whereas at the beginning of the conflict there were, I think, 196 of them, now there are about 150. And, as a matter of fact, the Iraq leadership looks at this question from the standpoint that if they have finished their business—this is normal contract work, even though it involves weapons—they leave Iraq. And this process is under way. So I don't think there's a problem there.[42]

Saudi Arabian foreign minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal Al Saud and Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze meet on September 17, 1990, in the Kremlin, as the two states establish formal diplomatic relations.

—Novosti from Sovfoto.

At this point, Moscow still clearly saw its military and economic advisers as important links of influence to Iraq—and, to a lesser degree, important sources of hard currency offsetting other economic losses occasioned by the crisis.[43]

On balance, however, Soviet cooperation was suf-

[39]TASS, Aug. 30, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 31, 1990, p. 12.

[40]For the text of the joint declaration, see *Izvestiya*, Sept. 10, 1990, trans. in *CDSP*, Oct. 17, 1990, p. 13.

[41]*Izvestiya*, Sept. 11, 1990, trans. in *CDSP*, Oct. 17, 1990, pp. 14–15.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Soviet officials differed among themselves as to the degree of the economic loss. Soviet deputy foreign minister Belonogov, speaking to the International Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet on August 30, 1990, said: "Soviet compliance with the economic sanctions would cost the USSR over $800 million: $520 million as a result of oil not supplied by Iraq for reexport to India, Bulgaria, Romania, and other countries, and $290 million in the form of goods and services not supplied to the USSR. [In addition, we will lose] a total of $115 million worth of goods, and financial resources from Kuwait of $700 million." TASS, Aug. 30, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 31, 1990, p. 10. Because of declining oil production, Moscow could not take real advantage of the temporary increase in world oil prices caused by the war, but Kuwait had sufficient financial resources not under Iraqi control that it could go ahead with its promised loan of $1 billion.

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ficiently strong in the first month of the crisis to prompt President Bush to reward Moscow economically, as well as sufficiently strong for Saudi Arabia to reward it politically—by establishing full diplomatic relations on September 17.[44] Eleven days later, Bahrain, home to a US military base and the last of the GCC members not to have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, followed suit.[45]

Even though the Soviets had refused to contribute even a token force to the coalition aligned against Iraq, there were hints of a more forthcoming posture in Shevardnadze's major address to the UN General Assembly at the end of September. The Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs condemned Iraq for a "terrorist act . . . against the emerging new world order."[46] He then called for activation of the UN Security Council's Military Staff Committee and suggested that the USSR was prepared to commit its own troop contingent to the Council. This position seemed aimed at preventing the United States from "going it alone" before all possible peaceful efforts to solve the crisis had been undertaken. Shevardnadze stated:

If the Military Staff Committee were operating properly, if the Council had concluded appropriate agreements with the permanent members, and if other organizational questions of countering threats to peace had been resolved, there would be no need today for certain states to be taking unilateral actions.

Shevardnadze's suggestion that the USSR might commit its own troops was widely criticized in the Soviet Union.[47] Iraq's response to US-Soviet cooperation on the Gulf crisis was to turn its Soviet advisers into hostages. They were harassed, and one person was shot. Concern over the hostage issue appears to have been one of the central reasons why Gorbachev dispatched his close adviser Yevgeniy Primakov to Iraq in mid-October. Accompanying Primakov was Igor' Belousev, the head of the Soviet interdepartmental task force on Soviet workers in Iraq, which had been formed in mid-August.[48] The pressure on Moscow was increased by the Iraqi threat that if the USSR gave the US any information on Iraq's military potential during the impending visit by US Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to Moscow, then Iraq would impede the return of the Soviet advisers.[49] According to Primakov's version of the trip, Saddam, a long-time acquaintance of Primakov, agreed to the release of only 1,500 of the specialists.[50] A version of the visit published in *Rabochaya Tribuna* also noted that the Iraqis demanded the payment of huge "forfeit fees" if advisers left before fulfilling the terms of their contracts.[51]

A second reason for Primakov's visit was to urge Iraq to moderate its position on the Gulf crisis. Saddam Hussein's hints that he might be willing to settle for the islands of Bubyan and Warbah (which block Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf) and the southern section of the Rumelia oil field (over which Iraq and Kuwait had been in dispute) reportedly led Primakov to be cautiously optimistic about his visit,[52] although US Secretary of State Baker opposed any deal that might be seen as "rewarding aggression."[53] Nothing concrete came from Primakov's trip to Iraq or from his follow-up trip several weeks later, despite Gorbachev's suggestions while on a visit to France that Saddam Hussein might be reassessing Iraq's position.[54]

The crisis continued to get worse throughout the fall. Moscow did, however, seek to reassure Iraq on one point—the issue of supplying information about Iraqi military capabilities to the US. Just after the completion of Primakov's first visit to Iraq, foreign ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told journalists that Moscow had "no intention of sharing military information, since this would violate existing agreements with Third World countries that stipulated that certain data would be kept

[44] *Izvestiya*, Sept. 19, 1990, trans. in *CSDP*, Oct. 24, 1990, p. 20. Technically, the two countries were restoring relations that had been broken off in the 1930's. For a historical survey of Soviet-Saudi ties in the 1930's and the reason for their rupture, see Igor' Belyayev's article in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Sept. 26, 1990.

[45] *Izvestiya*, Sept. 30, 1990.

[46] Ibid., Sept. 26, 1990, trans. in *CDSP*, Oct. 31, 1990, pp. 15–16.

[47] *Izvestiya* of Oct. 2, 1990, repeated Shevardnadze's statement on the US television program, "Meet the Press" that "the USSR will unconditionally fulfill the UN decision even if it involves the need to use Soviet military forces" (trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 2, 1990, pp. 12–13). A poll taken by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion in the USSR revealed that the Soviet public opposed by 64 percent to 15 percent any decision to send Soviet naval ships to the Gulf to participate in the blockade of Iraq. Basically, conservatives opposed any action against Saddam Hussein's Iraq because it was a treaty ally and a "fighter against imperialism," while reformers like Bovin saw the USSR as still too enmeshed in its Afghanistan Syndrome to send troops (Moscow TV, Oct. 6, 1990). Some Soviet commentators like Belyayev and newspapers like *Moscow News* favored sending Soviet forces to the Gulf to aid the war effort. For a discussion about the debate on this issue in the International Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet, see *New Times* (Moscow), No. 38, 1990, pp. 5–6.

[48] See Primakov interview, loc. cit. By early October, the status of Soviet advisers in Iraq had become an issue in the Soviet press. See the article by A. Levchenko and L. Negra, *Izvestiya*, Oct. 4, 1990, trans. in *CDSP*, Nov. 7, 1990, pp. 18–19; and *Argumenty i Fakty* (Moscow), No. 39, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 2, 1990, p. 12. Reportedly, some 400 Soviet specialists appealed to their government for help in getting out of Iraq.

[49] *Izvestiya*, Oct. 13, 1990.

[50] Primakov interview, loc. cit.

[51] Novosti report, *Rabochaya Tribuna* (Moscow), Oct. 14, 1990, trans. in *CDSP*, Nov. 14, 1990, pp. 11–12.

[52] Ibid.

[53] See the report by Thomas Friedman, *The New York Times*, Oct. 17, 1990.

[54] *Izvestiya*, Oct. 31, 1990.

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secret."[55] (So much for the reported initiative of Soviet attaché Yakovlev in mid-August!)

The killing of 17 Arabs by Israeli police in an incident on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem on October 8 provided Moscow with an opportunity to demonstrate to Iraq that it did not have a double standard in treating Middle Eastern events. An official Soviet foreign ministry statement blasted Israel:

Firmly denouncing this action by Israeli authorities, the Soviet Union believes that the UN Security Council should display the same unanimity and consistency in the approach to the situation in the occupied territories as was effectively demonstrated by the Security Council with respect to Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.

We support the idea of sending, as an initial step, a special UN mission to investigate the incident.[56]

Iraq, together with the PLO, sought to use the Temple Mount killings and Israel's refusal to admit a UN investigatory mission as a means of diverting attention away from the annexation of Kuwait and splitting off the Arab states from the anti-Iraqi coalition. The issue remained an active one in the United Nations for the next two months, with the US surprising the pro-Iraqi camp by siding with the critics of Israel, even though it sought to moderate the language of the UN condemnations.

On November 8, with Iraq still showing no real inclination to leave Kuwait, President Bush announced he was doubling the size of the American force in Saudi Arabia, giving it, for the first time, an offensive capability against Iraq.[57] Although Gorbachev may have hoped that the increase in the size of the American troop deployment would convince Saddam Hussein to withdraw his forces from Kuwait, he also realized that the US was preparing for war. Soon after the deployment decision, the United States began to press for a formal UN deadline for Iraq to leave Kuwait.[58]

Moscow and the Use of Force

Meanwhile, by early November, divisions in the Soviet government over the use of force became more visible. While Shevardnadze was acknowledging that "a situation may emerge that effectively would require such a move,"[59] Primakov was arguing in effect that it was the fear of attack and continued sanctions that was preventing Saddam from withdrawing.[60] A week later, speaking in New York, Primakov argued in favor of a "face-saving package" for Saddam that would link a resolution of the Gulf crisis to an overall Middle East settlement, including a resolution of the Palestinian problem. Primakov also called for a new security structure in the Middle East designed to stabilize the region, a structure that would guarantee the safety of both Israel and its Arab neighbors.[61]

While Secretary of State Baker toured Europe seeking support for a UN use-of-force resolution,[62] Moscow sent two diplomatic missions, each headed by a deputy foreign minister, to consult with Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Morocco, Tunisia, the PLO, Libya, and Algeria about the possibility of an Arab diplomatic solution to the Gulf crisis. The USSR also sent a diplomatic mission to Iran. For its part, Iran, which shared the Soviet goal of removing US forces from the Persian Gulf once the crisis was over, publicly stated its willingness to help the USSR get its advisers back home by offering them transit through Iran. Although the leader of one of the Soviet Middle East missions, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Petrovskiy, hailed a Moroccan proposal for an emergency Arab summit to deal with the crisis,[63] little came of the idea, as the Arab world remained badly split.

In mid-November, Gorbachev and Bush met in Paris at a gathering of the 34-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In a two-hour discussion, Gorbachev refused to give the US President assurances of Moscow's support on the UN vote seeking approval for the use of force against Iraq.[64] A meeting between Baker and Shevardnadze likewise failed to bring about an agreement, although Baker sought to put the best possible interpretation on the meeting. "Let me simply say that the United States and the Soviet Union have been united in their approach to this problem, beginning on the 3rd of August. We are united today. President Gorbachev and President Bush have both made it very clear that we intend to be united."[65] Bush himself counseled: "Be patient and all will be well."[66]

[55]Ibid., Oct. 16, 1990, trans. in *CDSP*, Nov. 21, 1990, p. 20.

[56]TASS, Oct. 9, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 9, 1990, p. 21. The Israeli police had fired on Arabs throwing stones at Jewish worshipers praying at the Wailing Wall just below the Temple Mount.

[57]For the text of Bush's announcement, which came after the 1990 US mid-term Congressional elections, see the *The New York Times*, Nov. 9, 1990.

[58]See the articles by Paul Lewis in ibid., Nov. 10 and 16, 1990.

[59]Cited by David Hoffman, *The Washington Post*, Nov. 9, 1990.

[60]Cited by Michael Dobbs, ibid.

[61]Cited by Paul Lewis, *The New York Times*, Nov. 16, 1990.

[62]See the article by R. W. Apple, ibid.

[63]*Izvestiya*, Nov. 22, 1990. The Moroccan proposal was made on November 11, 1990. See the report by Judith Miller, *The New York Times*, Nov. 12, 1990.

[64]See report by Andrew Rosenthal, *The New York Times*, Nov. 19, 1990.

[65]Cited by Andrew Rosenthal, ibid., Nov. 20, 1990.

[66]*The Washington Post*, Nov. 21, 1990.

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One of the reasons Gorbachev delayed voicing his support in Paris for a use-of-force resolution may have been his hope that Saddam Hussein, watching the buildup of pressure against him, might yet reconsider. Instead, Saddam sent his foreign minister Tariq Aziz to Moscow on November 26 for talks with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev in a final attempt to convince Moscow not to support the resolution.

But Soviet opinion was sharpening against Iraq even before Aziz arrived, because Iraq had reneged on the timetable for allowing Soviet advisers to leave Iraq. As Vitaliy Churkin, the new head of the Soviet foreign ministry's Information Directorate and an aide to Shevardnadze, warned on the day Aziz arrived:

If the Iraqi side does not immediately remove all the barriers it has artificially erected to block USSR citizens from returning home, and does not ensure their unimpeded departure from Iraq, then that will complicate still further the atmosphere of Soviet-Iraqi relations, and will compel us to adopt an even tougher position on the situation in the Persian Gulf. [67]

Aziz tried to attribute the delay in the departure of Soviet advisers to misunderstandings of a "bureaucratic nature."[68] But the meeting with Gorbachev turned out to be a "tough conversation," after which presidential spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko stated that the USSR would vote for the UN resolution establishing a "clear deadline" for the Iraqi pull-out from Kuwait and the release of hostages.[69] Gorbachev, in an interview broadcast in Arabic to the Middle East following Aziz's departure, blasted Iraq for trying to split the coalition and predicted that the resolution adopted at the UN Security Council session "will be, and I am confident of this, very harsh."[70]

Shevardnadze himself headed the Soviet delegation to the UN Security Council debate on the use-of-force resolution, which he praised as one manifesting "justice and a high measure of nobility."[71] The resolution, No. 678, authorized member-states cooperating with Kuwait to use "all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent resolutions to restore peace and security in the area after a pause of goodwill," which was to last until January 15, 1991.[72] The "goodwill pause" reflected a US concession (Washington had wanted a January 1, 1991, deadline), which Shevardnadze urged Iraq's Saddam to use to "rise above" any concern about saving face. A Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement issued four days later, following President Bush's offer of US-Iraqi talks, emphasized the possibilities for peace inherent in the "goodwill pause." It also praised Bush's offer of talks with Iraq as a "concrete embodiment of Soviet-American mutual understanding on the preferability of resolving the crisis by peaceful means."[73]

Moscow's continued emphasis on a political settlement to the Gulf crisis bore some tangible fruits. On December 6, after informing the USSR that all Soviet citizens could return to the USSR—although Moscow would have to pay for all uncompleted contracts[74]—the Iraqi government announced that all other foreign hostages would be set free. Gorbachev was also doubtless pleased by the November 30 announcement that the USSR would receive an additional US$3 billion in loans from the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The Kuwaiti ambassador was quick to deny that the loans were compensation for Moscow's stand on the Gulf crisis; they were, he said, designed "to help the Soviet people implement the *perestroyka* that was initiated by USSR President M. S. Gorbachev. . . ."[75]

Perhaps even more welcome to Gorbachev was President Bush's decisions on December 12 to waive the Jackson-Vanik amendment for six months (although the USSR had not yet passed its long-awaited emigration law) and to help the USSR meet its anticipated winter food shortages by approving up to US$1 billion in federally-guaranteed US loans to allow Moscow to buy food and other agricultural products. Like the Kuwaiti ambassador, Secretary of State Baker, together with Shevardnadze, denied that US economic concessions were intended as a "payback" for Moscow's cooperation on the Persian Gulf.[76]

In addition to authorizing economic credits, the US invited the USSR to send troops to participate in the multinational force in Saudi Arabia, even if in token numbers.[77] Given the fact that for decades a central

[67]TASS, Nov. 26, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 26, 1990, p. 14.

[68]Cited in *Pravda*, Nov. 27, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 27, 1990, p. 15.

[69]TASS, Nov. 27, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 27, 1990, p. 15.

[70]Moscow Radio in Arabic, Nov. 27, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 28, 1990, p. 17. Gorbachev's broadcast coincided with the visit of Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal to Moscow.

[71]For the text of the Shevardnadze UN speech, see TASS, Nov. 30, 1990, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 3, 1990, pp. 12–14.

[72]*The Washington Post*, Nov. 30, 1990.

[73]*Izvestiya*, Dec. 4, 1990, trans. in *CDSP*, Jan. 9, 1991, p. 17.

[74]*Izvestiya*, Dec. 5, 1990, citing a Reuters interview with an Iraqi leader who said "any Soviet specialist wishing to leave Iraq is free to depart our country at any time, beginning Wednesday. However, the Soviet side must take full responsibility for violation of the contracts that the Soviet specialists have signed." Trans. in *CDSP*, Jan. 9, 1991, p. 18.

[75]Cited in *Izvestiya*, Dec. 24, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 28, 1990, p. 10. See also Bill Keller, *The New York Times*, Dec. 1, 1990.

[76]Cited by Andrew Rosenthal, *The New York Times*, Dec. 13, 1990.

[77]See David Hoffman, *The Washington Post*, Dec. 11, 1990.

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objective of US policy in the Middle East had been to keep the USSR out of the region,[78] this invitation had to be gratifying to Moscow. However, as Shevardnadze pointed out, the sending of Soviet troops to the Gulf was a very sensitive issue domestically in the USSR. Moreover, Moscow's failure to send even a hospital ship seemed to underline its determination to maintain military neutrality if war broke out, in order to preserve its mediating position and the influence that went with it.

The likelihood of war soon seemed to increase. Iraq set a date for a visit of Baker to Baghdad so close to the UN withdrawal deadline that Bush put "on hold" the visit of Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz to Washington scheduled for December 14, claiming Saddam was not serious about negotiating.[79] The next day Iraq cancelled the Aziz visit to Washington, asserting that "Iraq alone" would set the date for the Baker visit.[80]

As US-Iraqi tensions escalated, Soviet-American relations were dealt a blow by Shevardnadze's sudden resignation on December 20. In his resignation speech, the Minister of Foreign Affairs warned of an approaching dictatorship in the USSR and complained about incessant criticism of his Gulf policy from right-wing elements in the Soviet government.[81] To allay concern that Soviet-American cooperation in the Gulf crisis would suffer with Shevardnadze's departure, Vitaliy Churkin, in a press conference after the resignation, stated:

We, the USSR Foreign Ministry, are deeply convinced that our foreign policy currently meets the country's and people's fundamental interests. This applies also to the Persian Gulf. We hope that the basic direction of the country's foreign policy will remain unchanged.[82]

Nonetheless, new strains between the two superpowers surfaced almost immediately, with Soviet KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov asserting that the US and other Western countries were trying to subvert the Soviet system under the guise of offering economic aid. His comment that bloodshed might be required to restore order to the Soviet Union further chilled relations.[83] (In mid-January things grew worse, as a bloody Soviet crackdown in Vilnius took the lives of 15 Lithuanians.)

Meanwhile, Belousev had led a Soviet delegation to Iraq in late December, which was able to make final arrangements for the withdrawal of Soviet advisers and the suspension of contracts while the Gulf crisis continued (at this point, with a possible war approaching, Saddam Hussein evidently felt he had to improve ties to Moscow). The Soviet delegation was, however, still unable to get any concessions on the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.[84] When a belatedly arranged meeting of Baker and Tariq Aziz in Switzerland in early January failed to produce any diplomatic progress and the US Congress subsequently voted in favor of granting Bush the right to use armed force against Iraq, the outbreak of war became almost inevitable once the UN deadline of January 15 passed.

By the time hostilities broke out, Moscow's "minimax" strategy had gained the Soviet Union expanded diplomatic recognition and considerable economic aid and, ultimately, protection for its citizens in Iraq, while allowing it to preserve its role as the only credible mediator between Iraq and the United States. Once the war erupted, Moscow played a mediating role to try to save both Iraq and the regime of Saddam Hussein from destruction.

Soviet Policy During the War

Moscow's actions during the six-week war in the Gulf in many ways reflected its prewar policy. At key junctures it cooperated with the US, but it also tried to mediate the conflict and preserve its position in Iraq. The key difference between the two periods was the escalation of anti-American rhetoric in the Soviet press, possibly a reflection of the increased influence of right-wing forces in Soviet society.

When the UN deadline expired and the last-minute visit of UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar to Baghdad failed to move Saddam, Churkin issued a statement condemning Iraq for its "stubborn refusal to take into consideration norms of international law and civilized contact, and the will of the international community voiced in 12 UN Security Council resolutions."[85] But, at the same time, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr Belonogov reassured Iraq that "the Soviet Union has no intention of taking part, even symbolically, in military action in the Gulf."[86] As if to emphasize this point, once the war began, Moscow withdrew its two warships from the Gulf. (To be sure, in what appeared to be a precautionary defensive move, it also

[78]See Freedman, *Moscow and the Middle East*, op. cit.
[79]See Thomas Friedman, *The New York Times*, Dec. 15, 1990.
[80]See Paul Taylor, *The Washington Post*, Dec. 16, 1990.
[81]For the text of Shevardnadze's resignation speech, see *The New York Times*, Dec. 21, 1990.
[82]*Izvestiya*, Dec. 22, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 24, 1990, p. 1.
[83]Cited in AP report, *The Washington Post*, Dec. 25, 1990.
[84]TASS, Dec. 29, 1990, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 31, 1990, p. 11.
[85]TASS, Jan. 15, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 16, 1991, p. 6.
[86]Cited in AFP report, *The Hong Kong Standard*, Jan. 17, 1991; and *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 22, 1991, p. 17.

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put its troops and air defense systems in its southern regions on limited alert.)[87]

When the fighting began with a massive US air strike against Iraqi military facilities in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq on January 16, Gorbachev himself, on Moscow Central TV, condemned Iraq, but also noted:

Having received a report about the decision that had been made by US Secretary of State Baker approximately one hour before the commencement of military hostilities, I immediately proposed to President Bush that additional steps be taken through direct contact with Saddam Hussein to achieve an immediate announcement by him of the withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait . . . . I once again emphasize that we have done everything possible to settle the conflict by nonmilitary means.[88]

When Iraq responded to the Allied attack by bombarding Israel with SCUD missiles, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs—worried about the implications of an expanded war, especially the dilemma the USSR would face if Syria switched sides and aided Iraq—condemned Iraq and urged Israel to show restraint.[89] And less than one week into the war, Churkin made public a January 18 appeal from Gorbachev to Iraq, offering to try to get the US to halt military action if Iraq announced the withdrawal of troops from Kuwait and complied with all appropriate UN Security Council resolutions. Churkin also suggested that in the process, the UN Security Council could guarantee Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity.[90]

Up to this point, Moscow had refrained from officially criticizing US policy in the Gulf crisis. (To be sure, right-wing newspapers like *Sovetskaya Rossiya* had begun condemning the US position on the Gulf well before the war broke out,[91] and once it erupted, both *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and, to a lesser extent, *Krasnaya Zvezda* became mouthpieces for Iraqi propaganda.) This posture changed, however, on January 22, when Gorbachev, in a press conference, warned of the "dangerous" tendency to further escalate the conflict which was going beyond the Security Council's mandate to liberate Kuwait.[92] The Soviet President was responding to the decision of US military commanders not to launch a ground assault to free Kuwait until Iraq's military infrastructure and its ability to resupply its troops in Kuwait had been gravely weakened. This entailed widespread bombing of Iraq and the "collateral damage" or civilian casualties inevitable in such military actions. The newly appointed Soviet foreign minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, on departing Moscow in late January for his first official visit to Washington, reiterated Gorbachev's position on this issue:

The Persian Gulf requires a very careful comparison of positions. ***On the whole we support the UN Security Council resolutions.*** *There are fears, however, that we are entering upon a second grave phase of the conflict, where, in addition to a resolution of the task stipulated by the Security Council resolutions—namely, the liberation of Kuwait—the fear is beginning to mount that Iraq is being subjected to very serious destruction, and there is a mounting danger for the country's peaceful population. Naturally, we are concerned about this. So, while adhering to the Security Council resolutions, we must at the same time show concern that the actions occurring in this zone do not go beyond the bounds stipulated in this resolution. Naturally, besides the Persian Gulf conflict itself,* ***it is necessary to take a look at the balance of forces in the Middle East*** *and think about the prospects for what will occur there. Thus, the task is very great.*[93]

Bessmertnykh's statement lacked his predecessor's enthusiasm for the UN Security Council resolutions, and his comment about the "balance of forces" seemed more of a reflection of the "old" than of the "new" thinking. In Washington, Bessmertnykh succeeded in convincing Baker to sign a joint statement that stressed that the US goal was the liberation of Kuwait and not the destruction of Iraq. The US Secretary of State also agreed to end military action against Iraq if Iraq made an unambiguous pledge to leave Kuwait and take specific steps leading to the complete fulfillment of the UN Security Council resolutions. Baker further agreed to link more closely than ever before the Gulf crisis to the Arab-Israeli conflict, angering Israel and its American supporters. The statement noted that after the war, "dealing with the causes of conflict, including

[87] *Asian Wall Street Journal* (Hong Kong), Jan. 18–19, 1991; and AFP citing the Soviet military command, Jan. 18, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 22, 1991, p. 17. See also the comments by Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev in an interview with *Neues Deutschland* as cited by Berlin ADN, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 22, 1991, pp. 16–17.

[88] Moscow Central Television, Jan. 17, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 17, 1991, pp. 9–10.

[89] TASS, Jan. 18, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 18, 1991, p. 5.

[90] TASS, Jan. 21, 1991, *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 22, 1991, p. 5.

[91] For example, on August 22, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* had asserted that all the United States wanted in sending troops to Saudi Arabia was to control the region's oil.

[92] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, Jan. 22, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 23, 1991, p. 4.

[93] Moscow Domestic Service, Jan. 26, 1991, trans. in, *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 28, 1991, p. 4. Emphasis added.

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From a telecast of Soviet envoy Yevgeniy Primakov's meeting with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in Baghdad on February 12, 1991.

—AP/Wide World.

the Arab-Israeli conflict, will be especially important."[94] Bessmertnykh hailed the joint statement with its emphasis on the Palestinian problem as "probably for the first time since 1976, two ministers [i.e., Soviet and American] have spoken jointly on the Middle East."[95] Despite agreement on these matters, the two countries postponed the planned February 1991 Bush-Gorbachev summit, possibly because of the Soviet crackdown in Lithuania.[96]

Meanwhile, barely two weeks after the beginning of the Gulf War, Soviet generals had begun to prophesy American defeat or a rising of other Arab countries against the "international force," should it win,[97] and Soviet diplomats were exploring with Iran Tehran's offer to mediate between the US and Iraq to prevent the war from getting out of control.[98] In this context, Secretary of State Baker, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 6, praised Iran's neutral position in the war, although he did not hold out any hope for Rafsanjani's mediation efforts. Baker outlined five "challenges" that would demand US attention in the postwar Middle East: Gulf security structures, in which, he intimated, the US would have a role to play; arms control; economic reconstruction; improved US energy conservation, and a reconciliation among the Arab states, Israel, and the Palestinians.[99]

At the same time, Gorbachev was moving to assert a Soviet role in the postwar Middle East. In a major statement on February 9 implicitly criticizing Iraq for both threatening the use of weapons of mass destruction and trying to draw Israel into the war, the Soviet President again called on Saddam Hussein to "display realism which would make it possible to take the path of a reliable and just peaceful settlement." Gorbachev emphasized that "the countries of the region should play a decisive role" in determining the postwar security structure of the region and that "Iraq should hold a worthy place in the postwar settlement." Gorbachev also announced that he was again sending Primakov to meet with the Iraqi leadership to try to bring about a peace settlement, because developments in the Gulf zone were "taking an ever more alarming and dramatic turn."[100]

Primakov's visit to Baghdad coincided with an intensification of the US bombing of Iraq. In describing the Hussein-Primakov talks, Baghdad criticized the USSR for giving cover to the "US and Allied crimes" against Iraq because Moscow supported UN Security Council Resolution 678, but it did assert that Iraq was "prepared to extend cooperation to the USSR and other nations and agencies in the interest of finding a peaceful, political, equitable, and honorable solution" to the Mid-

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[94]TASS, Jan. 30, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 30, 1991, pp. 9–10.

[95]Here Bessmertnykh erred in his chronology. He probably meant the joint US-Soviet statement on the Middle East of October 1, 1977. See Robert O. Freedman, *Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970*, New York, Praeger, 1982, pp. 308–09.

[96]See Don Oberdorfer, *The Washington Post*, Jan. 30, 1991. As reasons for the postponement, Bush cited the Gulf war and the still unfinished arms talks, but the shadow of Gorbachev's crackdown in the Baltic republics also appeared to be an important factor.

[97]In an interview in the liberal *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, the conservative editor of the *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, Major General Filatov (who had previously run excerpts from *Mein Kampf* and was preparing to publish the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* [an anti-Semitic forgery] in his journal), predicted that the war would end in a major US defeat, a second Vietnam "which will be somewhat worse for it than the first." He also stated that in the unlikely case that Iraq were to be defeated, other Arab countries would enter the war against the so-called "international force." The interview is translated in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 4, 1991, pp. 14–15. See also the article about Filatov by Bill Keller, *The New York Times/International Herald Tribune* (Paris), Jan. 8, 1991.

One week later, Major General N. Kostin, a department chief at the Soviet General Staff Academy, perhaps in an attempt to counterbalance criticism of the poor performance of Soviet weaponry in the hands of the Iraqis, and of the Soviet specialists who trained them, boldly asserted: "Iraqi units are manifestly superior to their enemies in desert warfare skills. They hold defensive positions that are well-equipped in the engineering respect, and it will not be easy to take them, even given air superiority. Soviet-made T–62 and T–72 tanks are better adapted for desert operations than the US M–1 Abrams." *Izvestiya*, Feb. 8, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 11, 1991, pp. 20–21. A similar evaluation was given by a Major General Bogdanov in *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Jan. 31, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 1, 1991, pp. 6–8.

[98]See the comments of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Belonogov in TASS, Feb. 5, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 5, 1991, p. 9.

[99]See David Hoffman, *The Washington Post*, Feb. 7, 1991; and Thomas Friedman, *The New York Times*, Feb. 7, 1991.

[100]TASS, Feb. 9, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 11, 1991, p. 18. Given the proximity of Iraq to the USSR, some Soviet citizens were voicing their concern about "fallout" from weapons of mass destruction.

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Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev receives Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz on February 22, 1991, to hear Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's reply to the Soviet Union's 11th-hour peace proposal, which sought to head off a ground offensive by Allied forces against Iraq.

—AP/Wide World.

dle East's central issues, including "the situation in the Gulf."[101] Although Iraq seemed in this statement to be clinging to its old linkage position, Primakov stated that he saw "glimmers of hope" as a result of his visit to Baghdad.[102]

On February 13, the US bombed a shelter in Baghdad that the US military command claimed was a military shelter but which turned out to have housed a number of Iraqi civilians, who became casualties. This incident threatened to inflame the Security Council discussion of the war that was set to begin the next day, and the US urged that the Council session be kept private so as to avoid the appearance of divisions in the Council. Although the USSR had the opportunity to embarrass the United States by pressing for an open session, Moscow, instead, again cooperated with Washington and voted with it to keep the session closed. Yuliy Vorontsov, the Soviet ambassador to the UN, stated that a public debate of the incident in the Security Council could be misinterpreted in Baghdad and thus complicate efforts by the USSR and other countries to bring about a peace settlement.[103]

"Plea-Bargaining" for Saddam

By mid-February, one month into the war, it appeared that Iraq had suffered so much destruction that Saddam Hussein began to search for a way out of the conflict. He turned to the Soviet Union in hopes it would help extract Iraq from the war with minimal political or diplomatic damage. On February 15, Iraq announced its peace plan for a pullout from Kuwait. However, the plan included so many conditions—including Allied payment of reparations to Iraq for the damages its bombing had caused, the repeal of all UN resolutions beyond No. 660, Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, and the withdrawal of all Allied forces and weapons, including the US Patriot missiles that had been sent to Israel to combat the SCUD's—that President Bush rejected the Iraqi offer as a "cruel hoax."[104]

[101]For the text of the Iraqi statement, see *The New York Times*, Feb. 13, 1991.

[102]Cited by Serge Schmemann, *The New York Times*, Feb. 14, 1991.

[103]TASS, Feb. 14, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 14, 1991, pp. 3–4.

[104]For the text of the Iraqi offer, see *The New York Times*, Feb. 16, 1991.

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In contrast, Moscow, which finally saw itself in the mediating position it had long coveted, took a much more positive view. Bessmertnykh, in words reminiscent of Shevardnadze's comments about Iraq's mid-August linkage plan, stated that the Iraqi announcement "opens up a new stage in the development of the conflict. This is an important development. We shall study this document attentively."[105] Gorbachev, in a letter to Bush, reportedly asked the US President to hold off the planned ground offensive until the completion of talks in Moscow between Aziz and the Soviet leadership scheduled for February 18.[106] One of the results of the Aziz visit was a Soviet plan for peace which Aziz was given to take back to Baghdad. The Iraqi foreign minister was upbeat about the talks, stating that "the atmosphere between us and the Soviet friends was cordial and objective."[107]

These developments were followed by a diplomatic process that can best be likened to the process in which a defense lawyer seeks to work out a "plea-bargain" with a district attorney. Over the next six days, Moscow was in contact with both Baghdad and Washington, trying to sell Bush on the concessions that Saddam Hussein was willing to make while, at the same time, trying to convince Saddam that he would have to make more concessions if he was to avoid an Allied ground offensive. Out of deference to Gorbachev's request, Bush delayed the ground attack several days, but he said that the Gorbachev plan fell "far short of what would be required."[108]

Attempting to pressure the US to accept Gorbachev's mediating efforts, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Bessmertnykh warned that an Allied ground attack would "tremendously complicate" negotiations toward an Iraqi pullout.[109] Former Soviet Chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev in an Interfax interview stated that Allied strikes against the Iraqi economy and people "can no longer be tolerated." Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, General Vladimir Lobov went further in his criticism, asserting that "no one should be allowed to use Security Council resolutions as a smokescreen to camouflage the massacre on Iraqi territory."[110]

Although the growing influence of the military and other hard-line groups in the USSR may have encouraged these officers to criticize US and Allied policy (*Sovetskaya Rossiya* went even further, claiming that Iraq was "the main bastion and base against US and Israeli domination of the region"),[111] Gorbachev stuck to his diplomacy. Indeed, when Iraqi obstinence over such issues as the payment of reparations to Kuwait and the speed of Iraqi military withdrawal from that country led Bush to issue an ultimatum and then begin the ground war, on February 24, Moscow again cooperated with the United States at the United Nations, although a Soviet government statement complained that "the instinct to rely on a military solution prevailed, despite Iraq's declared readiness to pull all of its forces out of Kuwait unconditionally."[112]

Primakov, interviewed on Moscow TV the day before the ground war started, sought to put Moscow on the diplomatic high ground no matter what happened: "If this war starts today, it will start and the whole world will see that it has been started in circumstances where the USSR has indeed accomplished a tremendous achievement in the efforts to find a political settlement . . . . if at this moment it is frustrated by war, then those who have started it [the war] will take upon themselves the responsibility."[113] *Pravda* went even further and on February 25 launched a blistering attack against the US, saying its decision to start the ground war was "based on its drive for sole leadership in the world."[114] Even Gorbachev was caught up in the rhetoric, noting in a speech in Minsk on February 26 that progress in relations between the US and USSR was "still fragile," and calling for responsible behavior "so that what has been achieved is not destroyed."[115]

Rhetoric aside, Moscow cooperated with the US in convincing Saddam to finally accept on February 28 the terms of a temporary ceasefire,[116] and then strongly supported the US in working out the terms for a stringent permanent ceasefire. Essentially, Moscow accepted the inevitability of the rapid collapse of its erstwhile ally, choosing to work with the regional victors (Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia) as well as the US rather than prolong its efforts on behalf of a lost cause. Indeed, Moscow, after the war, was to change its tune on Soviet-American relations as well. When asked at a post-ceasefire press conference about Gorbachev's statement that US-Soviet relations were "fragile," Bessmertnykh replied that Soviet-American relations had "withstood the test" during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict.[117]

[105]See Serge Schmemann, in ibid.
[106]Cited by Patrick Tyler, in ibid.
[107]Cited by Michael Dobbs, *The Washington Post*, Feb. 19, 1991.
[108]Cited by Rick Atkinson, ibid., Feb. 20, 1991.
[109]Cited by Andrew Rosenthal, *The New York Times*, Feb. 20, 1991.
[110]AFP report, Feb. 18, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 20, 1991, p. 15.
[111]*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Feb. 16, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 20, 1991, p. 19.
[112]TASS, Feb. 24, 1991, in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 25, 1991, pp. 9–10.
[113]Moscow Central Television, Feb. 23, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 25, 1991, p. 13.
[114]Cited by Trevor Rowe, *The Washington Post*, Feb. 26, 1991.
[115]See David Remnick, *The Washington Post*, Feb. 27, 1991; Reuters report, ibid.
[116]See Paul Lewis, *The New York Times*, Feb. 27 and 28, and Mar. 1, 1991.
[117]TASS, Feb. 28, 1991, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 1, 1991, p. 12.

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Soviet Policy—A Mixed Bag

In evaluating Soviet behavior during the crisis caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, we find some elements that appear to conform to Gorbachev's new thinking and other elements that were consonant with more traditional actions. Moscow's persistent emphasis on a peaceful, political settlement to the crisis closely reflected a central principle of the new thinking, as did its call for a major role for the United Nations in settling the conflict and its consistent posture of cooperation with the United States. However, even in the early stage of the crisis, Moscow's "minimax" strategy attempted to retain traditional Soviet linkages with Iraq and to withstand pressures to take a more active role in attempting to roll back Iraqi aggression in Kuwait. Indeed, throughout the conflict, Moscow sought to mediate between the United States and Iraq. Had the war proved less successful for the coalition led by the United States, such mediation might have been useful in extracting US troops from the conflict. But given the brevity of the ground war, it was perceived as undesirable meddling, even though President Bush was careful not to spotlight this issue.

In sum, while to a certain extent reflective of Moscow's new thinking and clearly preferable to the confrontation that occurred during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, US-Soviet cooperation during the crisis was at best limited. In the Gulf crisis, Moscow was too closely following its own perceived national interests to be a genuine partner for the United States in the UN-endorsed international effort to repulse Iraqi aggression. This may have an impact on future Soviet-American relations, particularly if conservative forces continue to gain influence in Moscow. Should the UN Military Staff Council ever be revived, as Moscow urged several times during the early stages of the conflict, and should the two thermonuclear superpowers play more equal roles in a UN force sent to quell a Third World crisis, it would be interesting to see whether Moscow would be willing to subordinate its interests fully to a larger international cause.

The effect of Soviet behavior on its position in the Middle East appears mixed. On the one hand, Moscow was able to exploit the crisis to gain diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and billions of dollars of economic aid from the Gulf Cooperation Council states. Also, its military neutrality and efforts at mediating the conflict may enable Moscow to reestablish its economic and political position in Iraq quickly, especially if Saddam Hussein remains in power. (However, the poor performance of Soviet weaponry and training during the conflict—despite the predictions of high-ranking Soviet officers—and the stringent limits ostensibly set by the ceasefire agreement on Iraq's military capability, together with its debts and reparations payment obligations, may limit Iraq's interest in and ability to pay for Soviet arms.)

Another positive consequence of the war for Moscow was a further improvement of relations with Iran, with which Moscow closely coordinated during the war as both states maintained military neutrality while trying to mediate the conflict. Since both Moscow and Tehran share the goal of getting US forces out of the Gulf as soon as possible, one can expect close coordination between the two countries in the future as well.

On the other hand, these gains for Moscow as a result of the war were offset by losses. The overwhelming military victory of the United States, while Moscow stayed on the diplomatic sidelines, underscored the fact that the United States was the world's number one great power, while Moscow was being marginalized despite its diplomatic activities. In addition, the United States became the major outside influence in the Arab axis of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, which appeared likely to dominate Arab diplomacy in the postwar period. If this axis remains intact, and if the United States can continue active cooperation with it (two big "ifs," given the vagaries of Arab politics and the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict), then the key states of the Arab world, which the United States proved willing to defend with military force while Moscow was only willing to support them with rhetoric, may be in the US sphere of influence for a considerable period of time. Given the fact that the Middle East is the only Third World area in which Moscow has maintained an active interest in the Gorbachev era, this outcome would not be a positive one for the Soviet Union.

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Yugoslavia: Confederation or Disintegration?

Bogomil Ferfila

Among the socialist and ex-socialist states, the condition of the federations—Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia—is the most complicated and uncertain. Chances are that the Czechs and Slovaks, who make up about 64 percent and 30 percent respectively of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, will remain united in a (con)federal framework. By contrast, the chances are small that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which are both made up of a large number of distinct, constituent units, will retain their present configuration.

Politicians in the West fear that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia could pose a threat to European and world peace. However, apart from the desire to forestall a violent dissolution of these two conglomerates, one is hard put to justify their continued existence. Both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are each dominated by one nation—the Russians in the Soviet Union and the Serbs in Yugoslavia. In both federations, the separatist tendencies are in large measure a consequence of the long-term domination of the largest nation over the other nations and nationalities and over the federal structures of these states. The situation in Yugoslavia is complicated by the fact that the republic of Serbia is under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević, a neo-Stalinist who is opposed to economic market reforms and to political reform in a confederal direction. Given the Serbian leader's intransigence, a violent disintegration of Yugoslavia cannot be ruled out.

The dissolution or disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia represents, in my view, the only logical outcome to the metamorphosis of these socialist federations. Given the pathologies of their economic, political, social, and cultural institutions, a radical departure from past practices is urgent. One reason has to do with implementing a marketizing economic reform. Capital, profit, and market logic do not recognize local or state borders. To allow the spontaneity of capitalism to work, it is essential that the kind of political hegemony exercised by federal authorities over the economy be abolished. The economy must be left to the economic actors, and the role of political authorities, who were red before and are now a variety of colors, must be minimized. In turn, when the economy and economic actors begin to behave in accordance with the logic of domestic and world markets, the role of federal politicians in the economy will likewise diminish and they will lose a large part of their raison d'être.

Yet, it is quite possible that the emergence of a number of sovereign states or loose confederations in place of the old socialist federations may lead to the forging of new links. Why is this the case?

All former socialist states strongly desire membership in the European Community (EC). The economic, political, and social differences between former socialist states and West European states are enormous, and therefore it could well happen that the 12 members of the EC will shut themselves off from Eastern Europe. For this reason and because they face similar economic problems, the former socialist states will be forced into relatively intense economic and political collaboration with each other. However, this time the links will be natural and functional, from the bottom up, and not forced upon them by a hated center. In short, the collapse of the old system will be less painful if the newly emerging states are able to cooperate with each other.

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Table 1: Some Basic Facts about the Population of Yugoslavia, its Republics, and Autonomous Provinces

	Territory (sq. km.)	Population 1985 (in 1,000's)	Percentage growth, 1981/ 1961	Density per sq. km. (1981)	Number of persons/ household
Bosnia and Herzegovina	51,129	4,314	126	81	4.0
Slovenia	20,251	1,927	119	93	3.2
Croatia	56,538	4,655	111	81	3.2
Montenegro	13,812	613	124	42	4.1
Macedonia	25,713	2,017	136	74	4.4
Serbia proper	55,968	5,787	118	102	3.4
Vojvodina	21,506	2,084	110	95	3.0
Kosovo	10,887	1,762	164	146	6.9
Yugoslavia	255,804	23,159	121	88	3.6

SOURCE: *Statistical Yearbook*, Belgrade, Modern Administration, 1987, p. 23.

Yugoslavia

The chances of Yugoslavia continuing its existence in an unaltered federal framework are quite low. Yugoslavia is an artificial union of its constituent elements—republics and autonomous provinces. The differences are manifold: national, religious, cultural, historic, and economic. The data in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 illustrate Yugoslavia's heterogeneity.

This heterogeneity was reflected in the constitution ratified in 1974. Let us examine the basic characteristics of Yugoslav federalism as found in this document:

- The constitution defines the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) as a federal state, a union of voluntarily united nations and their socialist republics, as well as the socialist autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are parts of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.
- In the SFRY, the normative bases of the Federation are the principles of brotherhood and unity, as well as the principle of self-management by the working class and all working people.
- The nationalities (members of nations whose native countries border on Yugoslavia—the Hungarians and Albanians—and members of other nations living permanently in Yugoslavia) are not given the rights of self-determination and secession. Only the nations—Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and Muslims (who are defined as a nation in Yugoslavia)—hold such rights. The enjoyment of all other rights within the Federation and participation in decision-making on the federal level are not determined by the size of a particular nation or nationality. Thus, the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which are dominated by Hungarians and Albanians respectively, functioned more or less as republics until their powers were curbed at the end of 1990 by Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević.
- Decisions on the most important issues regarding the implementation of joint economic policies within the Federation are achieved by consensus and unanimous agreement within the Council of the Republics and Provinces of the General Assembly of the SFRY. Decisions by majority vote on economic policies are reserved only for extraordinary circumstances and are intended to serve only as temporary measures.
- Although most other federal-level decisions are made by majority rule, the republics and provinces have the right of veto. This right can be exercised in three cases: a revision of the constitution of SFRY; an alteration of the borders between the constituent units of the Federation; and the ratification of certain treaties with foreign countries. In making these consensual decisions, the republics and autonomous provinces share equal rights.
- Full equality of the nations and nationalities is reflected in the principle of parity in the composition of the political organs of the Federation. This principle provides for minimal differences in the representation of the republics and autonomous provinces on the federal level. A good example of this principle is the composition of the presidency of the SFRY. The presidency consists of single representatives from each republic and autonomous province who take turns as president of that body.
- Sovereignty is not held by the citizenry but by the working people, who "are organized in accordance with their work and by territory."

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Table 2: Yugoslav Population by Nationality in 1981

	In 1000's	Percent
Serbs	8,140	36.3
Croats	4,428	19.8
Muslims	2,000	8.9
Slovenians	1,754	7.8
Albanians	1,730	7.7
Macedonians	1,340	6.0
Montenegrins	509	2.6
Hungarians	427	1.9
Turks	101	0.4
Others	481	2.1
Undeclared (according to the 1974 constitution)	1,291	5.7
Unknown	153	0.7
Total	22,425	100.0

SOURCE: *Statistical Yearbook*, Belgrade, Modern Administration, 1987, p. 18.

On the federal level, the 1974 constitution favored the independent development of the republics and autonomous provinces as well as of their constituent elements —the municipalities and the local communities. This was meant to allow each component of the Federation maximum leeway in solving local problems and developing local strengths while remaining within the union.

The 1974 constitution, however, also fostered particularist tendencies and conflicts among the republics, due in part to the erroneous economic concept on which it was based, and in part to the great national, historical, and economic differences among the constituent elements of the Federation. The result was that the republics and even the municipalities began to develop as independent economies, without links to each other. In turn, this led to an extraordinary degree of economic irrationality throughout the Yugoslav economy. This irrationality was manifest in many different spheres —from unnecessary duplication of production capacities (in the 1970's and 1980's, Yugoslavia had 5 oil refineries, 21 sugar factories, 45 calculator manufacturers, and 8 robot manufacturers) to a dysfunctional export and import regime.

Political relations within the country were influenced by the disintegration of the economy, expensive and unproductive production processes, and the autarchic and polycentric étatism on the part of the republics—all of which stimulated nationalism. Indeed, it may be argued that the Yugoslav example supports the proposition that nationalism is engendered wherever weakly developed productive forces are confined to a provincial (local) market.

Thus, during the second half of the 1980's, economic policies being pursued within the republics increasingly blocked the integrating economic currents:

- Apart from mandatory support for the less-developed republics and provinces, there was almost no flow of capital between the republics—the value of inter-republic investments accounted for only 1 percent of the value of all investments.
- Each republic and province had its own central bank, in addition to the federal Central Bank, to which the republic central banks are subordinate. All commercial banking is done on the republic level.
- Inter-republic market exchange was decreasing.
- Each republic pursued its own distinct policies on technological development, taxes, and price regulation. These as well as other policies were not coordinated with other republics or with the Federation as a whole.

Forces tending toward the integration of the all-Yugoslav market became weaker. What emerged instead was a trend toward greater isolation of markets within the borders of each republic: sub-republic or municipal markets arose. For example, approximately 70 percent of all enterprise mergers took place within municipalities. The transfer of technology, capital, and labor between individual republics and their foreign partners was far more frequent than such transfers between republics.[1] The contribution of inter-republic trade exchange to the country's total trade-exchange volume gradually decreased from 27.7 percent in 1970 to 24.8 percent in 1974, to 23 percent in 1979, and then to 21.7 percent in 1980.[2] The contribution of Slovenia, the economically most developed of the Yugoslav republics, to total inter-republic trade exchange is given in Table 5.

When, how, where, and why did the process of disintegration of the barely established Yugoslav market begin? Many observers trace this disintegration to the 1974 constitution. They rest this judgment on three premises. First, after 1974 the republics and provinces became economically sovereign. Consequently, they no longer gravitated toward the all-Yugoslav market but moved instead toward the creation of markets of their own. Second and as a direct consequence of the first premise, the constitution fractionated the concept of an all-Yugoslav market. Third, the 1974 constitution introduced the principle that decisions on the most important issues facing the country's economy could only be taken unanimously.

[1]Ivan Maksimović, "Theoretical Perspectives of the Problems of Social Property and of the Changes of Economic System," in Serbian Academy of Science and Art, *Crises of the Yugoslav Economic System*, Belgrade, 1986.

[2]M. Bevc, "Inter-Republic Trade Trends in Yugoslavia," *Ekonomska Revija* (Ljubljana), No. 3, 1988.

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Table 3: Selected Indicators of Population Structure for Yugoslavia, its Republics, and Autonomous Provinces

	Working population (percent)	Percent of rural population	Percent of urban population	Percent of illiterates
Bosnia and Herzegovina	37.7	17.3	36.2	14.5
Slovenia	49.6	9.4	48.9	0.8
Croatia	45.2	15.2	50.8	5.6
Montenegro	34.1	13.5	50.7	9.4
Macedonia	41.5	21.7	53.9	10.9
Serbia proper	51.4	27.6	47.8	11.1
Vojvodina	43.8	19.9	54.1	5.8
Kosovo	22.6	24.6	32.5	17.6
Yugoslavia (average)	43.4	19.9	46.5	9.5

SOURCE: *Statistical Yearbook*, Belgrade, Modern Administration, 1989, p. 47.

Table 4: Selected Economic Indicators for Yugoslavia, its Republics, and Autonomous Provinces

	Number of employed per 1000 active population (1985)	GNP per capita (1984)	Population (percent) 1984	Employed population (percent) 1984	GNP (percent) 1984
Bosnia and Herzegovina	354	68.2	18.6	15.3	13.5
Slovenia	678	201.0	8.4	13.0	15.4
Croatia	508	125.2	20.2	23.9	25.5
Montenegro	397	77.9	2.6	2.4	2.1
Macedonia	392	65.3	8.7	7.7	5.8
Serbia proper	417	98.4	25.1	25.0	23.6
Vojvodina	449	121.1	8.9	9.5	11.7
Kosovo	224	26.2	7.5	3.2	2.4
Yugoslavia	433	100.0	100	100	100

SOURCE: *Statistical Yearbook*, Belgrade, Modern Administration, 1988, p. 78.

The decentralization observed at the federal level stopped at the republic and province levels, although, in some cases, it reached the level of the municipalities. Yugoslav socially-owned capital was becoming national, republic-owned capital, and even capital owned by the provinces and municipalities. This led to competition among these "owners" of capital. Authorities at the level of the republics and provinces were engaged in constant competition, enforcing or attempting to enforce their (quasi) rights over the socially-owned property. This was the primary form of immediate and everyday involvement of political decision-makers in the economy.

The republics and autonomous provinces were gradually acting more and more like individual states:

- they took on powers equal to the Federation's in regulating matters common to the Federation as a whole;
- they assumed much authority previously held by the Federation;
- they were regulating enterprises that were in theory self-managed but that in reality were state institutions.

In turn, within each republic and province, bureaucratic, technical, and political structures along with a portion of the intelligentsia were becoming the fundamental bearers and advocates of nationalism.

Along with the state structures, the communist party experienced a gradual shift in the locus of decision-making. Although the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) retained the appearance of a centralized Leninist organization, there were links between the LCY and the state structure at the federal level. Moreover, the leagues of communists from each republic or autonomous province were represented in the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (CC LCY) according to the parity rule. Under this rule,

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Table 5: Slovenia's Contribution to Inter-Republic Exchange as a Percentage of Slovenia's Total Trade Exchange

Year	Contribution of purchases from other republics to total purchase of goods by Slovenia	Contribution of sales of goods to other republics to total sale of goods by Slovenia
1970	23.8	30.8
1980	25.8	32.6
1983	25.2	23.2

SOURCE: M. Bevc, "Inter-republic Trade Trends Within Yugoslavia," *Ekonomska Revija* (Ljubljana), No. 3, 1988.

the larger the membership of republic and province organizations, the greater their representation in the CC LCY. Thus, the republic party organization of Serbia, whose membership was ten times that of the Slovene party, contributed a substantially larger number of representatives to the federal party organs.

There is much evidence to indicate that the republic party leaderships were becoming the real centers of power within the party. First, the members of the CC LCY were elected by congresses and conferences in the republics and provinces respectively. The role of the LCY congress was only to ratify this electoral process. Second, one-third of the membership of the presidency of the CC LCY consisted of the presidents of the republic and province party organizations. They were not elected to the presidency but were ex officio members of this party body. Third, the congress of the LCY was always timed to take place after the congresses and conferences of the republic and province party organizations. Therefore, the documents of the LCY congresses were more a synthesis of decisions reached earlier at the republic level of the party hierarchy. Finally, democratic centralism within the CC LCY was becoming an empty shell. Democracy was not applied to the decision-making process. There was "monolithism" in the voting at the CC LCY: all its decisions were unanimous, without any opposing votes or abstentions. But centralism was not enforced in the execution of decisions. Nothing agreed upon at the center was ever implemented at the republic level or below.

On the republic level, the republic party organizations exercised paramount influence. In this sense, a "multiparty system" had emerged in Yugoslavia—each republic had its own party.

Developed vs. Less-Developed

Another of the cleavages tearing apart Yugoslavia is the one between the developed and less-developed republics and autonomous provinces. Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the autonomous province of Kosovo in Serbia were all defined by the federal government as "less developed" and therefore entitled to economic aid from the "developed" republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and, in part, Serbia. Disagreements between the developed and the less-developed constituent parts of Yugoslavia contributed greatly to the collapse of the Federation.

For different reasons, neither the developed nor the less-developed regions were ever satisfied with the amount of aid, the manner in which it was administered, or with the results it produced. The less-developed rested their case on the classic Marxist theory of value. They believed that the developed republics, which possess a greater degree of capital, that is, technical labor equipment, were in a privileged monopolistic position, which they used to gain possession of the profit (surplus value) from the less-developed.

The developed see the problem in a completely different light. In their view, the Federation simply transferred a large part of their income—the result of their greater productivity—into its own accounts, from which it would then distribute funds to the less-developed regions. The wealthier republics believed that the funds were then used in an ineffective fashion in the less-developed republics and Kosovo.

Since 1965, monies for the less-developed republics have been distributed via the Federal Fund for Assistance to the Less-Developed Republics and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo (see Tables 6 and 7). Until 1970, the Federation provided non-returnable monies from its own budget for the operation of this fund. Later, this fiscal and étatistic manner of fund collection was abandoned and a mandatory loan system was established, to which each republic contributed according to its share of the Yugoslav Gross National Product. But these "loans" actually became gifts—the less-developed never repaid them. Between 1966 and 1970, 1.85 percent of the national income was contributed to this fund.[3] Between 1971 and 1975, this figure increased to

[3]Federal Fund for Development of the Less-Developed Republics and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo, *Annual Report*, Belgrade, 1985.

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Table 6: Contributions to the Federal Fund for Assistance to the Less-Developed Republics and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo

(in billions of dinars)

	1988	Sept. 1989
Bosnia and Herzegovina	269.0	249.0
Slovenia	404.7	696.0
Croatia	527.3	800.1
Montenegro	37.5	58.4
Macedonia	109.6	174.4
Serbia proper	449.6	1,062.4
Kosovo	36.9	79.2
Vojvodina	194.5	397.9
Total	2,029.1	3,517.4

SOURCE: V. Gobec, "The System of Aid to the Economically Less-Developed Republics and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo," *Teorija in Praksa* (Ljubljana), Nos. 3–4, 1990.

Table 7: Distribution of Funds from the Federal Fund for Assistance to the Less-Developed Republics and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo

	Percentage
Kosovo	48
Bosnia and Herzegovina	25
Macedonia	18
Montenegro	9
Total	100.0

SOURCE: V. Gobec,"The System of Aid to the Economically Less-Developed Republics and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo," *Teorija in Praksa*, Nos. 3–4, 1990.

1.94 percent, and later (1975–80) to 1.97 percent. However, between 1981 and 1985, the contribution fell to 1.86 percent, and then to 1.56 percent in 1986–90.[4]

The less-developed republics and Kosovo also received additional financial aid aimed at developing their respective public services. In 1981, this aid represented 0.85 percent of Yugoslavia's national income, but by 1985 it had dropped to 0.73 percent.[5] They also received preference in obtaining foreign loans and the allocation of hard currency for major equipment purchases from abroad, and were allowed to make cash payments for approved purchases from abroad, which effectively exempted them from paying the compulsory duty on imported equipment.

The repayment of foreign loans to the less-developed regions was the obligation of the Federation. Thus, from 1980 to 1985, 80 percent of the loans to Yugoslavia from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development went to the less-developed republics and Kosovo.[6] Kosovo never repaid any of these loans.

The investment of large amounts of capital by the less-developed republics and Kosovo did not yield satisfactory results. Soccer stadiums and libraries were built instead of factories. Unmet deadlines and cost overruns were frequent. Three factors account for these problems. First, there was a lack of control over the fund's spending. Second, decisions on the allocation of funds were made on the basis of a political rationale, not an economic one. Third, no one was held accountable for these decisions.

Thus, the differences between the developed and the less-developed either remained the same or even grew. This is especially true for Kosovo. Per capita income in Kosovo before 1988 was 40 percent of the average per capita income for Yugoslavia as a whole. After 1988, it decreased to 30 percent.[7] To a great extent this was due to the enormous birth rate among the Kosovars. (The population of Kosovo increased from 1,585,000 in 1981 to 1,700,000 in 1989.)[8]

A comparison between Slovenia and Kosovo, whose populations are almost equal in number, is extremely illustrative. Slovenia generates 18 percent of Yugoslavia's GNP, 21 percent of its industrial production, and 23 percent of its export volume. Its GNP per capita is about US$7,000. Kosovo, by contrast, is responsible for 1.8 percent of GNP and 1.7 percent of Yugoslavia's export volume; GNP per capita in Kosovo is about $1,000.[9]

Such economic inequalities contributed to the deterioration of relations among nations and republics at the end of the 1980's. This in turn destroyed the system of aid to the less-developed. Commitments on the part of the republics to the Federal Fund for Assistance to the Less-Developed Republics and the Autonomous Republic of Kosovo simply went unmet. The following are the republics' percentage fulfillment of their assessed contribution in 1989: Croatia, 29 percent; Slovenia, 34.8 percent; Serbia, 67.1 percent; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 40.1 percent; Montenegro, 21.1 percent; Macedonia, 52.9 percent; Vojvodina, 27.8 percent; and Kosovo, 27.8 percent.[10] During the first quarter of 1990, Slovenia paid 65.1 percent of its assigned contribution;

[4]Ibid.
[5]Ibid.
[6]Ibid.

[7]V. Gobec, "The System of Aid to the Economically Less-Developed Republics and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo," *Teorija in Praksa* (Ljubljana), Nos. 3–4, 1990.
[8]Ibid.
[9]Bogomil Ferfila, *Toward a New Economic System for Yugoslav Society*, Ljubljana, Publishing House 2000, 1990, pp. 339–45.
[10]Ibid., p. 501.

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Croatia, 27.4 percent; Serbia, 15.3 percent; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 23.8 percent; Montenegro, 13.2 percent; Vojvodina, 20.2 percent; and Kosovo, 5.7 percent.[11]

The breakdown of the Fund for Assistance of the Less-Developed Republics and the Autonomous Republic of Kosovo was only one of several crises that had come to shake the Federation by mid-1990. Equally if not more important were the following:

- The intensifying civil war in Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians. The Albanians in Kosovo boycotted the republic's multiparty elections of December 1990, sensing that none of the serious competitors was willing to make fundamental concessions to them in the areas of human rights and national autonomy. Serb political leaders have fueled ethnic conflict between Serbs and Albanians to draw the attention of the Serbian people away from their republic's massive economic problems and win political support for themselves. But these economic problems mean that Serbia cannot enforce a long-term occupation of Kosovo; the solution to the problem lies in granting Kosovo the status of an independent republic.
- The discontinuation of almost all economic, political, and cultural relations between Slovenia on the one hand and Serbia and Montenegro on the other, and between Croatia on the one hand and Serbia on the other. For example, in 1990 Serbia introduced duties on the import of goods from Slovenia and Croatia.
- Rapidly emerging animosity between Croatians and Serbs—in particular, the Serbian minority in Croatia, which makes up 10–15 percent of that republic's population. The postcommunist government of Franjo Tudjman underestimated the significance of the Serb minority and used a confrontational approach to try to resolve this problem.
- Ethnic polarization in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is home to Europe's largest Moslem community. About 40 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's population are Moslems; Eastern Orthodox Serbs make up 32 percent of its population; and Roman Catholic Croats represent 19 percent. Political parties in this republic are divided along ethnic lines. The republic's leaders continue to be interested in the preservation of Yugoslavia. However, conflicts between Serbs and Croats in other parts of Yugoslavia could spill into Bosnia-Herzegovina. Additionally, monumental economic problems in the republic could foster overt ethnic strife.

Multiparty elections took place in all republics in 1990, and in Slovenia and Croatia the elections led to the replacement of the old communist elite—perhaps the last political force in these two republics representing a Yugoslav orientation. The demise of the communist elite in Slovenia and Croatia was the last nail in the coffin of the old Federation.

By the end of 1990, it seemed that two outcomes were possible—the building of a confederation or secession by one or more of the republics. Each option will be examined in some detail. The options have implications for other federal states in Eastern Europe as well as for the future of Europe as a whole.

The Confederal Contract

Yugoslavia has had a loose federal structure since 1974. Two factors appeared to hold Yugoslavia together. First, Yugoslavia was party to numerous international agreements and a member of organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Second, the central currency reserves, the centralized banking system, and other federal institutions also worked to unite Yugoslavia.

But the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation over the past few years clearly shows that these two factors are no longer enough to hold the country together. Radical solutions to stem Yugoslavia's disintegration have to be attempted. At the end of 1990, Slovenia and Croatia prepared a draft proposal for a confederal structure as a necessary step to the creation of a new Yugoslavia. The proposal, which needs to be fleshed out and would, of course, be subject to negotiation, was modeled on the organization of the EC. It contains the following major provisions.

Membership. Only states that have fulfilled a number of conditions can become members:

- they must allow free multiparty elections and must have a democratically elected parliament;
- they must guarantee property rights, free enterprise, and free trade-union association;
- if a member-state regularly breaks the provisions of the federal contract, it may be subject to expulsion after due process.

Principles of mutual guarantee. Every member-state of the Federation recognizes the right of all others to independence, equality, and international engagement. Interference in the internal affairs of other member-states is proscribed except when it takes place in ac-

[11] Ibid.

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cordance with the strictures of international law or the provisions of the confederal contract. Member-states guarantee to all ethnic groups living on their territory the rights to form their own political organizations, to use their own language and script, and to organize their own cultural institutions. The citizens of all member-states who have permanent residence in another member-state have the same civil and legal rights as the native citizens of the state. Discrimination on the basis of citizenship is prohibited. The confederal proposal recognizes free economic activity and freedom of movement.

Competencies of the confederation. Member-states pursue a number of activities in common: agreed-upon economic, agricultural, ecological, and scientific-research policies; and the development and maintenance of economically and technologically compatible railways and postal and telecommunication systems.

Authorities. The governing authorities of the confederation include a Parliament, Council of Ministers, Executive Committee, and a Confederal Court.

The Parliament is to be made up of 50 elected representatives from every member-state. This body would meet four times a year. Resolutions would be adopted by majority vote. At the end of every year, the Parliament would discuss and ratify a confederation budget for the following fiscal year.

The Council of Ministers would be composed of one representative from every member-state of the confederation. Final decision-making authority for the confederation rests with this body. All decisions would be taken unanimously.

The Executive Committee would serve as the secretariat of the confederation, being responsible for the implementation of the confederal contract. It accepts proposals and gives opinions on matters having to do with the confederal contract. Upon the agreement of the Council of Ministers, the Executive Committee could take on an independent decision-making authority. Members of the Executive Committee would serve a four-year term and be appointed by the member-states. However, members of this committee are to serve the interests of the confederation and not those of the member-state that appointed them. Decisions would be taken by majority vote.

The Confederal Court would ensure the fulfillment of all rights and obligations emanating from the confederate contract. The implementation of the judgments of the court would fall to the Council of Ministers. The Confederal Court would also review the legality of actions taken by the Council of Ministers and the Executive Committee.

Collective defense. Each republic will have its own armed forces. An attack on one member-state would be considered to be an attack on the confederation. Every member-state independently decides on the military engagement of the armed forces under its command. The armed forces of the confederation will be headed by a collective command. Costs for the troops under collective command will be borne by the republic from which they originate.

Financing the confederation. Every member-state would relinquish some land and buildings on its territory for use by the confederation, and also finance the functioning of those confederation authorities whose headquarters are located on its territory. Common expenses for the functioning of the confederation (diplomatic and consular services, collective armed-forces command, administrative expenses, etc.) would be financed by assessing a membership fee on all member-states. The membership fee is to be determined by a combination of a measure for GNP per capita (40 percent), the size of the state's territory (30 percent), and the number of its inhabitants (30 percent).

International activities. Individual member-states can operate their own embassies and consulates or operate embassies and consulates together with other member-states. The confederation concludes international agreements upon approval by the Council of Ministers.

Preliminary provisions. The confederal contract would become valid once two member-states ratify it. After a certain period of time has passed (probably two years), the contract could either be redefined or the confederation disbanded. To take advantage of integrational processes under way in Europe, the member-states could leave or disband the confederation and seek acceptance into the European Community even before the time limits for rewriting the confederal contract or disbanding the confederation altogether have been reached.

To be sure, by the end of 1990 even this kind of contractual agreement had become far too limiting for Slovenia and Croatia—the republics farthest along the road to independence. But as a solution to the Yugoslav dilemma, it nevertheless remained a formula that could permit an orderly transition to a confederal state structure.

However, the assault on Yugoslavia's financial and credit system, which was engineered by Serbia in December 1990, may have destroyed the last chance for negotiations among the republics over a new con-

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federal structure.[12] It left secession as the only alternative for republics seeking to distance themselves from the chaos and disorder in Yugoslavia.

Benefits of Secession

Secession is the most radical option for ending the problems of the Yugoslav federation. It is practical in the short term only for Slovenia. That republic's western geographic position, its links to regional integration efforts in Western Europe, its near-European standard of living, and its national homogeneity all facilitate independence. For this reason, I shall focus on the option of independence as it pertains to Slovenia. The Slovene government has developed a program for the transition of the republic into an independent state.[13] This scenario contains Ljubljana's rationale for independence and makes three significant arguments in support of this option.

First, Ljubljana claims that the present federal institutional framework does not allow Slovenia sufficient independence to develop the republic's economy. One of the reasons is the heterogeneity of Yugoslavia discussed above. In 1989, GNP per capita in Slovenia exceeded GNP per capita in Kosovo by 750 percent. GNP per capita in Slovenia exceeded that in Macedonia by 320 percent. Despite Slovenia's contributions to the federal fund for the less-developed regions, the differences between it and the less-developed republics have grown during the 1980's and constitute a great barrier to the implementation of economic reform and development strategies. Moreover, pressure for the redistribution of income will only increase in the future. It will stem both from the less-developed republics and from those who carry greater political weight at the center, that is, the Serbs. The center will find itself unable to pursue neutral economic policies.

Independence will afford Slovenia the best, perhaps its only, chance of getting out of its crisis. The next few years will be without doubt years of economic hardship, with increases in unemployment, a fall in productivity, and so on. After independence, all these negative trends would worsen in the short term. In the long term, independence would allow Slovenia to establish more quickly a normal, market-oriented economic system better suited to Slovenia's needs.

Second, continued membership in the Federation as currently constituted prevents Slovenia from participating in all-European institutions and processes leading to European integration. In addition, conditions in Kosovo make it very unlikely that Yugoslavia will be allowed in the near future to participate in processes of European integration. Indeed, Yugoslavia may now be last in line of those states wishing to "enter Europe." Inability to take part in the integration of Europe creates severe problems for Slovenia because two-thirds of its interaction with the world economy is with the states of the EC and the European Free Trade Association. The creation of an integrated market in the EC threatens Slovenia's share of the market in these two regions. Independence would allow Slovenia to establish more intense links with the world economy, allowing it to exploit economic development opportunities more effectively, and adapt more quickly to world standards.

Third, secession will make it easier for Slovenia to deal with the problem of unemployment. Slovenia is experiencing a rapid increase of unemployment, with an expected 100,000 unemployed in 1991 and perhaps 120,000 in 1992. The republic is now subject to pressures from the center to open its labor market to workers from other republics. Republic authorities have found that given these pressures they cannot implement suitable employment policies within the present federal system.

Costs of Secession

Secession will also present Slovenia with numerous economic and political problems.[14]

Loss of the Yugoslav market. In the first nine months of 1990, the Slovene economy made 32.5 percent of all domestic sales and 25.9 percent of all domestic purchases in other republics of Yugoslavia. The Slovene economy is linked most closely to Croatia, where it made 15.9 percent of sales and 13 percent of purchases, and to Serbia, where it made 9.4 percent of

[12]With the "robbery of the century"—amounting to 18.2 billion dinars ($1.5 billion)—Serbia completed the destruction of Yugoslavia. The reason for the robbery was that with the collapse of the Serbian economy, which was brought about by Milošević and Stanko Radmilović, sources of capital became unavailable to the republic. The Serbian parliament then adopted three secret resolutions by which the National Bank of Serbia and the National Bank of Vojvodina credited from their printing of money the purchase of 8 billion dinars worth of hard currency in Serbian banks, payment of pensions to Serbian pensioners of 5 billion dinars, and the subsidizing of agricultural production to an amount of 5.2 billion dinars. Thus, the robbery is not the work of a narrow group of people surrounding Milošević—the Serbian parliament stands behind its decisions. The Serbian people most probably believe that Serbia had the right to engineer this theft because they believe the other republics are taking advantage of it.

[13]Republiski sekretariat za trg in splosne gospodarske zadeve, *Nekaj ekonomskih vidikov neodvisnosti Republike Slovenije* (Some Economic Aspects of the Independence of the Republic of Slovenia), Ljubljana, November 1990.

[14]All the statistical data in this section are taken from ibid.

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

Socio-economic extremes in Yugoslavia. On the left, workers at Iskra Telekom near Ljubljana inspect circuit boards; on the right, a young boy in Kosovo.

—Steve McCurry/Magnum.

sales and 7.7 percent of purchases. During and after secession, trade with other republics need not be stopped completely. But if such sales were discontinued, Slovene production would have to drop by 37 percent. A 50-percent decline in sales would lead to a fall in production of 19 percent.

The introduction of duties on Slovene goods sold to other republics would lead to declines in sales proportional to the implemented duty. Thus, with a 50-percent duty rate, production would have to be decreased by 19 percent; and with a 10-percent duty rate, production would have to fall by 4 percent.

Disruption of foreign-trade links. Slovene enterprises handle a high percentage of foreign trade for enterprises in other republics. In the event of secession, Slovenia would cease to handle this trade and its regular exports would decrease by at least 15 percent, leading to the loss of approximately $600 million. Imports would fall 7 percent or approximately $280 million. If other republics became foreign markets for Slovenia, imports from them would have to be paid for in hard currency. Consequently, exports would have to rise by 80 percent—from the $4 billion at present to $7 billion—to cover the higher costs of these imports. Moreover, at least 50 percent of goods now coming from other republics would have to be imported from Western markets. The value of Slovene imports from foreign markets would consequently have to increase by 100 percent—from $4 billion to $8 billion.

Loss of Slovene property in other parts of Yugoslavia. The number of Slovene agencies and businesses in other republics far exceeds the number of other republics' agencies and businesses in Slovenia (see Table 8). With the termination of ties, these agencies and businesses might have to close. Moreover, Slovene agencies might stand to lose these assets entirely.

Governmental expenses. Individual Slovene repub-

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Table 8: Number of Slovene Enterprise Units and Companies in Other Republics and Vice Versa

Republic or autonomous province	Slov. enterprise units in other rep. and aut. prov.	Slov. companies in other rep. and aut. prov.	Enterprise units from other rep. and aut. prov. in Slov.	Companies from other rep. and aut. prov. in Slov.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	375	3	43	
Croatia	1315	32	375	5
Montenegro	67	2	7	
Macedonia	148	2	21	
Serbia proper	561	18	204	4
Vojvodina	195	4	38	
Kosovo	49	1	2	
Total	2710	62	690	9

SOURCE: Republiski sekretariat za trg in splosne gospodarske zadeve, *Nekaj ekonomskih vidikov neodvisnosti Republike Slovenije* (Some Economic Aspects of the Independence of the Republic of Slovenia), Ljubljana, November 1990, p. 11.

Table 9: The Share of Yugoslavia's Convertible Foreign Debt Owed by the Federation, the Republics, and the Autonomous Provinces

	(in millions of US dollars)			(in percent)		
	1978	June 1988	Sept. 1989	1987	June 1988	Sept. 1989
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,881	1,748	1,747	9.8	9.9	10.5
Slovenia	1,841	1,702	1,661	9.6	9.7	9.9
Croatia	3,543	3,263	3,109	18.5	18.6	18.6
Montenegro	761	710	667	4.0	4.0	4.0
Macedonia	906	826	782	4.7	4.7	4.7
Serbia proper	3,586	3,423	3,281	18.7	19.5	19.6
Vojvodina	854	801	831	4.4	4.5	4.9
Kosovo	869	794	725	4.5	4.5	4.3
Federation	4,917	4,308	3,917	25.7	24.5	23.4
Total	19,159	17,576	16,720	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: Republiski sekretariat za trg in splosne gospodarske zadeve, *Nekaj ekonomskih vidikov neodvisnosti Republike Slovenije* (Some Economic Aspects of the Independence of the Republic of Slovenia), Ljubljana, November 1990, p. 25.

lic secretariats have estimated that in 1990 Slovenia would need from 9.5 to 14.1 billion dinars for performing functions that the Federation is now performing. In reality, Slovenia paid 17.5 million dinars. Additional expenses linked to introducing a Slovene currency and assuming a share of the guarantees now given by the Federation and the National Bank of Yugoslavia for Yugoslavia's hard-currency and safety deposits would have to be added to this sum.

Increased foreign debt. Slovenia is in an advantageous position compared to other republics because of its own low level of debt and its low share of the collective Yugoslav debt (see Table 9). In 1989, the share of Slovene debt in the total collective debt of Yugoslavia amounted to approximately 10 percent. The Slovene economy, with its inflow of hard currency, is capable of settling its commitments to foreigners—the debt incurred in the past years represents 8 to 12 percent of the currency inflow (the export of goods and services) and deposits in the population's hard-currency accounts.

However, the debts of the Federation as a whole would also have to be added to the Slovene hard-currency debt. If these debts are divided according to each republic's and province's share in Yugoslavia's present debt, the Slovene debt would rise by approximately $400 million. This would increase the rate of servicing debts by approximately 25 percent, that is, from 12 percent to 15 percent of Slovenia's hard-currency inflow. But if the Federation divides its debt according to the republics' and provinces' share of Yugoslav GNP—which for Slovenia now amounts to approximately 20 percent of the total—then its debt would rise by another $800 million. In this case, debt servicing

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would increase by 50 percent or about 18 percent of Slovenia's hard-currency inflow.

Possible embargoes of foreign funds. Foreign investors might show less interest in Slovenia due to the small size of its market. Moreover, a negative attitude on the part of the United States and West European states could hinder Slovenia's secession if it leads such institutions as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and others—which are dominated by Western countries—to limit the flow of funds and expertise necessary to assist Slovenia in reforming its economy and adjusting to competition in the world market.

Other Secession Issues

In addition to the various problems that Slovenia would have to confront if it were to secede, there are several other issues that will have to be dealt with.

International agreements and obligations. During the transition period, Yugoslavia and Slovenia would have to maintain parallel contacts abroad. As long as its independence has not been recognized by the international community, Slovenia would have to carry on its foreign relations with the use of informal representation abroad and with the help of Slovenes who have foreign citizenship.

State borders with Austria, Italy, and Hungary are regulated by international treaties; independence would not affect them. The border between Croatia and Slovenia is also inviolable. The part of this border that runs through the Adriatic Sea will have to be established by treaty according to the provisions of international maritime law.

International agreements that have been signed by Yugoslavia and refer to Slovenia will be respected by Slovenia after its independence. The government of Slovenia is studying and recording all agreements and treaties signed by Yugoslavia. It will prepare concrete proposals enumerating which international agreements it will not recognize, which it will recognize in part, and which it will recognize in their entirety.

National minorities. Citizenship will be ordered by constitutional law, and will be modeled on provisions found in West European states that are comparable in size and population. The Italian and Hungarian minorities will be guaranteed the same rights in an independent Slovene state that they are now guaranteed by the Yugoslav constitution and by international agreements. The right to independent cultural and linguistic development will also be guaranteed to minorities. Members of other nations and nationalities will be able, if they so desire and if they have permanent residence in Slovenia, to become citizens of the Republic of Slovenia.

The transition period. During the transition period, Slovenia's relations with what remains of Yugoslavia will be placed on a new foundation. Negotiations with the Federation over relations with the federal government and with the republics will have to be undertaken. Such negotiations would be facilitated by the continued functioning of the Federation, whose existence will have to be maintained until the final resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.

The success of Slovenia's drive for independence will strongly depend on the manner, sequence, and speed of efforts to secure economic independence. Economic independence will first be secured via the establishment of ownership rights, the creation of a tax, banking, and financial system, and the development of a system of foreign economic relations. Slovenia would proceed in a parallel fashion with the development of new kinds of economic policies designed to facilitate the country's competitiveness in the world market.

Conclusion

Yugoslavia, like the Soviet Union, is being torn apart by nationalism and ethnic conflict. The other former socialist federation—Czechoslovakia—is experiencing national conflict as well. What are the reasons behind the discontent?

The former communist regimes claimed to have resolved national and ethnic issues, but they did nothing of the kind. Communist regimes fabricated an ideologically comprehensive program on nationalities. Expressions of national interests, national identity, and national sentiments became stigmatized as counterrevolutionary and antisocialist and were suppressed through ideological indoctrination, purges, and terror.

Suppression of national conflict was part of a larger political logic that dominated these societies. This political logic was imagined to be a substitute for the capitalist economic logic of the West. Some economic development occurred on the basis of this political logic, but by the mid-1970's it became apparent that Marxist-Leninist societies were not catching up with the West and, indeed, were falling further behind.

Political logic provided the rationale for the existence of Tito's Yugoslavia and other socialist federations. Some observers believe that the Yugoslav army, 60–70 percent of whose officers are Serbs, could intervene to

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enforce the continued existence of the Federation on the basis of some kind of political logic. However, it is quite possible that army officers understand that the military cannot offer a long-term solution to the Yugoslav crisis. The army may well leave the political arena to the politicians.

As a critical part of their effort to catch up with the developed world, postcommunist societies must encourage and reward behavior based upon capitalist economic logic. Subjectively, *homo economicus* must replace the *homo politicus* of former socialist societies. If the economic logic of market capitalism replaces the political logic of Leninism as the guiding principle of Yugoslav society, federal Yugoslavia will disappear. If the former socialist republics of Yugoslavia can establish links with each other based on economic interests—either within the context of a confederation or as independent states—the chances will improve for a diminution of national conflict in that part of Europe.

In any case, for Slovenia, which has already gone a long way toward establishing a society based on market logic, there is no going back to the Federation as previously constituted. On the other hand, those republics whose societies continue to be guided by political logic—be it nationalism, Marxism-Leninism, or some hybrid—will fall further behind. Indeed, they may be consigned to permanent backwardness.

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Slovenia's Independence: A Reversal of History

Carole Rogel

On December 23, 1990, Slovenia, one of Yugoslavia's six republics, held a plebiscite to determine the citizenry's view on the question of sovereignty and independence for the republic. Of those voting, 1,289,369, or 88.5 percent, favored independence.[1]

Holding a plebiscite was the idea of the Socialist Party of Slovenia and the Social-Democratic Party of Slovenia, and they pressed hard for it. They saw themselves as Western-like democratic socialists whose mission it was to lead Slovene workers out of Balkan political and economic bondage. Independence, for them, was a necessary prerequisite to this goal. By contrast, both the Presidency and the leadership of *Demos,* the governing coalition in parliament, had good reasons for initially not supporting the plebiscite. Many were still committed to Yugoslavism—a noble dream whose roots lay in the 19th century. Milan Kučan, a former Communist and the popular president of the Presidency of Slovenia, was still very attached to Yugoslavism, as were many, although by no means all, in his party, now called the Party of Democratic Renewal (*Stranka demokratične prenove*). Others, including Prime Minister Lojze Peterle, President of the Parliament Francè Bučar, and foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel felt it was economically and politically wiser to maintain some kind of Yugoslav state association and to that end they were developing, together with Croat authorities, a proposal to transform the Yugoslav federation into a confederation of sovereign states.

This last proposal rested on the premise that once all of Yugoslavia's republics had instituted democratic elections and noncommunist authorities had assumed power, an orderly, friendly progress toward a confederation could follow. Slovenia and Croatia had their elections in April and May 1990 respectively; noncommunists assumed power in Ljubljana and Zagreb, and Slovenia and Croatia ceased to be socialist republics. Elections in the other republics were scheduled for the last six weeks of 1990: for the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on November 18; and for Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, each in two stages in December.

Slovene leaders favoring a confederation feared that a Slovene plebiscite expressing support for secession could fatally poison relations among the nations of Yugoslavia. Worse, the plebiscite could fail, and thereby undermine the effort to transform Yugoslavia into a confederation.

In Serbia and Montenegro, two of the four republics to hold elections at the end of the year, the communists would win handily. These communist victories in turn would strengthen the resolve of the newly reelected Serbian president, Slobodan Milošević, to resist the political decentralization and market reforms so central to the confederalist plans being proposed by the northern republics. They would also stymie the less radical reforms of the federal government of Prime Minister Ante Marković and ultimately disrupt even the everyday workings of the federal administration. By the end of December, it would be clear that the Serbian elections, in particular, had unleashed a formidable force, one driven by renewed Great Serbian aspirations. One thing all Slovenes, irrespective of political party allegiance, knew was that they did not want to live in what increasingly they referred to as "Serboslavia."

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[1] *Delo* (Ljubljana), Dec. 27, 1990.

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Citizens of Slovenia vote in the republic's April 8, 1990, multiparty elections.

—AP/Wide World.

Momentum for Independence

Given the perspective of historical hindsight, one can find strong evidence of a revolution simmering in Slovenia as early as 1987. Mostly, however, this revolution was limited to intellectuals urging Slovenes to assert themselves culturally. In a landmark issue of *Nova Revija*—the avant-garde journal of the Slovene intelligentsia—published in 1987, Slovenia's sovereignty and independence were first proposed.[2] It was a spark that was fanned by events and by ever-bolder publications. *Mladina,* a weekly journal published by young Slovene liberals, considered no subject too sacred for scrutiny. It took on the governing establishment, to the glee of Belgrade's opponents throughout the country, but especially in the north. What began as a Slovene journal with a circulation of about 20,000 by 1989 was publishing 80,000 copies per issue that were selling well even outside Slovenia.

[2]*Nova Revija* (Ljubljana), No. 57, March 1987. The subtitle of the issue was "Contributions to a Slovene National Program."

By the spring of 1988, Slovene politicians were drawn into these developments while debating constitutional revisions in the federal parliament. They found themselves opposing Serbian attempts to further centralize Yugoslavia's administration. The debates, televized and widely viewed, served to build a broader constituency for the "revolution." Slovene Communist politicians, such as Milan Kučan, soon began championing Slovene cultural rights and, by early 1989, human rights for all in Yugoslavia, including the Albanians in Kosovo. The Serbs were not pleased, and tensions built throughout 1989 between Serbs and Slovenes and their respective Communist leaders. In the first six weeks of 1990, the Slovene Communists effected a political upheaval. In the republic's parliament, they voted the republic the right to secede from the Federation; then, in mid-January, they walked out of a Yugoslav League of Communists congress in Belgrade because this body refused to support political liberalization and market economic reforms; and finally, they broke officially with the Yugoslav party and formally changed their name to the Party of Democratic Renewal. Not incidental to these developments is the fact that Slovene

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communists themselves established political pluralism in Slovenia, a move they believed would assure them victory in elections that would be held a few months hence. They were ultimately disappointed in their efforts, for the noncommunist opposition had adopted an effective coalition strategy.[3]

Support for an independent Slovenia had been growing significantly for about a year before the April 1990 elections. The May Declaration of 1989, sponsored by the writers' union and four incipient political movements, made Slovene sovereignty its primary goal. Leading intellectuals and emerging noncommunist political figures (who formed what came to be known as the united opposition, later *Demos*) advocated independence in a special March 1990 issue of *Nova Revija*. This special issue—entitled "*Samostojna Slovenija*" (Independent Slovenia)—was extremely influential in the April 1990 elections.[4] Among its contributors were those who, once they were elected, came to fear the political repercussions of a plebiscite.

Resistance on the part of the Federation to steps Slovenia had taken toward sovereignty and independence made a plebiscite all the more urgent. The Slovene parliament hit a raw nerve with its declaration of sovereignty on July 2, 1990. Tensions rose again in late September when parliament established a Slovene national guard (Territorial Defense) under the republic's control and also proposed declaring Slovene laws sovereign within the republic. It knew that the federal government, the federal army, and especially Serbia with its chauvinist, neo-Stalinist president, Milošević, would not quietly accede to such steps.

December 23 was set for the vote after what seemed like interminable haggling over the prudence of holding a plebiscite and the mechanics of the undertaking. (In fact, the scheduling of the plebiscite really only took a couple of weeks from the time the Socialists called for it and Kučan, on behalf of the Presidency, officially proposed it to parliament.) The parties, the government, the media, the whole population—if one judges by the deluge of letters received by editors of newspapers—deliberated the issues to exhaustion. Who should vote? What would constitute a positive result? A majority of those voting? A majority of registered voters? What was the best date? What response might be expected from the federal government? What did Slovenes have to lose? To gain? Enormous energy was put into planning the event meticulously in order to avert

[3]For insight into the thinking of prominent Slovenes on these developments, see Janko Prunk's interviews of Slovene leaders in *Nova slovenska samozavest* (New Slovene Self-Awareness), Ljubljana, Lumi and Panatal, 1990.

[4]No. 95, March 1990. A commemorative hardback edition of this issue was subsequently published.

PRIDNIH ROK SE NI BATI SAMOSTOJNE PRIHODNOSTI DEŽELI S ŠTIRIMI MILIJONI PRIDNIH ROK SE NI BATI SAMOSTOJNE PRIHODNOSTI

A poster in Ljubljana reads: "A Land with 4 Million Hard-Working Hands Need Not Be Afraid of an Independent Future."

—Reuters/Bettmann.

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disaster. This level of concern was understandable because just 70 years before, Slovenes, as a result of a plebiscite held after World War I, lost part of Carinthia to Austria. This was the Slovenes' only prior experience with a plebiscite, and they did not want the defeat repeated.

On December 6, members of parliament greeted the passage of the plebiscite provisions with a standing ovation.[5] What followed was two weeks of determined campaigning to ensure success. All parties agreed to cooperate, postponing work on amending the Slovene constitution and putting aside their political differences. Instead, politicians dispersed to the countryside and spoke as one about why the plebiscite was necessary, what its passage would mean, and why a large turnout at the polls was essential. *Delo,* the leading daily newspaper, carried full- and half-page ads sponsored by political parties and cultural and professional organizations in support of independence. Many included inspirational phrases from the works of Francè Prešeren, the 19th century Romantic writer, whose poem *Zdravljica* (A Toast) had become the Slovenes' national anthem. One ad, depicting opened hands supporting an infant's unsteady feet read: "A Land with 4 Million Hard-Working Hands Need Not Be Afraid of an Independent Future." To this wording, another poster with the same photograph added: "With 2 Million Sensible Heads"—an especially effective codicil.[6]

In those weeks, voters and particularly politicians were anxious over the sharp warnings periodically emanating from Belgrade. They consoled themselves with the results of frequent public-opinion polls predicting that both voter participation and support for independence would be around 90 percent. Yet, could the polls be trusted? Even the social scientists who had been so instrumental in bringing about multiparty government that year had their doubts. Confidence grew in the week before the vote, and at least *Delo*'s political cartoonist, Franco Juri, himself a member of parliament, retained a sense of humor about the situation. One cartoon depicted Slovenia's foreign minister rushing to announce to Prime Minister Peterle that independent Slovenia had already been recognized by one country—Burkina Faso. Another had the federal president, Borisav Jović, unable to dispatch a Yugoslav army tank to Slovenia because the oilcan he was using to lubricate its treads had run out of oil—an allusion to the Mideast crisis.[7]

Slovene Prime Minister Lojze Peterle at a bulletin board, which reads: "A List of States That Will Recognize Us Immediately." Slovene foreign minister Dimitrij Rupel arrives with a letter of recognition from Burkina Faso.

—Franco Jura/*Delo* (Ljubljana), Dec. 4, 1990.

On December 23, excitement turned into euphoria when early poll results confirmed a landslide vote in favor of independence. Although unofficial tallies were not announced until 11 pm, the plebiscite's passage became a certainty early in the day. Some polls closed even before noon, because all those registered had voted. Having done their civic duty early, voters passed the remainder of that Sunday festively with food, drink, and music. Champagne flowed that day, and Ljubljana put on a fireworks display. The effect of it all was cathartic. Slovenes had a sense of doing for the first time in their history what they had not done or had been prevented from doing in the past: they had decided overwhelmingly to be independent.

In Belgrade, the importance of the plebiscite was minimized and given scant coverage. For the federal government in late December it was business as usual—agonizing over the economic woes of Yugoslavia's six republics and two autonomous provinces.

For Slovenes, after the plebiscite and Christmas fes-

[5]*Delo,* Dec. 7, 1990.

[6]*Delo* issued a special December 23 supplement entitled "*Most v slovensko samostojnost*" (A Bridge to Slovene Independence). Proceeds from the sale of this special issue went toward building an actual bridge in Ljubno to replace one that had been washed out during floods in early November. A full-page color reproduction of the "hard-working hands" ad appears in this publication.

[7]Ibid., Dec. 20, 1990.

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tivities, it seemed that nothing had changed: the dinar was still the medium of exchange, Yugoslav army troops were still seen in the streets, and there was still a sense of belonging to a state whose capital was Belgrade. Clearly, Slovenia had not yet become independent. Nevertheless, according to a December 26, 1990, *Delo* editorial, everything had changed. The Slovene nation had overwhelmingly affirmed its will.

A few days later Francè Bučar, a law professor who is president of the parliament, explained the significance of the plebiscite. He said that it was similar to the American Declaration of Independence, that is, it was a statement of intent. Real independence, as in the case of the United States, would come eventually, inevitably, but only after the groundwork had been laid.[8] In the case of Slovenia, independence was projected for June 26, 1991, a half year after the vote. Meanwhile, the Slovenes would initiate what amounted to a six-month divorce proceeding (President Kučan's term), during which the republic would define Slovene citizenship, issue passports and money, empower territorial defense units with safeguarding the republic, establish diplomatic relations with other states, acquire United Nations' representation, and attend to complicated economic issues. (The last are especially serious, given that Slovenia would have to establish economic independence at the same time as it was attempting a transition from socialist to market principles and practices.) A new constitution, on which parliament continued to work, was to embody the laws of a sovereign Slovenia. For those already at work on the constitution, the plebiscite clarified direction and goals, and gave their work a sense of urgency. It also gave them a deadline—June 26, which they soon began referring to as D-day. All in all, the plebiscite shored up the fledgling Slovene government—one that tended to get mired in political squabbling—and gave it renewed focus.

Rationale for Independence

Several factors contributed to the emergence of Slovenia's independence movement in the late 1980's. Yugoslavia's economic woes, which have been well documented and regularly described in the Western press, are chief among them. Slovenia, the relatively prosperous, hard-working northern republic, with an enviable foreign-trade balance, has been impoverished by a galloping inflation and federal taxes whose revenues were destined for the less-developed areas of Yugoslavia. Many Slovenes concluded that Socialist Yugoslavia's central-planning and self-management systems were the source of their problems, yet they felt powerless to change them. Even federal Prime Minister Ante Marković's 1990 economic reforms, which dramatically curbed inflation, accomplished less for Slovenia than for the other republics.

Economic and political conflicts with Serbia, particularly with Milošević and his supporters, have also pushed Slovenes toward independence. Serbia effectively uses its dominance of federal institutions to thwart economic reform initiatives. In the eight-member Yugoslav Presidency, for example, Serbia controls the votes of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and can generally count on the support of Montenegro and, until recently, Macedonia as well. Serbia has also sabotaged those economic policies it deems unfavorable to its interests. One example of Serbia's egregious economic acts was the "Great Serbian Bank Robbery" of late December 1990. Without the knowledge or approval of the federal government, Serbia's parliament printed US$1.8 billion worth of dinars to honor election promises made by Slobodan Milošević. This action convinced the Slovenes (and Western bankers) that Serbia was not to be trusted.

Politically, Slovenia feels it suffers from its association with Serbia. Serbia's long record of violating the human rights of Albanians in Kosovo, as documented by Helsinki Watch and various Western governmental delegations throughout the 1980's, casts an unfavorable light on Yugoslavia as a whole. The world community deals with Yugoslavia as a single unit, and the shame of Kosovo has reflected upon all Yugoslavs, including the Slovenes. Milošević and his allies will not relinquish Serbian control over Kosovo, and they have exploited Serbian nationalism throughout Yugoslavia to bolster the political position of Milošević.

Slovenes have worked hard to separate themselves from the negative image attached to Yugoslavia. They have repeatedly proclaimed their opposition to Serbia's treatment of Kosovo Albanians. This effort appears to have paid off in that at least some in the West have come to single out Serbia, rather than all Yugoslavia, as the culprit.[9]

International events have influenced developments in Slovenia. Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroyka*, the 1989

[8]Ibid., Dec. 27, 1990.

[9]For example, US Senator Robert Dole, after a visit to Kosovo in September 1990, was very critical of Serbia. In November 1990, the US Senate passed an amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for 1991 (Nickles Amendment) opposing financial assistance to Yugoslavia. It was intended to punish Serbia for human-rights violations in Kosovo; the six-month grace period allowing Yugoslavia to rectify those wrongs expired in May 1991. See *The New York Times*, May 19, 1991.

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revolutions in East Central Europe and the Balkans, the unification of Germany, and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact marked the end of an era. By 1990, it appeared that a new Europe was emerging, a post-cold war Europe that was not divided into blocs. By 1992, the 12 West European states are to be formally integrated into a single European market. "Europe now!" was a slogan heard frequently during the election campaign and the run-up to the plebiscite. Yet, Yugoslavia's participation in European integration is being held up because democracy, market economic reforms, and efforts to establish the rule of law have made so little headway in Serbia. Yugoslavia, which in the view of the international community, had been close to the West for decades, was now lagging behind. Even the former Soviet satellites of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia have moved ahead of Yugoslavia in their bids to "join Europe."

If Slovenia is to participate in these developments Yugoslavia must either be transformed into a loose confederation of sovereign republics or Slovenia must break away entirely. The latter seemed the preferred option in early summer 1991.

The Slovenes and the South Slavs

Historically, the idea of Slovene independence is something radically new. It has not been an option that Slovenes have considered seriously in the modern period.

Slovene national consciousness was nonexistent in the late 18th century. Even Anton Linhart (1756–95), who was the first to investigate Slovene history, entitled his work *Versuch einer Geschichte von Krain und der übrigen südlichen Slaven Österreiches* (The Search for a History of Carniola and the Other Southern Slavs of Austria).[10] Note that there is no mention of "Slovenes" or territories other than Carniola (located in the Habsburg Empire), where Slovenes made up a majority at the time.

Over the first half of the 19th century—before the revolutions of 1848—intellectuals and clergy went about investigating the history, culture, and language of the territories inhabited by the people who later became known as the Slovenes. In the process, they established and defined Slovene national consciousness. But almost from the beginning, these intellectuals linked the Slovenes to the larger Southern Slav family (which, in some cases, even included the Bulgarians). Some intellectuals, such as the poet Stanko Vraz, were strong proponents of Illyrism—the idea that all Southern Slavs adopt a common language. Vraz had in mind *štokavian,* which became the basis for modern Serbo-Croatian.

The Slovenes' first political program was formulated in 1848 by a handful of intellectuals, many of whom had been involved in the cultural work described above.[11] The program called for a united Slovenia (combining all the Slovene-inhabited lands of the Austrian empire in one administrative unit), and for use of the Slovene language, rather than German, in schools and administration. Some Slovenes also wanted to cooperate politically with other South Slavs of the empire. Nothing came of these demands, because all the revolutionaries, nationalists included, were suppressed by the Habsburgs. However, it should be noted that in 1848, the Slovenes did not seek independence. Rather, they sought only autonomy within the Habsburg Empire, and they worked together with other South Slavs, mainly Croats, to press their demands. Until the outbreak of World War I, most Slovene political programs projected their future within a Habsburg framework, and they stressed cooperation with or actual merger with other South Slavs in the empire.

After the revolutions of 1848, Europe experienced a change in the *Zeitgeist.* Before 1848, Romanticism was the dominant intellectual mode of Europeans. Those who considered the emerging national consciousness of different peoples thought of nations living in harmony with each other. For them, national cultures were like flowers, each unique, comprising a beautiful bouquet called Europe. That ideal vanished in the quarter century after the revolutions of 1848. Rather, states competed with each other for power and influence and utilized nationalism in that competition. Prussia's Chancellor Otto von Bismarck became quite adept at using national sentiment to further Berlin's political aims. This culminated in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 in which the victorious Prussians proclaimed the formation of the German empire at Versailles.

In the new era, the losers were multinational empires —the Habsburg and the Ottoman—and the smaller, backward nations. In the 1850's and 1860's, following a series of short wars, the Austrian empire was compelled to bow to the national aspirations of Italy, Germany, and Hungary. Vienna gave up two valuable prov-

[10]Linhart's book was written in revolutionary times, between 1788 and 1791.

[11]The best survey of Slovene history is a collaborative work entitled *Zgodovina Slovencev* (A History of the Slovenes), Ljubljana, 1979. For a survey of Slovene Yugoslavism, see Carole Rogel, *The Slovenes and Yugoslavism, 1890–1914,* New York, East European Monographs, 1977.

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inces (Lombardy and Venetia) to the newly created Kingdom of Italy, forfeited to Prussia/Germany its role as the dominant power in Central Europe, and agreed to the Compromise of 1867, which established the Dual Monarchy and thereby allowed Hungary to rule the southeastern parts of the empire from Budapest. The Slovenes, one of those backward nations just beginning to attain national consciousness were divided among these three realms. Most remained in the Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire, but 27,000 found themselves in Italy after 1866 and 45,000 remained in Hungary after the Compromise of 1867. These irredenta may not seem large, but they were considerable for a nation that numbered only 1.1 million at approximately that time.[12]

How did Slovenes deal with Europe's hostile new environment? One strategy was to try to prod the Habsburg Empire to become a kind of protector to the small nations in its domain. This position is sometimes referred to as "Austroslavism" and was supported by other Slavs in the empire as well. In fact, in the late 1870's and 1880's, the Slavs fared quite well in the Austrian half of Austria-Hungary, mainly because Emperor Franz Joseph was interested in using them to counter the influence of the German Liberals in Austria, who sought to centralize the empire under German leadership and opposed non-German efforts at national autonomy.

But from about the mid-1890's, the Slovenes were becoming more and more disappointed with the Austrian administration as Vienna became increasingly "German" in its leanings. Slavs were less prominent in imperial government posts, the dynasty seemed to favor German culture as official, and the Foreign Office had forged a firm alliance with Germany. However, during the same period, the Slovenes, with few isolated exceptions, chose not to turn elsewhere. The three incipient political parties—the Liberals (*Narodna napredna stranka*), the Clericals (*Slovenska ljudska stranka*), and the Socialists (*Jugoslovenska socialdemokratična stranka*)—despite philosophical and political differences—all advocated Slovenia's remaining within Austria. Slovenia's potential enemies—Germany, Italy and, to a lesser degree, Russia—after all were too big to confront alone.

The Slovenes also actively pursued cooperation with other South Slavs in the empire. The Liberals worked closely with Croat and Czech liberals for a federation of national units within Austria. The Clericals temporarily merged with the Croat Party of Right (in 1912) to promote trialism, that is, the creation of a third unit within the empire composed of South Slav domains that would be given autonomy and equal status with Austria and Hungary. (They believed that the Archduke Franz Ferdinand favored this plan. The Croat Rightists, however, were not convinced that the Archduke was willing to include the Slovenes, so they broke with the Slovene Clericals.) Finally, the Socialists even made the term "Yugoslav" part of their official name, and in 1909 called for the complete national cultural unification (including language) of all South Slavs. They were "Austro-Marxist," believing that a large, multinational state like Austria offered favorable grounds for the development of socialism.[13]

These parties and other groups among the Slovenes developed a variety of "Yugoslav" solutions to complement their respective national programs. In the main, they believed that the empire's South Slavs would end up living in one jurisdiction, and that eventually other South Slavs would gradually be absorbed into the empire. Most even thought that Serbia, an independent state at the time, would become part of Austria some day. None of these Slovene programs was ever realized. Instead, in 1914, Austria made war against Serbia, holding it responsible for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.

The war destroyed the Habsburg Empire, and in its place the Wilsonian ideal of national self-determination legitimated the establishment of successor-states based on the ethnic principle. At last, the goal of Ivan Cankar and the *Preporod* (Renaissance) Movement, which before the war had called for Austria-Hungary's breakup and the Slovenes' union with Serbia, was realized.[14]

Support for a South Slav state had been growing throughout the war, as more Croats and Slovenes gave up on Austria. In the summer of 1917, the Serb government-in-exile on the island of Corfu came to an understanding with Croats of the Yugoslav Committee, a group in exile throughout the United States and Western Europe, to pursue a common state after the war. On October 29, 1918, a few days before the resignation of

[12]For a history of the Habsburg state in the 19th century, see C. A. Macartney. *The Habsburg Empire, 1790–1918*, London, Macmillan, 1968.

[13]Rogel, op. cit., pp. 28–74.

[14]Ibid., pp. 102–17.

The *Preporodovici*, a group of high school students who had organized a secret society in 1912, had been determined proponents of joining with Serbia in order to promote their version of Yugoslavism. In a generational conflict with their elders, they rejected establishment politicians (including those of Slovene nationalist politicians who were regarded as "Uncle Toms") and wrote treasonous articles in their newspaper *Preporod*. They also established close links with radical students throughout the Balkans. It was a truly revolutionary group, many of whose members volunteered to fight for Serbia when Austria declared war in July 1914 (most Slovenes and Croats chose to fight for Austria-Hungary).

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the Emperor and two weeks before the end of the war, the National Council of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs—made up of political activists within the empire—proclaimed the creation of a new South Slav state. On November 24, 1918, the new South Slav state formally unified with the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. On December 1, the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was announced in Belgrade.

Slovenia and Yugoslavia

The creation of a South Slav state was to have been the fulfillment of a national dream, but it turned into a nightmare. First, the number of Slovene irredenta grew. Interwar Slovenia did not include the Slovenes of the Littoral, Istria, or even some parts of Carniola—these lands had been promised to Italy by the Entente in 1915. In particular, the loss of Trieste to Italy was a major economic setback, for that city had the largest Slovene urban population, nearly double that of Ljubljana, and its hinterland was predominantly Slovene. Slovene socialists especially regretted the loss of Trieste because it was more of an industrial and commercial center than Ljubljana.[15] The plebiscite was also a particular blow to the Slovenes' national pride because their medieval homeland, *Karantania,* remained in Austria.[16]

Second, the experience of living in what historians call the first Yugoslavia did not meet Slovene expectations. Ultimately, the problem stemmed from the fact that Yugoslavia was created before it was clear how it would be governed. The South Slavs of Austria-Hungary sought federalism and autonomy for each national group when they chose to become part of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. By contrast, the Serbs considered the kingdom to be a "Greater Serbia" and centralized power in Belgrade. The *Vidovdan* (St. Vitus Day) constitution of 1921 came to symbolize Serbian centralist rule. It was even promulgated on June 28, a Serbian national holiday.

Given developments over the last 70 years, some have argued that the Slovenes should have chosen independence in 1918, that they should not have looked to the south for their political and cultural salvation. However, at the time, this position was not tenable. After all, Slovenes had developed a strong Yugoslav orientation over the previous century. All Slovene political parties had well-developed Yugoslav programs. Equally important, it seemed to be the solution favored by the Western allies. Yugoslavism had been especially idealized and promoted among influential intellectuals in Great Britain. Very prominent among these was R. W. Seton-Watson, who had published *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy* in 1911. From 1916 to 1920, Seton-Watson edited *The New Europe,* a journal that advocated Wilsonian principles and therefore national self-determination for, among others, the South Slavs.

At the end of the war, the Allies were ready to sponsor the creation of a South Slav state. A numerically small people like the Slovenes had no choice but to join it.

With 23 governments between 1921 and 1929, the first Yugoslavia was extremely unstable politically (to be sure, so were other states of Eastern Europe). In 1929, out of desperation, King Alexander dissolved the parliament, abolished the *Vidovdan* Constitution, and established a dictatorship. He hoped to minimize national differences by changing the name of the state to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. But Serb centralist rule persisted, and was met by strong resistance, chiefly on the part of the Croats. The King was assassinated in 1934, but the fundamental issues were not resolved, and soon the Yugoslavs became embroiled in yet another European war.[17]

World War II engulfed Yugoslavia with the bombing of Belgrade on April 6, 1941. Within weeks, the country was occupied and dismembered by Germany, Italy, and Hungary. Slovenia, for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist. Slovenes in the occupied areas were subjected to deportation, imprisonment, resettlement, and systematic efforts at de-nationalization by Italians, Hungarians, and Austrian Germans.

Those Slovenes who fought with the Communist-led partisan resistance ended up in the winning camp when the war was over. The Slovene resistance had been organized early and had been surprisingly effective throughout the war in a particularly sensitive geopolitical area. Slovenes who had been subject to political oppression in Italy and Austria in the interwar years were especially valuable in that fight. At the war's end, Slovene resistance fighters occupied those ethnic Slo-

[15]In 1910, Trieste, then an Austrian city, had a population of 229,510, of whom 56,916 were Slovenes. At the same time, Ljubljana's population was 41,727, a significant proportion of whom were non-Slovenes. See *Zgodovina Slovencev,* op. cit., pp. 532–34, 540.

[16]The wording of the plebiscite implied, not a choice between living in Austria or the new Yugoslav state, but a vote to keep Carinthia united. In any case, Slovene voters were assured that culturally they would not be affected by the vote. But already in the 1920's, even before the advent of Hitler's racial policies, Carinthian Slovenes were proclaimed to be Windisch in origin, and therefore not related to Slovenes south of the Karavankan Alps. Assimilation pressures have been applied in varying degrees since.

[17]For a concise history of Yugoslavia, see Fred Singleton, *Twentieth Century Yugoslavia,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1976.

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vene lands that had gone to Austria and Italy after 1919, including Trieste, but Slovenia was not allowed to keep all the territories occupied by the partisans. Consequently, although Slovenia is significantly larger than it was in the interwar period, Slovene minorities still live in Italy and Austria, and Trieste remains an Italian city.

Slovenia, of course, remained a part of Yugoslavia. The partisan war effort had been an all-Yugoslav affair; moreover, Slovene partisans subscribed to the idea of building a new Yugoslavia comprised of nations having equal rights united in a federal structure. The script was written by none other than Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene and confidant of Tito, who had outlined his own solution to the Slovene nationality question in a widely read book published just before the war.[18]

As Kardelj, who might have been Tito's successor, saw it, socialist Yugoslavia was to be a safe haven for the small nations—including even the Bosnian Muslim nation. The experience of the Yugoslav Communist Party, federated by nationality in the late 1930's and steeled in the revolution/anti-fascist war effort, was to be applied in the building of socialism in peacetime. Protection for the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia became a cornerstone of all the postwar Yugoslav constitutions.

However, a fundamental change in the way nations were to be regarded began in the mid- to late 1950's and coincided with Kardelj's theoretical redefinition of the nation. In 1957, Kardelj distinguished between "bourgeois" nations (as understood by Marx and Stalin) and "socialist" ones. Only the latter were, of course, progressive. In the case of Yugoslavia, to oversimplify Kardelj's labyrinthian Marxist language, only that which contributed to the building of a "socialist" Yugoslav nation was deemed to be progressive. To further the cause of that nation, Kardelj helped devise the system of self-management, and when bourgeois nationalisms threatened either Yugoslavism or socialism they were dealt with accordingly. One example is the way Croat reformers were muzzled in 1971.

Slovenes tolerated the system longer and somewhat better than other nations in Yugoslavia; for one, their standard of living was much higher, comparable to that of Austria's. But this was not for any love of Kardelj, whom they held responsible for many of their woes.

[18]*Razvoj slovenskega narodnega vprašanja* (The Development of the Slovene National Question) was first published under the pseudonym Sperans in 1939. Kardelj's revised postwar editions of 1957, 1970, 1977, and 1980 (Serbo-Croatian translations were also printed) came under harsh criticism from Slovene historians who charged Kardelj with manipulating historical evidence to suit contemporary political needs. See Carole Rogel, "Edvard Kardelj's Nationality Theory and Yugoslav Socialism," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* (Prince Edward Island), Vol. XII, No. 2, 1985, pp. 343–57.



Slovene President Milan Kučan.

—AP/Wide World.

Why, for example, had Kardelj not objected when the Yugoslav army (at Stalin's urging) retreated from Slovene lands in Carinthia, the Littoral, and Trieste? Slovenes, except for a mini-reform effort in the late 1960's–early 1970's, went along because they believed there was no viable alternative. Also, they are traditionally a cautious people. And their identity was at least constitutionally protected in Yugoslavia. Yet, after Tito's death in 1980, they found it hard to ignore the glaring realities of the failure of Yugoslavism and of socialist self-managment. These failures comprise the entire spectrum of political, economic, and cultural life—including ecological concerns that motivate the Slovene Greens, who became part of the *Demos* coalition. In the last four years, the Slovenes have concluded that on balance their well-being was regularly being sacrificed to the benefit of some other constituency. The material and spiritual costs of living in Yugoslavia were no longer acceptable.

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Conclusion

By 1990, it was apparent that Kardelj's solution had failed. The Slovenes have decided that in 1945 they made two mistakes: one was choosing communism; the other was staying in Yugoslavia.[19] In 1990, they firmly rejected both. Success in the effort to gain real independence, however, depends on many factors, not the least of which is gaining the approval of the major West European powers and the United States. If Slovenia's leaders are not to get cold feet two things must happen. First, a settlement with the Federation—preferably an amicable one—must be worked out to settle financial accounts and obtain assurances that the Yugoslav army will not move to prevent Slovenia's secession. Second, goodwill in Western Europe and the United States is also imperative because it will determine whether or not vital assistance will be forthcoming. In fact, United States Secretary of State James Baker went to Belgrade on June 21, 1991, following the Berlin meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. He spoke with the presidents of each of Yugoslavia's republics, and warned Slovenia and Croatia that should they break away unilaterally, the US and its allies would not recognize them, nor would economic assistance be forthcoming.[20]

Slovenia's neighbors, especially Italy, must also be supportive. Until recently, Rome had been warning that international boundary agreements as they pertain to the Italian-Yugoslav border would have to be subject to renegotiation should Slovenia secede. And yet, the Slovenes are inclined to be hopeful. Slovenia's leadership will not let world leaders forget that Slovenia exists and wants to be sovereign and a part of Europe.

Whatever the judgment of Western leaders, events in the last couple of years have changed the way Slovenes view themselves. There is a new sense of self-awareness about them and a new self-confidence as well. This attitude prompted one journalist to remark recently that Slovenes have a new self-image: "Small is beautiful" sums it up.[21]

[19]Lecture by Ernest Petrič, Dean, Faculty of Political Science, Sociology, and Journalism, Edvard Kardelj University of Ljubljana, Cleveland, OH, November 1988.

[20]*The New York Times*, June 22, 1991.

[21]The author, Marko Crnković, actually uses the English subheading "Small Is Beautiful" in his article. See *Delo*, Mar. 23, 1991.

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Civil Society and Soviet Psychiatry

Peter Reddaway

Since the late 1980's, it has become commonplace among Western and Soviet observers to refer to the gradual emergence in the USSR of a civil society. This article will consider to what degree reforms in psychiatry and in the ensuring of rights for the mentally ill have contributed, or have failed to contribute, to creating the basis for a civil society in the Soviet Union. I will treat psychiatry as a microcosm in which to test the proposition that a civil society may be emerging.

Western writers on the emergence of civil society in the Soviet Union have paid little attention to a careful definition of the term.[1] Moreover, the definitions usually *implied* by them appear to diverge substantially from the meanings typically given to the term by political philosophers over the last three centuries. For example: "Civil society is a sphere of social life where people as private citizens interact with each other, creating their own various organizations not controlled by the state."[2] It is, of course, easy to agree that such a "sphere of social life" has existed in the Soviet Union since the 1950's, that it has come into the open and expanded dramatically since 1986–87, and that in most cases it strives to be as independent as possible from the state. But it is much harder to say that it constitutes civil society.

Classical theorists of civil society have seen an *interdependence* between civil society and the state. In return for the state's granting of various degrees of autonomy to the voluntary associations of civil society, these associations either implicitly or explicitly pledge their loyalty to the state. Without such a relationship, whether it be with a Hobbesian or a democratic state, the various associations cannot achieve the recognition and stability which are essential if they are to develop and thrive as a civil society. Civil society also makes direct inputs into the polity and affairs of state, for example through such associations as political parties. It has a strong interest in legal order and in political stability, since disorder and revolution inevitably threaten its survival. Civil society, theorists also stress, must be civil—a society in which tolerance and viable, civilized relations between individuals and groups having different political and religious persuasions, and with various commercial and intellectual interests, can flourish.

Many qualifications and exceptions to the above generalizations can of course be made. But rather than review here the particular views of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hegel, de Tocqueville, Marx, Durkheim, Gramsci, and others, or even summarize a recent and stimulating comparative study of such views,[3] let me for the moment only comment that the contemporary situation in the Soviet Union is not very conducive

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[1]See, e.g., S. Frederick Starr, "Soviet Union: A Civil Society," *Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC), Spring 1988, pp. 26–41; idem., "Civil Society and the Impediments to Reform," in William G. Miller, Ed., *Toward a More Civil Society? The USSR Under Gorbachev,* New York, Ballinger, 1989, pp. 304–09; idem., "The Road to Reform," in Abraham Brumberg, Ed., *Chronicle of a Revolution,* New York, Pantheon Books, 1990, pp. 17–29; Gail Lapidus, "State and Civil Society: Toward the Emergence of Civil Society in the Soviet Union," in Seweryn Bialer, Ed., *Politics, Society, and Nationality Inside Gorbachev's Russia,* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1989; Vladimir Shlapentokh, *Public and Private Life of the Soviet People,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1989; Geoffrey Hosking, *The Awakening of the Soviet Union,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1990; Victoria Bonnell, "Voluntary Associations in Gorbachev's Reform Program," in George Breslauer, Ed., *Can Gorbachev's Reforms Succeed?* Berkeley, CA, Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet Studies, 1990, pp. 177–93; and Helsinki Watch (L. Alexeyeva and C. Fitzpatrick), *Nyeformaly: Civil Society in the USSR,* New York, Helsinki Watch, 1990.

[2]Shlapentokh, op. cit., p. 190.

[3]Salvador Giner, "The Withering Away of Civil Society?" *Praxis International* (Oxford), October 1985, pp. 247–67.

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to the emergence of a civil society as just defined. First, the lack of any political tradition of democratic compromise, honest debate, and coalition-building, and the prevalence in traditional Soviet political culture of intrigue and diktat, have made the emerging pluralistic culture anything but tolerant and civilized.[4] Some radical democrats have been as bad as the politically threatened conservatives; for example, they have paralyzed the Leningrad city council by extremist behavior.[5] Second, the civil associations and the government have not built bridges to each other. The government has been aggressively defensive of its old prerogatives, and the civil associations have been unsure about the desirability of close cooperation with a discredited regime. And third, since 1988, there has been steadily growing instability in the USSR, with no solid improvement in legal order—a trend that, I believe, will get worse in the 1990's.[6]

Another way of framing these objections to the current orthodoxy about the emergence of civil society is to suggest that the explosion of voluntary associations is evidence not of the emergence of civil society but, rather, of a developing anticommunist revolution. If this is the case, then many of the associations—whether political, professional, religious, commercial, trade-unionist, or whatever—may prove to be more immediately concerned with furthering a revolution than with creating a civil society. And whether or not such a society would emerge after a revolution is impossible to predict.

What we *can* say, however, is that the above pattern seems to have occurred in the late tsarist period. Many of the prerequisites for a civil society came into existence in the wake of Alexander II's "Great Reforms," but the attempt to complete and secure civil society by building a bridge between the state and society during the "constitutional experiment" of 1907–14 failed.[7] The gap was not adequately bridged, voluntary associations increasingly promoted or connived at revolutionary activity, revolution ensued, and the embryonic civil society—after a short, chaotic flowering in 1917—was soon crushed by the Bolsheviks.

In my view, then, it is premature to conclude that a civil society—rather than just some prerequisites for one—has emerged in today's Russia, the republic on which I would like mainly to focus. But let me also state my view that the emergence of the prerequisites for a civil society is probably the most hopeful sign of development regarding the future of Russia over the next decade or two—whether that future be evolutionary or revolutionary in nature.

[4]Vera Tolz, *The USSR's Emerging Multiparty System,* Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990, pp. 86–87.

[5]Andrei Chernov, "In Favor of a Strong Hand," *Moscow News,* Oct. 21, 1990.

[6]Peter Reddaway, "The Quality of Gorbachev's Leadership," *Soviet Economy* (Washington, DC), Vol. 6, No. 2, 1990, pp. 125–40.

[7]Geoffrey Hosking, *The Russian Constitutional Experiment,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973, Ch. 9.

Psychiatry and Patients' Rights

All societies find it difficult to provide humane assistance to the mentally ill and ensure ethical behavior by mental-health professionals. Issues surrounding the treatment of the mentally ill are not easy. As the Russian psychiatrist V. A. Gilyarovskiy said, "Psychiatry is a mirror that reflects the shadowy sides of life." Nonetheless, in the highly developed civil societies of Western Europe and North America, the following conditions usually obtain, if in varying degrees. Psychiatric theory and practice are fields in which freedom exists to debate, innovate, and experiment. Private and public sectors interact, and many specialized journals and magazines, as well as parts of the mass media, act as forums for discussion, criticism, and exposés of real or perceived abuses. Medical and lay organizations exist for similar purposes; they also pursue corporate goals concerning the moral development and autonomy of the mental-health professions. Important here are maintaining educational standards, promoting research on a national and international basis, enforcing patients' rights and professional ethics through the use of disciplinary codes, and—together with lawyers—refining solutions to the many problems presented by the interaction of psychiatry and the law.

Psychiatry and mental health provide illustrations of the interdependence between civil society and the state. Political parties, pressure groups, professional organizations, health administrators, and government agencies at various levels interact, consult, and disagree with each other constantly over financing the public sector and the overall regulation of both public and private sectors. Government ultimately produces budgets, directives, regulations, and, occasionally, laws. The deepest conflicts in this sphere usually concern money, for example, the level of funding for the public sector. For lack of sufficient resources, this sector is often unable to provide high-quality care to many of its patients. Finally, charitable and voluntary organizations strive to fill the gaps in the established structures, and pursue goals of special concern.

As the reformist forces in Soviet psychiatry seek to move their whole psychiatric system toward this sort of pattern, they face enormous problems. First, the totalitarian communist system, which destroyed the last elements of the embryonic civil society in the 1920's, persisted in many respects until the late 1980's, and even

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struggles to survive today. For decades, this system has regarded the mentally ill as an unredeemable, essentially incurable, unproductive, and expensive nuisance, which must be kept out of sight and handled at lowest possible cost to the state's resources. Although ordinary citizens have had, in effect, no enforceable rights, the mentally ill were even more helpless before the all-powerful state. Second, doctors have been servants of the state, virtually obliged to carry out its orders, deprived of professional autonomy, and forced to operate in structures established by politicians trained in Marxist-Leninist ideology. Third, psychiatrists have been trained in a monopolistic psychiatric theory which lays down, among other things, that most mental illness is incurable and that acts of deviation from the social and political norms of Marxism-Leninism are symptoms of mental illness. Fourth, the totalitarian state used the psychiatric system to stifle dissent and political deviance. It pressed psychiatrists to diagnose some of the dissidents as mentally ill, and then to treat them in institutions for indefinite periods of time with the aim of forcing them to recant their beliefs.[8]

Has Soviet psychiatry changed in recent years? Are there indications that any changes that have taken place reflect the emergence of a civil society in the USSR? Probably the biggest achievement to date has been the initiation in the USSR since 1987–88 of an increasingly open public discussion of all the issues just listed. This has been the joint work of an informal, loose, unarticulated, but de facto coalition of reformist forces. In many cases, these forces have acted independently of each other, while trying to build on each other's successes. This coalition, which I have described in detail elsewhere,[9] has consisted of a number of official, semi-official, unofficial, and foreign components. The main official components have been the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Eduard Shevardnadze, which has been directly engaged in dealing with and pressuring leaders in the field of Soviet psychiatry; the personal office of Aleksandr Yakovlev, which has quietly "sponsored" key parts of the media's efforts to promote reform; the Academy of Sciences' Institute of State and Law, which has encouraged key staff people to push for legal reform; and, on occasion, even the KGB, which has shown some willingness to help dissidents who are opposed to psychiatric abuse.[10] Other components have been official and semi-official press organs that have had a strong or intermittent commitment to reform, notably *Kommunist, Moscow News, Literaturnaya Gazeta, Ogonek, Izvestiya, Komsomol'skaya Pravda, Sobesednik,* and *Meditsinskaya Gazeta.*[11] Unofficial components have been new groups—such as the Moscow-based Independent Psychiatric Association (IPA)—which have enjoyed the encouragement or toleration of the official components. Finally, the informal reformist coalition has been rounded out by forces operating outside the USSR, notably the main psychiatric associations of the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany, some elements in the leadership of the World Psychiatric Association (WPA) elected in 1989, the International Association on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry, and the broadly based human-rights bodies Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch.

The Soviet Psychiatric Establishment

Materials in the Soviet media on the issue of psychiatry and the treatment of the mentally ill have been somewhat one-sided, inasmuch as almost all of them have come from the reformists. The main obstacle in the latter's path, the psychiatric establishment, has stated its case only rarely. Its few statements have been defensive in tone and designed to avoid the real issues. It has maintained a grip on the core of the system, a grip that is only slightly less powerful than it was before 1987. Quite simply, the establishment fears that if it launches serious reforms in psychiatry it will almost at once be swept away, official investigations into the system of political abuse of psychiatry will be started, and its leading figures will be, at the least, publicly disgraced.

The establishment has four principal bastions. The Serbskiy Research Institute of General and Forensic Psychiatry has been the operational apex of the system of psychiatric abuse for some four decades. Its director since 1957, Georgiy Morozov, who personally handled many well-known dissidents, formally retired in a blaze of official glory in 1990,[12] but remained as honorary director and was replaced by his close friend Tat'yana

[8]On all this, see Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, *Russia's Political Hospitals,* London, Gollancz, 1977; Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, *Soviet Psychiatric Abuse: The Shadow over World Psychiatry,* London, Gollancz, 1984; and Alexander Podrabinek, *Punitive Medicine,* Ann Arbor, MI, Karoma Publishers, 1980.

[9]Peter Reddaway, "Reform of Soviet Psychiatry: Is the Establishment Beginning to Panic?" Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Nov. 2, 1990, pp. 1–14.

[10]For example, in 1989, the KGB facilitated the reformist psychiatrist Semen Gluzman's attendance at a World Psychiatric Association congress, where he greatly embarrassed the official Soviet delegation by his pointed criticisms of the psychiatric system in the USSR.

[11]The materials appearing in these and other publications since 1987 have been chronicled systematically elsewhere. See Peter Reddaway, "Soviet Psychiatry: An End to Political Abuse?" *Survey* (London), October 1988, pp. 25–38; idem., "The Uphill Struggle for Change in Soviet Psychiatry," *Report on the USSR,* Nov. 3, 1989, pp. 1–9; and idem., "Reform of Soviet Psychiatry: Is the Establishment Beginning to Panic?" loc. cit.

[12]Georgiy V. Morozov, "Jubilee," *Zhurnal Nevropatologii i Psikhiatrii* (Moscow), No. 6, 1990, pp. 156–57.

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Dmitriyeva, who quickly showed herself adept at appearing to be flexible and humane, while evading the most sensitive issues.[13]

The All-Union Research Center for Mental Health is still run by the regime's chief apologist for psychiatric abuse over the last 20 years, Marat Vartanyan, whom the reformists have rightly identified and attacked as the now undisputed "Godfather" of the establishment. Accordingly, Vartanyan has been increasingly boycotted by psychiatric groups in the West.

The All-Union Scientific Society of Psychiatrists, which resigned from the WPA in 1983 to avoid expulsion and was conditionally readmitted in 1989, was until 1991 headed by a close associate of Vartanyan and Morozov, Nikolay Zharikov, who in 1973 declared a well-known dissident, Yuriy Shikhanovich, to be mentally ill.[14] Its new president, Aleksandr Tiganov, is an intimate colleague of Vartanyan. Faced with the threat of becoming irrelevant as alternative associations sprang up, this society has recently begun to stir.[15] But no serious change has yet occurred. In 1989, its leadership tried to falsify the record of the WPA congress of that year in order to retract a generalized, grudging Soviet admission that, because of political circumstances, political abuses of psychiatry had in fact taken place in the past. Frustrated in this, it then prevented the admission from appearing in the Soviet press until a year after the event.[16] In this way, it tried its utmost to defend the establishment's central, life-and-death claim, namely, that although a few isolated mistakes may have occurred in the past, they were not deliberate and certainly did not constitute any "policy."

The USSR Ministry of Health has done everything possible to defend the psychiatric establishment from criticism, yielding ground with great reluctance only when the reformist coalition has—as in the case of a visit by an American psychiatric delegation in 1989—concentrated maximum pressure on it. Key figures in this ministry have been Yevgeniy Chazov, the minister of health from 1987 to 1990, the Ministry of Health's chief psychiatrist—Aleksandr Churkin until 1989, thereafter Aleksandr Karpov—and their immediate superior, Vladimir Yegorov. In the past year, Yegorov has shown some signs of being interested in reform.

The defensiveness of the whole establishment was obvious during the visit of the US psychiatric delegation, of which I was a member, and also in the visit's aftermath.[17] The establishment did not like the delegation's critical, though tactfully written report,[18] and managed to prevent publication even of extracts of it in any nonspecialist Soviet source until a year and a half after it appeared in a US publication in July 1989.[19] The leadership's obstructiveness showed again in March 1991, when it created a flimsy pretext to block a visit by a WPA delegation that was to decide whether to recommend the confirmation or rejection of the All-Union Society of Psychiatrists as an association member. The establishment's tendency to deceive and manipulate by saying different things to different people has recently been documented in detail by Catherine Fitzpatrick of Helsinki Watch.[20]

Efforts at Change

In the face of the establishment's refusal to reform the profession, independent-minded psychiatrists have been forced to strike out on their own. They have attempted to develop new organizations and change the laws applying to psychiatry.

Given the virtual absence of private funds in the USSR, and a high level of official resistance and harassment, alternative psychiatric groups have developed slowly. They have not been able to acquire their own facilities, and their publications have to date been technically primitive[21] and few in number. Nonetheless, the Independent Psychiatric Association has impressive achievements to its credit. It has given psychiatric evaluations to several hundred individuals who had reason to fear unjustified, forcible internment in a mental hospital. Over a five-month period, it evaluated

[13]Tat'yana Dmitriyeva, "The Abuses Are in the Law," *Novoye Vremya* (Moscow), No. 5, February 1991, pp. 31–33. See also Dmitriyeva and I. Gurovich's article on the need to introduce an independent legal-social counseling service for patients in mental hospitals. *Meditsinskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), May 15, 1991.

[14]See the text of the official psychiatric report in *Khronika Zashchity Prav v SSSR* (New York), No. 36, October-December 1979, pp. 63–67.

[15]Yuriy Savenko, "*Perestroyka* Begins with Skirmishes," *Meditsinskaya Gazeta,* Sept. 23, 1990; Nikolay Zharikov and Grigoriy Lukacher, "But Was There a Skirmish?" ibid., Oct. 10, 1990; Modest M. Kabanov, "A Deficit of Morality and . . . Psychiatry," *Leningradskaya Pravda* (Leningrad), May 26, 1990; *Zhurnal Nevropatologii i Psikhiatrii,* No. 8, 1990, pp. 139–42.

[16]James Birley's interview with Yelena Izyumova, *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Nov. 11, 1990.

[17]Peter Reddaway, "Should World Psychiatry Readmit the Soviets?" *The New York Review of Books,* Oct. 12, 1989, pp. 54–58; and follow-up correspondence, ibid., Dec. 22, 1989, p. 54.

[18]"Report of the US Delegation to Assess Recent Changes in Soviet Psychiatry (with official Soviet responses, and also a complete Russian translation)," *Schizophrenia Bulletin* (Washington, DC), Vol. 15, No. 4 (Supplement), 1989, 219 pp.

[19]"An Evaluation of Recent Changes in Soviet Psychiatry," *Meditsinskaya Gazeta,* Feb. 1, 1991. Short extracts appeared earlier in the research journal *Zhurnal Nevropatologii i Psikhiatrii,* No. 5, 1990, pp. 146–58.

[20]Helsinki Watch, *Psychiatric Abuse in the Soviet Union,* New York, May 1990.

[21]The one exception here is the Leningrad Psychiatric Association's *Obozreniye Psikhiatrii i Meditsinskoy Psikhologii im. V. M. Bekhtereva,* the impressive first issue of which appeared in May 1991.

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168 such people, and in 60 of those cases in which an official diagnosis had been made earlier, the IPA's diagnosis differed from the official one and/or the IPA found evidence of psychiatric abuse.[22] The IPA has also organized scientific conferences at which heterodox papers were presented, made proposals for reform of the laws governing the psychiatric profession, and issued reformist statements on issues of public concern. In revenge for these activities, Karpov of the Ministry of Health organized a split in the IPA and then, using an array of "dirty tricks," created and fostered a rival group with dubious credentials.[23] In March 1991, the rival group collapsed.

Other associations of independent psychiatrists have emerged, notably in Leningrad, Georgia, Estonia, and Lithuania. The Estonian association has been granted provisional membership in the WPA, and the Lithuanian one has applied for it. In Ukraine, the psychiatrist Semen Gluzman, who served ten years in prison and exile for demonstrating the falsity of the psychiatric report by Morozov and others on a leading dissident, General Petr Grigorenko, has, with the encouragement of Ukraine's progressive minister of health, played an active role in forming another such association.[24] He has also continued to publish his thoughtfully critical views in the Soviet media.[25]

Crucial to any secure civil society is, as mentioned above, the rule of law. Has Soviet reform taken strides in this direction with respect to psychiatric practices? Yes, but with mixed results. The 1988 legislation on psychiatric care was a step forward, but it was severely criticized both in the USSR and abroad for doing too little to secure patients' rights.[26] The drafting process was dominated by the hard-line Ministry of Health, which undercut some of the reformist proposals advanced by the Institute of State and Law.

In 1990, a draft of a new and better "Law on Psychiatric Care in the USSR" was published.[27] However, this law was also criticized both at home and abroad, including by the American forensic psychiatrist Loren Roth.[28]

In October 1990, a revised draft was circulated among psychiatric specialists. It has been trenchantly analyzed by American lawyer Lisa Chalidze, who welcomed some features, but made many suggestions on how to improve it.[29] For example, she criticized the draft for selecting only certain civil interests for protection. It would be preferable, she said, to state a general principle that all rights of mental patients, which include all rights enjoyed by other citizens, are protected unless specifically limited by law. Such a formula would of course ensure a much larger number of rights than can be specifically dealt with in a single law. Chalidze also criticized the implied intention of the drafters to provide a basic amount of protection at the all-Union level, and then allow the republics to add to, but not reduce, this protection. "What," she asked, "if the union republics fail to enact such legislation?" This problem grows more acute as some of the republics strive toward varying degrees of independence, and also raises the danger of the USSR not meeting its obligations under international law. Finally, Chalidze criticized the draft for not providing for judicial review in cases of unjustified initial psychiatric examinations; for loose legal wording; and for permitting involuntary hospitalization if a person were deemed to pose a threat of serious (but, remarkably, undefined) "moral harm."

It is not inevitable that the legal reformers will again have their proposals watered down by the conservative psychiatric establishment. In October 1990, a "working group" of 19 people was set up to revise the draft. In this group, reformers somewhat outweigh conservatives. Among the former are Dr. Gluzman, four members of the IPA, including its president, Yuriy Savenko, and the reformist lawyers Stanislav Borodin and Svetlana Polubinskaya. The working group is attached to the "Subcommittee on Constitutional Legislation and Legislation to Reform the Political System" of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on Legislation. Both the subcommittee and the working group are chaired by People's Deputy Andrey Sebentsov. The working group had a lively discussion at its first session,[30] subsequently met on a weekly basis, and plans to finish its draft in time for the Supreme Soviet to consider it in au-

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[22]Reddaway, "Reform of Soviet Psychiatry: Is the Establishment Beginning to Panic?" loc. cit.

[23]Ibid.; and L. Yelin in *Novoye Vremya*, Sept. 11–17, 1990, pp. 38–39.

[24]International Association on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry, *Documents on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR*, No. 43, P. O. Box 3754, 1001 AN Amsterdam, February 1991.

[25]Semen F. Gluzman and Leonid I. Plyushch, "Grimaces of the Carnival of History," *Sobesednik* (Moscow), No. 48, November 1990, pp. 4–7; see also Reddaway, "Reform of Soviet Psychiatry: Is the Establishment Beginning to Panic?" loc. cit.

[26]Soviet sources critical of the legislation include Stanislav Borodin and Svetlana Polubinskaya, "Laws for Psychiatry: Support or Fifth Wheel?" in Yu. Baturin, Comp. *Pul's Reform: Perestroyka* (The Pulse of Reforms: *Perestroyka*), Moscow, Progress, 1989, pp. 177–93; and Stanislav Borodin and Svetlana Polubinskaya, "Juridical Problems of Soviet Psychiatry," *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (Moscow), No. 5, 1990, pp. 67–76.

Non-Soviet sources include "Report of the US Delegation to Assess Recent Changes in Soviet Psychiatry," loc. cit.; and Anatoly Koryagin, "Compulsion in Psychiatry: Blessing or Curse?" *Psychiatric Bulletin* (Royal College of Psychiatrists, London), No. 14, 1990, pp. 394–98.

[27]*Meditsinskaya Gazeta*, July 27, 1990.

[28]Semen F. Gluzman, "Both Morality and Law," ibid., Sept. 5, 1990; Yuriy Savenko and Aleksandr Rudyakov, "For the Presumption of Psychological Health," ibid., Aug. 8, 1990; and Loren Roth, "Notes," International Association on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry, op. cit.

[29]Lisa Chalidze, "Psychiatric Reform in the Soviet Union," manuscript awaiting publication.

[30]Roth, loc. cit.

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tumn 1991. Confusingly, the USSR Council of Ministers has been working since early 1990 on its own draft law, which is also entitled "On Psychiatric Care in the USSR." This draft has apparently not yet been circulated or published because of disagreements between the USSR Supreme Court and the USSR Procuracy. The danger exists that delay may result if two draft laws, which may not be easily reconciled with each other, are presented to the legislature at the same time.

Customs and Public Attitudes

Good law, though, however desirable, will not by itself ensure humane treatment for patients. Law alone cannot force psychiatrists and other mental-health professionals to act in an ethical manner. As Leon Lipson observes in his wise reflections on the problems of building the rule of law, "The sense of ethical responsibility may owe more to custom, art, and religion than to the legal system."[31]

It is in this regard that the tight grip compromised leaders hold on the Soviet psychiatric system has yet another pernicious effect. The "custom" they are so grimly perpetuating has long alienated both patients and the public from psychiatry. Until they are replaced with new reformist leaders who can introduce new "custom," i.e., attitudes and procedures, into the whole system, the alienation will be almost impossible to combat. Several hundred psychiatrists have been compromised simply by their involvement in political abuse, and many of them are still working.[32]

All this makes the results of the first major academic survey of public attitudes toward psychiatry, medical personnel, and patients not so surprising. Conducted in 1990 in Moscow and a small provincial town by Dr. V. Rukavishnikov, the survey's findings include, according to a lengthy summary, the following:[33]

- "Every second Muscovite shares the view that a psychiatric hospital is a place where criminals hide from legal retribution and where dissenters are locked up; that it is more a prison than a hospital. Every third one calls a psychiatric hospital a place where healthy people are turned into cripples."
- Although many respondents held that deliberate psychiatric abuses occurred in the past, between 12 and 32 percent, depending on respondent category, said they personally knew of a *recent* case.
- Because "the punitive functions of psychiatry have seeped so deeply into our consciousness," people "rarely go to a psychiatric clinic voluntarily."
- Thirty-two percent of respondents' answers had an "anti-psychiatric" tendency (i.e., like many other people throughout the world, they believe that psychiatry is not an objective science, but a set of arbitrary norms which reflect the interests of the dominant classes).
- Six percent of psychiatrists and 14 percent of psychiatric nurses had never heard of the psychiatric legislation of 1988. Nor had most of the public.
- Sixty-eight percent of all respondents believed that in the last few years nothing of substance had changed in mental hospitals, and 85 percent believed this of outpatient psychiatric clinics. One in ten held that things had got worse.
- Patients said the "worst evil" for them was "the indifferent, sometimes rude attitude of the staff," which "humiliated them." They also deplored the crowded and dirty conditions, and the ban on use of the telephone by psychiatric patients.
- Echoing Lipson's thought, many respondents expressed the view that "conditions in Soviet psychiatry will improve only when the moral climate in society as a whole changes."

Unreformed Practices

Until changes in psychiatry and the moral climate of society take place, reformers face a psychiatric profession rigidly trained in a single, questionable theory and accustomed in many cases to behave toward patients with authoritarianism or indifference. One well-known psychiatrist, Aron Belkin, sees the need for wholesale reeducation: "Retrain our doctors from the very beginning. Only then will we be able to overcome the crisis in which we find ourselves."[34] Modest Kabanov, leader of Leningrad's reformist psychiatrists, attacks the "monopolism" of the school of psychiatry developed by the former tsar of Soviet psychiatry, Andrey Snezhnevskiy (1904–87), "with its purely biological, one-sided approach to mental illness in general, and with its elastic view of what constitutes schizophrenia." This monopolism is still promoted by Vartanyan and his center, which helps explain "why we have such a sorry state

[31]Leon Lipson, "Towards the Rule of Law in Soviet Society," in Human Rights Project Group (Part of the International Foundation for the Survival and Development of Humanity), *The Rule of Law in Modern Society*, New York, Human Rights Project Group, 1991, pp. 37–41, at p. 40.

[32]Andre Koppers, *A Biographic Dictionary on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR*, Amsterdam, International Association on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry, 1990, pp. 13–53.

[33]Elena Salina, "Ripples in the Water," *Stolitsa* (Moscow), No. 3, March 1991, pp. 53–55.

[34]*Meditsinskaya Gazeta*, Jan. 12, 1990.

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of affairs in psychiatry."[35] As for other personnel in the psychiatric system, like hospital orderlies, a senior administrator is pessimistic about improvements, given the lack of state funds: "The level of orderlies' pay is so low that either one cannot recruit orderlies at all, or one has to be content with individuals with highly dubious moral and ethical qualities."[36]

The same official, a member of a return delegation of Soviet psychiatrists to the US,[37] reports enthusiastically about most but not all aspects of the American psychiatric system. He sees attractive features worthy of emulation in the shortness of the average hospital stay, the scrupulous attention to patients' rights, and the minimal policing of patients, but understandably regards the good material conditions in American institutions as unattainable in view of Soviet poverty.

The deepening economic crisis and the evident inability of the state to increase real spending on mental health have led some more enterprising hospitals to seek support from church volunteers, who have only recently been allowed to operate legally. One of these is Moscow's biggest psychiatric hospital, the Kashchenko, which, according to a supporter, is falling apart and "in a disastrous financial state." Praising its doctors for their dedication, this woman calls on Muscovites to follow the example of local Baptists, "who constantly help the hospital both with funds and by caring for the severely ill," and also of an Orthodox Metropolitan who has made a donation.[38]

Another of the very few reports on specific hospitals to have appeared in the press concerns the high-security inter-regional hospital in Dvoryanskoye near Volgograd.[39] The newly appointed chief psychiatrist of the region, L. Sokolova—her job is unpaid and held on top of a regular position—visited it, and was quoted as saying: "For a month I couldn't recover from what I had seen. . . . It was some sort of nightmare! I wouldn't be surprised if in such conditions people lose the habit of human speech and just twitch and completely rot." Since complaints had come that an inmate, Vladimir Novikov, was being held there for political reasons, Sokolova organized a commission of inquiry. The ultimate finding of this and a second commission was that "200 inmates (including Novikov) out of the 600 in Dvoryanskoye are behind barbed wire without justification." The hospital had been transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Health "along with all its previous staff, and of course with the patterns of behavior that had become entrenched over many years." The press report adds that the inmates "are in essence without any rights. And their written complaints are—in view of their illnesses—ignored." Since the report says that the Ministry of Health has been asked to carry out a second examination of all 600 inmates, the reader gains the impression that real changes are still not assured. And such practices are still going on in one of the seemingly few regions that have chief psychiatrists with both the humanity and the courage to risk disturbing deeply vested bureaucratic interests. Such accounts, by their inconclusiveness as well as their rarity, help one to understand the size of the problems involved in trying to carry out reform when there is little or no reforming zeal coming from the top, when the bureaucracy mostly opposes change, when minimal outside resources exist to draw on, and when the economy is collapsing.

Given these factors and the situation reported in Dvoryanskoye, it is hard to be confident that the use of the very painful but ineffective drug Sulphozine, and of Atropine shocks, has sharply declined in Soviet mental institutions. Soviet spokesmen first told Western colleagues that in response to the American delegation's representations, these drugs had been banned. However, no announcement to this effect appeared in the press, and only five months later did the text of the relevant regulation appear in the specialist journal *Voprosy Narkologii*.[40] But the regulation did not ban the drugs, merely their use "without the written consent of the patient to such treatment." And since psychiatrists told the US delegation in March 1989, unapologetically, that Soviet psychiatric patients are not consulted about their medication and are obliged to take it, it is even more doubtful how much impact an almost unpublicized and conditional instruction will have.

The Dvoryanskoye account also reinforces the impression gained from the US delegation's visits to two similar institutions, as well as from other sources, that the high-security hospitals, and probably ordinary hospitals too, still contain many people held without medical justification, including some interned for political or religious

[35]Kabanov, loc. cit. Snezhevskiy's disciple, Anatoliy Smulevich, has continued to defend Snezhevskiy's most disputed diagnosis—"sluggish schizophrenia" (see the source cited in fn. 18 above for one such defense)—and the official psychiatric journal has declined to publish a detailed Western refutation of Smulevich's work. When it did publish a short Soviet refutation by P. V. Mikhalev, it followed this up with a crude Stalinist-style attack on Mikhalev by O. G. Vilenskiy. See *Zhurnal Nevropatologii i Psikhiatrii*, No. 3, 1990, pp. 147–49, and No. 12, 1990, p. 109, respectively.

[36]Vladimir F. Yegorov, "And What About Over There, Across the Ocean?" *Meditsinskaya Gazeta*, Feb. 15, 1991.

[37]For a discussion of the controversy in advance of this visit, see ibid., May 20, 1990.

[38]*Ogonek* (Moscow), No. 44, October 1990.

[39]*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 22, 1990. One additional "strict surveillance psychiatric hospital," an especially infamous one in Sychevka, Smolensk region, has also been profiled. See the lengthy report by V. Rekhina in *Meditsinskaya Gazeta*, May 17, 1991. This report includes interviews with its humane-sounding head doctor, Mikhail Fedorov, who says that his orderlies are still (contrary to official assurances) convicted prisoners serving their terms, and who blames the Ministry of Health as well as Soviet poverty for most of the hospital's failings.

[40](Moscow), No. 1, 1990.

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reasons. Certainly, new internments of dissidents have continued to occur sporadically, and have been reported by the official press and by human-rights groups.[41]

More serious in terms of the number of people involved has been the virtual impossibility, in practice, of formerly hospitalized dissidents obtaining psychiatric rehabilitation.[42] Because this would entail faulting the original "phony" diagnoses, the Ministry of Health has gone to great lengths to prevent the psychiatrists who signed the diagnoses from being revealed as, probably, co-oppressors with the politicians. Meanwhile, the dissidents continue to suffer restrictions on their rights, though less so if they can manage to get themselves removed from the state's "psychiatric register" of out-patients subject to compulsory recall. In 1988, officials announced their intention to reduce the register by some 2 million, from 5.6 million,[43] and substantial progress has apparently been made toward that goal.

Other areas of current concern are the rights of alcohol and drug abusers and of orphans. The former are still, contrary to the USSR constitution, being deprived of their freedom by order of doctors, not courts, and made to do forced labor in camps. And 500 orphans in Leningrad have been labeled by doctors as mentally retarded, even though they seem not to be. The apparent reason is that such labeling is financially advantageous to the officials running the institutions that hold them.[44]

Although the psychiatric establishment has hung on through the last year or so, and taken some comfort from Gorbachev's lurch toward the hard-liners in autumn 1990, the reformers have kept up their pressure, even following the partial removal from the political scene of two important patrons of their coalition—Shevardnadze and Yakovlev. Apart from items mentioned earlier, the Soviet press has educated the public about psychiatric abuse and related issues through a stream of additional materials.[45] Either gradually, as up to now, or perhaps more suddenly, it seems likely that the positions of the hard-liners will continue to erode, and those of the reformers to strengthen.

Conclusion

As noted in the beginning, civil society needs to have a substantial autonomy from the state, yet it must constantly interact with it. It must have civilized procedures, and it depends heavily on the assurance of legal order and political stability. Psychiatry is not yet contributing decisively to the construction of a civil society in the USSR. Its leadership belongs not to civil society, but to the state. The profession as a whole is demoralized, divided, unreconciled with society at large, and quite incapable as yet of healthy, autonomous development. The reformist elements within it have no established, powerful structures of their own through which to interact with the state, although the potential embryos of such structures have appeared and are beginning to play a marginal role in the legislative process. There is very little legal order in the psychiatric system, first because there is very little in the state and society as a whole, and second because the establishment has consistently hampered the development of better, more just laws and regulations, fearing the consequences for itself.

With the sharp conflicts and clashing interests that inevitably result from all these circumstances, there is, despite the valiant efforts of Dr. Gluzman and some other reformers, not very much civility to the debates surrounding psychiatry. As mentioned above, the virtual absence to date of private funds of any size, coupled with the economic crisis, greatly hamper progress toward a civil society. And finally, while such progress is nonetheless occurring, and would occur much faster if the profession's leaders could be decisively replaced, the possibility also remains that progress could be set back—temporarily or otherwise—if the chaotic evolutionary process turns into revolution.

[41] *Moscow News*, Nov. 25, 1990; and International Association on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry, *Documents on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR*, No. 40, Amsterdam, November 1990, and No. 42, Amsterdam, January 1991.

[42] Birley, loc. cit.

[43] See the discussion of this issue in Reddaway, "The Uphill Struggle for Change in Soviet Psychiatry," loc. cit., p. 4.

[44] International Association on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry, *Documents on the Political Abuse of Psychiatry in the USSR*, No. 43, Amsterdam, February 1991.

[45] Albina Biichaninova, "We Need a Memorial to All Victims of Psychiatric Abuse," *Moscow News*, Sept. 23, 1990; Nikolai Lupandin, "Psychiatric Abuse," ibid., Aug. 26, 1990; Boris Protchenko and Aleksandr Rudyakov, "Psychiatry Is a Human Right," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 12, August 1990, pp. 104–11; Vyacheslav Bakhmin, "Looking into Psychiatric Wards," *New Times*, Sept. 11–17, 1990, pp. 34–38; I. Virabov, "The Moon They Make in Hamburg," *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 1, 1990 (this article is about Mikhail Zotov); Natal'ya Safronova's articles in *Meditsinskaya Gazeta*, July 22, and Sept. 14, 1990; Anatoliy Koryagin, "Patients Against Their Will," *Meditsinskaya Gazeta*, Oct. 14, 1990; Peter Reddaway, "Czars of Official Psychiatry," *New Times*, No. 5, February 1991, pp. 34–35; A. Yakovlev in *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1991; L. Yelin in *New Times*, June 19–25, 1990, pp. 24–25, and June 26–July 2, 1990, p. 45; P. Penezhko in *Smena* (Moscow), No. 8, 1990, pp. 54–64, and V. Nayman in *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, Aug. 16, 1990.

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Books

China's International Security Policy

Roxane D. V. Sismanidis

R. MARK BEAN. *Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia: A China-Japan-South Korea Coalition Approach.* Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1990.

ROSITA DELLIOS. *Modern Chinese Defence Strategy: Present Developments, Future Directions.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1990.

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER and ILPYONG KIM, Eds. *Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy.* New York, Professors World Peace Academy, Paragon House Publishers, 1989.

CHONG-PIN LIN. *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition Within Evolution.* Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1988.

R. R. SUBRAMANIAN. *India, Pakistan, China: Defence and Nuclear Tangle in South Asia.* New Delhi, ABC Publishing House, 1989.

IN THE decade after the historic December 1978 Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, China's international security policy followed a pragmatic course similar in its broad outlines to that of the country's domestic policy, which deemphasized confrontational politics and stressed economic development. China's leaders pursued five principal foreign objectives: maintenance of a stable domestic and international environment, expansion of Chinese power and influence, integration of China into global affairs, reduction of threats to Chinese security, and the building of military power. Throughout most of the 1980's, the People's Republic of China (PRC) successfully utilized this multifaceted policy to enhance its global standing, augment its national power, and reduce threats to its security.

What contributions do the five books reviewed here make to our understanding of this policy? In *Cooperative Security in Northeast Asia,* R. Mark Bean contends that common political aspirations, mutual economic interdependence, and fear of growing Soviet regional military power have resulted in increased official and unofficial political, diplomatic, and economic ties among the Northeast Asian triangle countries of China, Japan, and South Korea. Bean argues that these factors will lead to unofficial cooperative security relations among the triangle countries; he also explores what role the United States might play in strengthening this coalition and making it responsive to US interests.

Rosita Dellios's *Modern Chinese Defence Strategy* disputes assessments that people's war under modern conditions (PWMC) is a makeshift doctrine dictated by technological and fiscal restraints, and instead holds that Chinese defense modernization entails the application of "middle-range" technology to unconventional warfare methods. Dellios suggests that in a

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modern people's war, China's numerically superior forces, armed with conventional and tactical nuclear weapons of middle-range technology, and using positional, layered defenses combined with mobile guerrilla operations, could counter any hostile incursion into China. Dellios suggests a "guerrilla nuclear war" strategy for PWMC, which she defines as the use of guerrilla methods within a protracted nuclear war fought at the theater level. Dellios also evaluates threats to China from what she conceives of as the perspective of a modern people's war strategist.

Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy, edited by June Teufel Dreyer and Ilpyong Kim, contains essays examining global and regional issues in Chinese foreign policy, the interrelationship of domestic politics and foreign policy and the military, and defense modernization. Chong-pin Lin's *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy* demonstrates that since the 1950's, the PRC has had a coherent, well-planned strategy for the development and deployment of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and predicts that China will continue the quantitative and qualitative improvement of its nuclear arsenal. Lin assesses the influence of traditional Chinese strategic thinking (for example, the art of ambiguity) on China's nuclear strategy and concludes that China has a distinct nuclear strategy compatible with the Western concept of deterrence by denial but falling short of the concept of warfighting.[1]

In *India, Pakistan, China: Defence and Nuclear Tangle in South Asia,* R. R. Subramanian provides an Indian perspective on triangular relations among China, India, and Pakistan, focusing specifically on the existing or prospective nuclear capabilities of each country. Subramanian contends that India must develop its own nuclear-weapons systems because of nuclear threats to India posed by China and (potentially) Pakistan.

THE FIRST component of PRC security policy was the attempt to create a stable domestic and international environment that would permit China to concentrate on internal political, economic, scientific and technological, and military modernization and reform. Chinese leaders believed that the infighting of the Maoist years not only presented an image of weakness potentially exploitable by China's adversaries, but also distracted the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from concentrating on external threats by deeply involving it in domestic affairs. Until the spring of 1989, the revitalization of party and state organs, the pragmatic reform policies pursued by the Deng Xiaoping regime, and the relative lack of leadership turmoil permitted China to project an image of relative stability that won the respect of friend and foe alike.

Deng's military modernization program furthered those policies aimed at disengaging the military from politics that were initiated in the 1970's. Rather than seeking to depoliticize the PLA, the Deng regime strove instead for political reliability. Deng sought stability at the apex of the political system in order to persuade top military leaders that extensive military participation in civilian affairs was unnecessary. To help ensure the success of his program, Deng made personnel changes in the high command that placed loyal subordinates in key positions throughout the PLA. Military leaders welcomed the opportunity to concentrate on implementing military reform and raising professional standards. Although some military officials had reservations about aspects of national policy, military leaders did not become enmeshed in politics until the crises of December 1986–January 1987 and May–June 1989, and then only reluctantly.

China's leadership had much less control over the international environment, but they perceived that despite the increasing military might of the superpowers, the outbreak of a world war was neither imminent nor likely. Similarly, although Beijing took quite seriously the buildup of Soviet military power and the string of Soviet alliances with China's neighboring rivals, the Deng regime apparently believed its diplomatic endeavors could manage these threats. The PRC thus formulated a nonconfrontational, nonideological approach to its external relations. Beijing's new approach entailed diplomatic relations and cooperation, particularly economic, with most countries, regardless of social, economic, political, or belief systems. By the late 1980's, not only had China managed to establish diplomatic relations with more than 130 countries, but it had made a broad range of economic, military, cultural, and political contacts, even with countries with which Beijing had no formal relations.

THE SECOND element of Beijing's security policy was to expand PRC global influence in the bipolar world system and position China for a

[1]Lin states: "Deterrence by denial aims to dissuade an opponent from attacking by convincing him that he will be frustrated in his efforts to achieve, through an attack, an objective: territorial gains, political vengeance, or military victory" (p. 115). Lin stresses that a warfighting nuclear strategy aims to win a nuclear war and *requires a massive, diversified tactical and* strategic nuclear arsenal employed by combined-arms forces in conjunction with conventional weapons; post-nuclear warfare; survival of C^3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) capabilities; and civil-defense measures to prepare for postwar recovery (pp. 119–23).

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more prominent role should a multipolar system emerge. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, relations with the superpowers dictated Beijing's security policy. In the 1950's, China developed close ties with the Soviet Union to counterbalance the enmity of the United States. In response to the breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations in the early 1960's, China adopted a posture of hostility to both superpowers. Border clashes between the PRC and the USSR in 1969 led Beijing to initiate a strategic relationship with Washington as a counterweight to Moscow's growing threat. In the late 1970's, China sought to draw the United States, Western Europe, and even some Third World countries into a de facto alliance against the Soviet Union.

By the early 1980's, China began to pursue a more sophisticated strategy, which it dubbed its "independent foreign policy." Rather than playing off the superpowers against each other, Beijing assumed a more equidistant stance between them while gradually improving its relations with both.

The flexibility provided by this independent foreign policy brought a string of diplomatic successes in the 1980's. The PRC consolidated wide-ranging political, economic, cultural, and military ties with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Relations with East European countries were normalized, trade with the Soviet Union rose dramatically, and in May 1989, rapprochement between the PRC and the USSR was achieved, including restoration of party-to-party ties. This success in normalizing Sino-Soviet relations without alienating the West reassured Chinese leaders who had worried that US-Soviet détente might damage Chinese interests.

PRC relations with Third World countries also advanced during this period, albeit less dramatically. Rather than presenting itself as a revolutionary alternative to the superpowers, as it had in the 1960's and 1970's, Beijing abandoned its material support for revolutionary groups, particularly in Asia, and instead portrayed itself as a nonideological champion of Third World interests. The PRC supported the Non-Aligned Movement's positions on the creation of a new international economic order and debt relief, and criticized the superpowers on global issues such as arms control and on regional issues such as the superpower roles in Afghanistan and Nicaragua. China, in keeping with its independent foreign policy and its claim that it did not aspire to be the leader of the Third World, did not, however, join the Non-Aligned Movement.

China also focused its energies on improving its bilateral relations with individual Third World countries. The PRC stressed mutual benefit, or economic cooperation, although it continued to grant aid to some countries on a limited basis. Overall, however, Beijing assigned a lower priority to the cultivation of Third World ties and goodwill than to manipulating the East and West blocs to gain resources and the breathing space necessary to build national wealth and power.

As the 1980's progressed, Chinese leaders came to regard the international situation as one in which China could expand its influence. The Deng regime considered the superpowers to be in a strategic stalemate, in which they faced each other from a position of military parity. The regime also felt that the superpowers' serious domestic economic problems would weaken their international standing. Furthermore, the emergence of Japan as an economic superpower and the impending creation of a single market in the European Community suggested to the Chinese leadership the emergence of a multipolar system that would offer China and other Third World countries room for increasing their maneuverability and influence.

The expansion of China's influence in global and regional politics is examined in essays by Steven I. Levine and Donald W. Klein in *Chinese Defense and Foreign Policy* and in *India, Pakistan, China: Defence and Nuclear Tangle in South Asia*. Levine probes Beijing's success in achieving good relations with Moscow and Washington simultaneously for the first time in PRC history. He suggests that if China can preserve and build on this accomplishment and cooperate with the United States and the Soviet Union on global and regional issues, China's drive to become a global power will be facilitated. Klein discusses how China's hostile approach to ASEAN was replaced by expressions of warm support. He argues that the imperatives of economic modernization and the Soviet-Vietnamese threat brought about a convergence in Chinese and ASEAN military, political, and economic interests, and underscores the effectiveness of China's new cooperative, economics-driven foreign policy in boosting China's regional influence after 1978.

Subramanian, by contrast, presents China as a coercive power, a "belligerent and hegemonistic nation" (p. 31) that poses a security threat to South and Southeast Asia. He ignores the improvement of Sino-Indian relations, and the trends in regional and global politics that might mitigate Sino-Indian animosity. He believes Sino-Soviet détente would remove Chinese inhibitions against waging war against India and seeking hegemony in Southeast Asia, thus increasing China's nuclear threat to both regions. Although he does not ex-

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plicitly label it such, Subramanian apparently considers the Sino-Pakistani strategic relationship as tantamount to a joint anti-Indian encirclement strategy.

THE PRC's international security policy sought the integration of China into global affairs. The Deng regime discarded the Maoist notion of self-reliance and its rejectionist attitude toward participation in the world community, both of which had handicapped PRC diplomacy, isolated China from advances in science and technology, and hamstrung efforts to develop the economy. Instead, it sought to integrate China into global affairs in order to marshal international economic, scientific and technological, and military resources to aid in China's modernization. Increased involvement in the international scene also dovetailed nicely with Beijing's efforts to ensure a stable international environment to enhance domestic development and to maximize China's power and influence abroad. Adoption of the policy of opening to the outside world enabled the PRC to utilize all possible foreign policy instruments and all available international institutions to defend and advance Chinese interests. Beijing remained confident that increased Chinese involvement in world affairs would not compromise Chinese sovereignty, cultural integrity, security, or interests, and that the benefits of being part of an increasingly interdependent world would outweigh the disadvantages.

China's emergence from isolation brought substantial dividends to PRC security affairs. After 1978, Beijing greatly expanded its foreign military relations, primarily with the West, but also with many Third World countries. Delegations of PLA and defense-industry officials made extensive window-shopping trips abroad to apprise themselves of Western advances in defense technology and courted Western defense firms in search of weapons to purchase, joint ventures, and coproduction and technology-sharing agreements. Although few deals to acquire weapons materialized, primarily because of budgetary constraints, the Chinese ability to exploit competition for sales among Western defense companies assured that the Chinese military obtained the best possible price as well as a fine understanding of the state of the art.

Selective arms purchases permitted the incremental improvement of some weapons systems, such as the F–7 fighter, the A–5 attack aircraft, and the T–69 tank. China's successful entry into the international arms market also earned foreign exchange that was needed to finance the modernization of Chinese defense industries and to supplement a tight military budget. Exchanges of high-ranking officials and working-level personnel lessened the isolation of the PLA from its overseas counterparts and offered the opportunity to examine firsthand a variety of foreign models upon which the PLA could draw in its efforts to modernize military strategy and tactics, organization, education and training, and personnel systems.

Beijing's expansion of its foreign military relations also fulfilled security objectives other than defense modernization. The PRC used military ties and arms transactions in concert with other diplomatic, economic, and cultural approaches to enhance its foreign relations. In the 1980's, China cultivated or solidified relations with countries as diverse as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Thailand. With countries on China's periphery, such as Pakistan and Thailand, the military relationship, including weapons sales, lessened threats from India and Vietnam. In the Middle East, the adroit use of arms sales and covert military dealings with Israel enabled Beijing to improve its relations with the adversaries in the Iran-Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflicts.[2] Although Chinese arms sales in this region were motivated by commercial considerations, the deals had the distinct geopolitical effect of expanding China's influence.

Another area in which integration into global affairs serves Chinese security policy is arms control. Until the late 1970's, the PRC rejected bilateral or multilateral arms control efforts, decrying the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as an attempt by the nuclear weapons powers to protect their nuclear monopoly, and condemning US-Soviet arms control treaties as a means to intensify the superpowers' arms race. By the early 1980's, however, China had adjusted its arms control policy. In its capacity as a UN member, Beijing actively participated in UN-sponsored disarmament conferences, such as the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and in talks whose objective was to ban chemical weapons. It also joined the International Atomic Energy Agency. By pledging never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, sponsoring resolutions calling for a 50-percent reduction in superpower strategic nuclear weapons, condemning US and Soviet ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, cultivating ties between Chinese and Western disarmament groups, and stressing the purported 1-million man reduction in PLA strength, China tried to project itself as a fervent backer of arms control.

[2]Yitzhak Shichor, *East Wind over Arabia: The Implications of the Sino-Saudi Missile Deal*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California-Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, China Research Monograph No. 35, 1989.

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Nevertheless, PRC enthusiasm for arms control did not extend to its own nuclear forces. While declaring that it did not engage in nuclear proliferation, China still refused to accede to the NPT. The PLA continued the qualitative and quantitative improvement of its nuclear forces, and disclosed selected details of the history of its nuclear-weapons program to impress both domestic and international audiences.

Subramanian, and Samuel S. Kim and William T. Tow (in the Dreyer volume) deal with aspects of China's increased involvement in global affairs. Subramanian examines PRC aid to Pakistan's nuclear program and China's attitudes to the NPT and the export of nuclear technology. He notes that although Beijing has adopted a more circumspect approach to nuclear proliferation, China has neither signed the NPT nor joined the nuclear suppliers' group (NSG—consisting of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other Western nations) committed to controlling the export of nuclear-weapons technology. Subramanian doubts that second-tier nuclear suppliers such as China (and India) will cooperate with the NSG, because they believe NSG rules contravene NPT provisions guaranteeing the peaceful development of nuclear energy (p. 121) and challenge their sovereignty.

Kim's study of the revived use, after 1978, of international law as an instrument of Chinese foreign policy indicates that in negotiations on legal matters, Beijing has made compromises to attain its objectives after gaining legal obeisance to the principle of state sovereignty. Although this approach of "staying firm in principle yet flexible in tactics" (p. 122) marks a retreat from the PRC conception of absolute sovereignty, Beijing still has far to go before it embraces the logic of global interdependence that characterizes the capitalist world system. Tow explores how the PRC has managed to exploit fears of closer Sino-Soviet ties to obtain military technology from the major Western military powers. He suggests that there is a limit to how far China can go in manipulating the Sino-Western arms-technology relationship; he maintains that Beijing realizes that it cannot provoke the United States and its allies to the point of endangering ties with the West.

BEIJING's international security policy has sought to reduce threats to China's security emanating from the Soviet Union, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Northeast Asia. Since 1978, the Chinese leadership has believed that there was little likelihood of a US-Soviet conflict that would embroil China in a war with the Soviet Union. However, the regime found the USSR's continuing military buildup in the Soviet Far Eastern Military Theater worrisome. The PLA could claim only numerical superiority over Soviet forces; by contrast, the Soviet army had growing superiority in strategic and tactical nuclear power, air power and air defenses, and naval power, and in the mobility and firepower of the ground forces. Many Soviet military units in the Far East were not maintained at full combat strength, but nevertheless received advanced equipment—such as Backfire bombers, MiG–23/27 and MiG–29 aircraft, and T–72 tanks—that was technologically superior to anything the PLA possessed.

China strove to defuse the Soviet threat by relying on diplomacy rather than on trying to match Soviet military capabilities.[3] Beginning in 1982, China took advantage of US-Soviet tensions, Soviet overtures, and Soviet leadership changes to rebuild trade, economic, technical, and cultural ties with Moscow. Regular, high-level consultations on bilateral and international issues occurred, but Beijing remained suspicious that Moscow had only superficially altered its Asian policy. There was little movement toward normalization of political relations as long as the USSR refused to satisfy PRC security concerns by removing the "three obstacles": the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Soviet support of Vietnam's presence in Cambodia, and Soviet troops on the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia. Despite Mikhail S. Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok and 1988 Krasnoyarsk speeches, which outlined Moscow's "new thinking" on Soviet Asian policy, progress toward normalization occurred only after the warming of Soviet-American relations, the signing of the INF treaty, and discrete Soviet measures to address the three obstacles. In 1988–89, the pullout of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the announcement of reductions in Soviet troops in Mongolia and along the Sino-Soviet border, and Soviet willingness to press Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia paved the way for the May 1989 summit in Beijing. The gap between Chinese and Soviet military power remained wide, but the Soviet threat to China had been effectively neutralized.

Levine (in the Dreyer book) focuses on the PRC's diplomatic efforts to improve relations with the USSR and suggests that the success of normalization of Sino-American relations facilitated Sino-Soviet détente. His discussion emphasizes that Beijing used the three obstacles to regulate the pace and scope of Sino-Soviet rapprochement and to reassure Washington that Sino-Soviet détente would not

[3]See Steven Goldstein, "Diplomacy Amid Protest: The Sino-Soviet Summit," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1989, pp. 49–71. See also Rajan Menon, "New Thinking and Northeast Asian Security," ibid., March-June 1989, pp. 1–29.

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endanger Beijing's pro-Western tilt. Levine does not delve into Beijing's concerns about the Soviet military threat, but observes that China's perseverance in pursuing Sino-Soviet détente in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup was a triumph of statesmanship over the " 'iron imperatives' of geopolitics" (p. 72).

Bean and Dellios, by contrast, attach little credence to the possibility of a fundamental change in Sino-Soviet relations engineered by Chinese and Soviet diplomacy. They portray Beijing as regarding Sino-Soviet détente as a short-term development that the PRC could exploit. Bean sees China meeting the Soviet threat by cooperating with Japan and South Korea (discussed below). Dellios, for her part, explores how a modern people's war strategy would ensure Soviet defeat in an attack on China. She also outlines strategic factors that she believes would deter a Soviet attack and favor China's ability over that of the Soviet Union to recover from war. Recent events have undermined these views. Although Sino-Soviet rapprochement does provide Beijing with the time to build its military capabilities, it also removes the impetus to do so by removing the threat. Furthermore, Dellios's discussion of Soviet strategic weaknesses, such as economic chaos, is on target, but her assessment of Chinese strengths seems overly optimistic.

Beijing's security concerns in South, Southeast, and Northeast Asia were prompted by the Soviet position in each region. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the Soviet alliances with India and Vietnam, the Soviet base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and the Soviet acquisition of overflight and port-call rights in North Korea all intensified Chinese apprehension about Soviet intentions to encircle China. China's view of each region was also dictated by geostrategic, economic, and historic factors. In South Asia, the PRC regarded India as a rival for Asian great-power status and a potential threat. China attempted to reduce this threat by maintaining a strategic relationship with Pakistan, cultivating close ties with other South Asian countries that feared Indian regional dominance, and by seeking to ameliorate Sino-Indian relations. Although it did not manage to effect a rapprochement with New Delhi, Beijing did expand economic, cultural, and technical ties, entice Premier Rajiv Gandhi to visit Beijing in December 1988, and establish working-level talks on the unresolved border claims.[4] Moreover, the restraint exercised in the border clashes of 1986, and India's coolness toward protests in Tibet in 1988 mitigated China's worries of an imminent threat to its security. Finally, the warming of Sino-Soviet ties and movement toward resolving the Afghan and Cambodian conflicts facilitated the improvement of Beijing–New Delhi relations.

Subramanian offers an Indian perspective on the clashing regional ambitions of India and China, but his work is of little value in understanding the Indian threat to China. A more complete picture emerges from Dellios, who believes that a military settlement of the unresolved border dispute is unattractive to both parties since both possess disputed and strategically vital territory: China controls Aksai Chin and India has made Arunachal Pradesh a state. Moreover, the current state of relations between China and Pakistan, India and the Soviet Union, and China and the Soviet Union reinforce the need for restraint.

[4]See Surgit Mansingh and Steven I. Levine, "China and India: Moving Beyond Confrontation," ibid., March-June 1989, pp. 30–49.

Southeast Asia presented China with its most intractable security problems, the main components of which were Vietnam's alliance with the Soviet Union, the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, and China's claim to the disputed Xisha and Nansha Islands. Beijing was angered by the Soviet attempt to use Vietnam to encircle China, by Vietnamese ingratitude for Chinese assistance, and by Vietnam's pretensions to regional dominance as represented by the overthrow of China's client, the Khmer Rouge. Furthermore, Vietnam, as well as Taiwan, Malaysia, and the Philippines laid claim to some of the South China Sea islands, which China regards as strategically vital because of their economic potential and their proximity to major shipping routes.

Throughout most of the 1980's, the PRC responded to these intertwined problems with a mixture of force and diplomacy. Although its 1979 war with Vietnam failed to dislodge the Vietnamese from Cambodia, Beijing maintained military pressure on Hanoi by strengthening its border defenses and by conducting periodic artillery shelling and low-level cross-border ground attacks. The Chinese also supplied the Khmer Rouge with weapons to fight the Vietnamese in Cambodia. Thailand, with which China developed close military ties in an effort to bolster that state against Vietnam, also received weapons from China. The PLA Navy strengthened its South Sea fleet, including deployments in the Xisha Islands, and conducted naval exercises in the South China Sea. The March 1988 clash between PLA and Vietnamese naval forces in the Nansha Islands indicated Beijing's determination to back up its claims with force if necessary.

In addition to military pressure designed to bleed Vietnam, China

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exerted considerable diplomatic efforts to isolate Hanoi, to win international support for the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, and to cooperate (for the most part) with ASEAN in seeking a political solution to the Cambodian problem. Rather than directly pursuing negotiations with Hanoi over Cambodia, Beijing instead opted to pressure the Soviet Union. When it perceived that unqualified Soviet support for Vietnam was falling victim to warming Sino-Soviet relations in 1988 and 1989, China began to show more interest in a political solution and initiated talks with Vietnam in the winter and spring of 1989.

Dellios characterizes PRC responses to Vietnam in the late 1980's as ". . . pointing to a deliberate strategy of protracted attrition" (p. 156) that typifies the people's war approach. She suggests that Vietnam will either succumb to political and economic pressures or find itself ". . . the victim of the post-attritional phase in Chinese war strategy—that of decisive counter-attack . . ." (p. 166). Dellios does not foresee, given Sino-Soviet détente, Soviet intervention to aid Vietnam; she views Beijing's security concerns vis-à-vis Hanoi as stemming from the Chinese desire to resume its historical position of "regional elder" to Vietnam as well as from Beijing's fear of Soviet-Vietnamese collusion against China.

PRC security concerns in Northeast Asia have centered primarily on the potential for instability on the Korean peninsula. In the 1980's, China endeavored to defuse tensions by counseling the Kim Il-song regime to moderate its stance toward South Korea and to pursue a Chinese-style economic reform program. As the decade progressed, China's policy toward the Korean peninsula became a balancing act, as Beijing tried to maintain good relations with Pyongyang—to prevent either a radical tilt toward Moscow or aggressive moves toward Seoul—while quietly promoting Chinese trade with South Korea.

Although economic ties—trade, investment, and technology—dominated China's relationship with Japan, Chinese fears about possible Japanese remilitarization began to emerge in the late 1980's. The growth in Tokyo's military budget (it exceeded the 1 percent ceiling on defense expenditures in 1987), controversies about the glossing-over of Japanese aggression in China and other parts of Asia in Japanese textbooks, and Japan's expanding diplomatic role all combined to make Chinese security planners begin to consider Japan as a potential long-term threat.

Both Bean and Dellios assert that the Soviet military threat and economic factors will lead to greater regional military cooperation in Northeast Asia. Bean argues that a de facto security alliance among the triangle countries of China, Japan, and South Korea emerged in the 1980's, and he foresees a synergistic division of security responsibilities in which China would form the western flank, South Korea the center, and Japan the eastern flank (p. 132). Bean also sees increased economic coordination and interdependence, cultural contacts, and common political aspirations toward pluralism and democracy reinforcing security cooperation. Dellios envisions Sino-Japanese air and naval cooperation to cut off Soviet access to the Yellow and South China Seas and indirect support of Seoul to remove Soviet influence from Pyongyang. Dellios contends that a united, capitalist Korea would pose no immediate threat to China but rather contribute to Chinese modernization. She also believes that the PRC could preempt future Japanese remilitarization stemming from economic uncertainties by enticing Japan into an economic-security arrangement that would provide for Japanese access to Chinese raw materials and markets, Chinese utilization of Japanese capital and technical expertise, and bilateral military cooperation.

These analyses have been overtaken by events. Sino-Soviet rapprochement has obviated PRC interest in anti-Soviet security cooperation. In addition, both authors place too much confidence in the logic of economic interdependence overcoming long-standing historical perceptions that inform international security policy-making in Beijing.

Allen S. Whiting (in the Dreyer volume) sees Sino-Japanese tension in a very different light. He points out the PRC's disinclination to minimize these tensions even in order to pursue advantageous strategic and economic interests, and concludes there is no prospect for a substantive Beijing-Tokyo security relationship given the potential for adverse domestic political reaction in China.

In contrast to the emphasis on Soviet-driven military cooperation in the Bean and Dellios volumes, Norman D. Levin's analysis (in Dreyer) of evolving Chinese and Soviet policies toward the Korean Peninsula stresses a wide array of factors. Levin points out that Beijing does not consider its relationship with Pyongyang to be a zero-sum game vis-à-vis Moscow and notes that China can exercise leverage over North Korea by acting as broker to the West and by adjusting its ties with South Korea. Levin portrays China as seeking to lower tensions on the Korean Peninsula by the three-point strategy of nudging North Korea toward domestic economic reforms and a peaceful reunification policy, expanding unoffi-

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cial contacts with South Korea, and encouraging US-DPRK contacts.

THE FIFTH and final component in China's international security policy in the 1980's was military modernization. Chinese leaders sought to build Chinese military power in a cost-efficient manner to meet potential threats and to defend China's expanding economic interests.

The defense modernization program had three premises: disengaging from politics, increasing combat capabilities, and reforming the defense-industrial and scientific establishment. The heart of this program lay in the military's efforts to improve combat effectiveness to meet external threats. Reforms in organization, doctrine, training and education, and personnel all emphasized the development of combat capabilities in combined-arms warfare. Structural changes in China's defense establishment included the reorganization of military regions, the streamlining and reduction of superfluous PLA forces, the civilianization of some military units and personnel, the formation of group armies, and the creation of reserve units. In addition, military units with internal-security duties were transformed into the newly created People's Armed Police force (PAP) under the control of the Ministry of Public Security.

The concept of people's war under modern conditions made it possible to adapt doctrine, strategy, and tactics to the needs of modern conventional and nuclear warfare, while adhering to the Maoist legacy that the PLA continued to hold dear. PWMC doctrine enabled the PLA to envisage a forward defense near China's borders to prevent attack on cities and industries; it emphasized military operations using modern combined-arms tactics. PWMC also foresaw the retaliatory use of strategic nuclear weapons in the event of an enemy first strike as well as employment of tactical nuclear weapons in both offensive and defensive situations.

In the late 1980's, the PLA became interested in local wars and low-intensity conflict and the creation of lightly armed, rapidly deployable crack troops. Training and education policies deemphasized ideology in favor of developing military skills and raising the educational levels of officers and soldiers. Finally, new personnel policies required the upgrading of the quality of recruits and officer candidates and stressed professional competence over ideological rectitude in promotion.

Also crucial to military modernization was the transformation of the defense establishment into one capable of independently sustaining a modern military force. The defense research and development and industrial base was reorganized to foster the integration of military and civilian science and industry, which, prior to 1978, had operated autonomously. Reforms civilianized and streamlined the defense industries, increased defense-industry production of civilian goods, and transferred advanced technology from the defense sector to the civilian sector of the economy, all for the purpose of spurring efficient economic development from which the PLA and defense industries would benefit in the long run.

The adoption of a new system for weapons research, development, and production had the objective of providing the PLA with better weaponry at minimum cost, while making the procurement process more responsive to military needs. In addressing the problem of how to overcome technological inferiority in weaponry in the short term while achieving indigenous, advanced technology research, development, and production in the long run, Chinese leaders chose to combine the selective importation of weapons and technology with improvement in the educational opportunities and technical training of defense personnel and the development of greater integration of the civilian and defense economies.

By the late 1980's, China's military modernization program had achieved mixed results. Reforms to improve combat capabilities streamlined and reshaped PLA force structure and provided it with personnel trained in combined-arms operations and tactics. Although these reforms raised China's defense posture, the sheer size of China's military and budgetary constraints resulted in the uneven implementation of reforms. To overcome these limitations, the high command focused on developing the capabilities of forces deployed to meet specific threats on the northern and southern borders. By the end of the decade, PLA combat capabilities had vastly improved, but they still fell short of Soviet or Western capabilities, particularly in weaponry.

Finally, transforming the defense establishment into a system capable of maintaining a modern military not only required resources unavailable to the military, but also depended on the success of reforms in civilian education, science and technology, and the economy as a whole. Improvements in weaponry stemming from indigenous efforts occurred at a snail's pace, and financial limitations and the inability to assimilate foreign technology hampered the use of imports to upgrade Chinese arms. Budgetary constraints on defense expenditures also caused problems. Although defense industries sold civilian goods domestically and exported these goods and weapons to earn the hard currency needed to modernize, and reforms per-

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mitted PLA units to engage in business to supplement tight budgets, misallocation of resources and corruption meant that extrabudgetary monies could not make up the shortfall between existing funding and military needs. As a result, in the late 1980's, some PLA leaders began calling for increased expenditures to accomplish the objectives of defense modernization.

The Dellios and Lin books and William T. Tow's essay in the Dreyer volume deal with these aspects of defense modernization. Tow articulates the view shared by many analysts that China's military modernization program has been characterized by the ad hoc policies that have resulted from the regime's failure to formulate a doctrine incorporating the use of modern, high-technology conventional and nuclear-weapons systems. Tow also points to the roles traditional cultural biases against external influences as well as the desire to preserve its independent foreign policy play in Beijing's inability to close the military technology gap between itself and the superpowers. He notes that Chinese strategists have yet to accept the idea that modern technology is the crucial factor in determining "success or failure in achieving a truly credible national security posture" (p. 278) and predicts that the Chinese military will remain consigned to technological backwardness.

Lin and Dellios take issue with this view. They argue that the Chinese strategic tradition is an asset, rather than a liability, in modernizing China's military forces, and portray contemporary Chinese strategy as permitting the PRC to sidestep the "technological imperative" that would entail the creation of large-scale, expensive, high-technology conventional and nuclear forces. Both stress that contemporary Chinese strategy has inherited the traditional emphasis on the manipulation of enemy perceptions (through ambiguity, deception, and secrecy) and the combination of extra-military (such as diplomacy and psychological operations) and military factors, and thus relegates technology to an important rather than decisive role. They argue, in effect, that Chinese strategy determines the role of technology in force development. They also distinguish between declared and undeclared nuclear doctrine and ascribe the opaqueness of Beijing's nuclear strategy and force structure to the desire to enhance the deterrent value of its nuclear forces. Both offer detailed, valuable discussions, based on evidence as well as conjecture, of operational strategies for the employment of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and address the issue of whether and under what conditions China might abandon its no-first-use policy.

SINCE 1989, domestic and international events have altered both the nature of the threats to Chinese security and the perceptions of China's role in the world. The domestic and international fallout of the Tiananmen massacre, the fall of communism and the end of the cold war in Europe, instability in the Soviet Union, and the Persian Gulf war have changed China's internal and external environment and created new challenges for its international security policy in the 1990's.

The Tiananmen massacre and the end of the cold war, in particular, had strong repercussions for the first and second components of Beijing's security policy—the maintenance of a tranquil domestic and international environment, and the expansion of China's global power and influence. Domestically, the post-Tiananmen crackdown exacerbated existing problems—unbalanced economic development, inflation, the stalling of the economic reform program, massive corruption, political infighting among the elite, and restiveness among the ethnic minorities—by pushing China into a morass of leadership conflict and policy stagnation from which it has yet to emerge.[5]

Tiananmen also reversed the trend toward PLA disengagement from politics by destroying leadership stability and the consensus on the direction of policy, thus creating conditions for the involvement of the military in national politics.[6] Nevertheless, the military has been circumspect in flexing its political muscles. Military representation in key central leadership organs has not increased markedly: the sole new military official was PLA General Political Department Director Yang Baibing, who was named to the Secretariat in November 1989 concurrently with his appointment as Secretary General of the CCP Central Military Commission (CMC).[7] Yang's elevation may reflect more the increasing influence of his brother, PRC President and CMC First Vice-Chairman Yang Shangkun than the military's rising political prominence. There are few concrete indications of greater military influence on policy outside of international security affairs, except

[5]See Michael D. Swaine, "China Faces the 1990's: A System in Crisis," ibid., May-June 1990, pp. 20–35. See also Ian Wilson and You Ji, "Leadership by 'Lines': China's Unresolved Succession," ibid., January-February 1990, pp. 28–44.

[6]There were already some signs that the political climate that had permitted the PLA's political quiescence since 1978 had begun to unravel before spring 1989. Top military leaders played a key role in engineering the downfall of Hu Yaobang in January 1987. The PLA's administration of martial law in Tibet, from March 7, 1989, to May 10, 1990, was a harbinger of the PLA's post-Tiananmen internal-security role.

[7]Tai Ming Cheung, "Stroking the Tiger," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong—hereafter, *FEER*), July 6, 1989, pp. 10–12; *Beijing Review*, Nov. 20–26, 1989, pp. 5–6.

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with regard to the national budget: defense expenditures in the 1990 and 1991 budgets rose 15.2 and 12 percent, respectively, after a decade of negative real growth.[8]

Instead, the PLA itself seems riven by the same combination of factional struggle and policy immobilism that dominates the civilian sphere in China. The high command appears divided roughly into two factions: the conservative camp, led by Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing, for whom political concerns are paramount; and the moderate, professionally oriented group, centering around CMC Vice-Chairman Liu Huaqing, Chief of the General Staff Chi Haotian, and Minister of Defense Qin Jiwei, for whom the post-Tiananmen emphasis on political rectitude threatens to undermine military preparedness. The impact of these political divisions on the PLA's role in a future succession, however, remains unclear. Although the military would probably play the role of a kingmaker in a disputed succession, the military is but one of several factors—others being the timing and order in which top leaders pass from the scene and the relative unity of surviving civilian leaders—influencing the succession.[9]

Internationally, Tiananmen shattered China's image as a peaceful, stable, reform-minded country. After June 4, 1989, shock and outrage in the international community, and political, military, and economic sanctions imposed by Western countries and international institutions left China isolated and cut off from external resources important to its modernization program. The post-Tiananmen isolation also damaged the second component of China's international security policy—the effort to expand Beijing's global power and influence. However, this effort was even more seriously affected by the fall of East European communist regimes in the second half of 1989.

Indeed, China spent the year following June 1989 pursuing defensive policies designed to undo the damage done by the Tiananmen debacle and the revolution in Eastern Europe. Beijing tried to badger Western nations, particularly the United States, into dropping sanctions, alternating conciliatory but nonetheless cosmetic gestures on human rights—such as lifting martial law in Beijing and permitting Fang Lizhi to leave China—with bitter warnings that countries that did not lift sanctions were damaging their own interests.[10] Attempts to rely on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to compensate for Western sanctions failed because of the political changes in the East bloc.

BY THE middle of 1990, the implications for China of the end of the cold war had become clearer. The end of the bipolar global system rendered Beijing's pivotal position in the US-USSR-PRC triangle irrelevant, and removed the strategic rationale for both the East and West blocs to seek improved relations with and to render assistance to China. Furthermore, the post–cold war realignment of power strengthened the United States and the West at the expense of what remained of the socialist bloc and the Third World. With the United States and Europe focused on the political and economic reconstruction of Eastern Europe and a Soviet Union greatly weakened by internal difficulties, China found itself in a weak position to play a prominent role in the newly emerging international order.

However, the Persian Gulf crisis and the continuing efforts by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to formulate a UN peace plan to end the Cambodian civil war provided the PRC with opportunities to demonstrate to the West that it could play a constructive role in world affairs. China's affirmative votes on all the UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait (except the one concerning the use of force, from which it abstained), its halt of arms sales to Iraq, and its pressure on the Khmer Rouge and Prince Norodom Sihanouk to agree to the UN peace plan were appreciated by Western governments and helped China mitigate its international isolation, restore some of its tarnished prestige, and achieve a partial lifting of the sanctions imposed on it by the West.

China, however, hedged its Persian Gulf policy, and by the end of the war its middle-of-the-road stance had brought only modest gains. By adopting a largely neutral position rather than openly siding with the anti-Iraq coalition, China ended up playing only a minor role throughout the crisis, and missed the opportunity to achieve major improvements in Sino-Western relations and to raise its profile in the Middle East. In addition, the impressive US-led victory, contrary to Chinese expectations of a protracted struggle that would sap American strength, reinforced Chinese fears that the United States could emerge as the world's single superpower.[11]

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[8]Tai Ming Cheung, "Political Payoff," *FEER*, Apr. 5, 1990, pp. 28–29; *The Washington Post*, Mar. 27, 1991; "Channels of Support," *FEER*, June 13, 1991, p. 15.

[9]Tai Ming Cheung, "Gun-Barrel Politics," *FEER*, Jan. 17, 1991, pp. 16–17; and idem., "Channels of Support," ibid., June 13, 1991, p. 15.

[10]Astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, who took refuge in the United States embassy in Beijing along with his wife Li Shuxian, left China on June 25, 1990. *The Washington Post*, June 29, 1990. See also Susumu Awanohara, "China Card Shuffled," *FEER*, Feb. 15, 1990, pp. 12–13; and *The Washington Post*, Feb. 3, 1990.

[11]Michael Vatikiotis, Salamat Ali, and Hamish McDonald, "Pax Americana," *FEER*, Mar. 7, 1991, pp. 10–11.

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Following the war, Sino-American relations, took a sharp turn downward, with irritants ranging from the jump in China's trade surplus with the United States from US$3.5 billion in 1989 to $10.4 billion in 1990, inadequate intellectual property protection, and the use of penal labor to make goods exported to the US, to China's negotiations to sell ballistic missiles to Pakistan and Syria, alleged provision of nuclear-weapons technology to Algeria, the Dalai Lama's April 17, 1991, private visit with President George Bush, and the possibility that the United States might not renew, or would attach conditions to most favored nation (MFN) trading status for China.

Other events proved to be more advantageous to China. The deteriorating position of the Soviet Union and Soviet President Gorbachev's crackdown in the fall of 1990 caused Chinese leaders to reconsider their ideological aversion to Gorbachev and spurred a warming of Sino-Soviet relations. Although Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Moscow in April 1990 and signed an agreement on mutual troop reductions, real improvements in relations only began to materialize in 1991. Fearful of the implications for China of the fall of the Soviet Communist party and the possible dissolution of the Soviet Union, the PRC in March provided the USSR with a $730 million credit to buy food and consumer goods and in May dispatched CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin to visit Moscow.[12]

Finally, the Tiananmen massacre and the post–cold war realignments strengthened China's relations with the Third World. Beijing stepped up its courtship of developing countries, escalating its rhetorical condemnations of hegemonism and the big powers' political power plays. In 1990, building on past endeavors, China made diplomatic breakthroughs in establishing relations with Saudi Arabia, restoring relations with Indonesia (after which Singapore established relations with the PRC), and opening trade offices with South Korea and nongovernmental offices in Israel. In Asia, Beijing improved relations with a range of countries including Mongolia, Laos, India, and Vietnam.[13]

THE THIRD component of Chinese security policy, integration into global affairs, has remained unchanged since 1989, but the Western imposition of military sanctions on Beijing denied China access to Western defense technology and military establishments. Almost a year after the US suspension of arms sales and military contacts with the PRC, China terminated Peace Pearl, the joint US-PRC project to modernize the PLA's F–8 fighter, largely because of the expense involved; it did not cancel three other small Sino-American weapons programs.

China and the Soviet Union began negotiations on defense industrial cooperation and the Chinese acquisition of Soviet weapons and technology. The close timing of the cancellation of Peace Pearl, in May 1990, and the initiation of high-level Sino-Soviet defense talks, in June 1990, appeared designed to send a warning to the United States and other Western countries that Beijing would restore close military ties with Moscow if Washington and other Western capitals did not resume defense ties with Beijing.[14]

It is important to remember, however, that although China's anger at the imposition of Western sanctions was a factor in seeking Soviet military equipment, China's actions were a natural outgrowth of the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations and the compatibility of PLA and Soviet army hardware, and would have occurred regardless of Tiananmen. Since the initiation of talks, China has agreed to purchase 24 Mi–17 troop carrier helicopters and 24 Su–27 fighters. The $700 million hard-currency fighter deal, expected to be signed by mid-1991, will provide the PLA Air Force with a less sophisticated export version of the Su–27, and training for pilots and technicians in the Soviet Union.[15] Despite these purchases, China will resume acquisition of Western defense technology once Sino-Western defense ties are normalized; the superior performance of Western over Soviet and Chinese hardware in the Persian Gulf War has spurred the PLA's desire for Western high-technology weaponry.

China also continues to obtain defense technology from other non-Western sources. Beijing has had long-standing defense technology cooperation agreements with Pakistan, with which China is developing a main battle tank and upgrading Chinese fighters with Western avionics, and with Israel, which is providing China with technology from its canceled Lavi fighter project.[16] More recently, in October 1990, China expanded its defense relationship with Iran to include defense industrial cooperation. China

[12] *The Washington Post*, Apr. 25, 1990, and Mar. 16, 1991.

[13] Tai Ming Cheung, "Old Friends and New," *FEER*, Feb. 22, 1990, p. 13; and Robert Delfs, "Exit/World Stage Left," ibid., Aug. 23, 1990, pp. 32, 34.

[14] *The Washington Post*, May 16 and July 17, 1990; and Tai Ming Cheung, "Comrades in Arms," *FEER*, July 19, 1990, p. 30.

[15] "Choppers for the PLA," *FEER*, Oct. 11, 1990, p. 8; Tai Ming Cheung, "More Punch for the PLA," ibid., Apr. 11, 1991, p. 18.

[16] Tai Ming Cheung, "A Nuclear Deal on Han," ibid., Sept. 6, 1990, pp. 20–21; and *The Washington Post*, July 17, 1990.

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reportedly has also purchased air refueling kits from Iran. In March 1991, Beijing expressed an interest in a barter purchase of some Iraqi military aircraft which had flown to Iran during the Persian Gulf War.[17] The PRC reportedly has even received an offer from Mongolia to sell Mi–24 ground attack helicopters.[18]

CHINA'S isolation following the Tiananmen crisis did not change Beijing's determination to remain an active participant in international affairs. Concern with deleterious foreign influences on the domestic front was seen as insufficient cause for sacrificing China's hard-won diplomatic gains by withdrawal from global affairs. PRC leaders and diplomats took great pains to emphasize China's unaltered commitment to the policy of opening to the outside world. Beijing particularly values its role in the United Nations and stresses that the PRC makes valuable contributions to world affairs in its capacity as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, citing for example, its "principled position" on the Persian Gulf crisis and its advocacy of Third World interests on such global issues as environmental protection. Although China decries efforts by "a few big countries" to use "the United Nations as a forum to carry out their own power politics," China is well aware of the usefulness of its UN participation in advancing its own interests.[19]

Chinese arms sales continue; recipients range from traditional clients such as Pakistan to new clients cultivated in the 1980's, such as Iran, Thailand, and Burma. The PRC halted arms sales to Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait.[20] Since the Persian Gulf war, reports have surfaced of possible Chinese ballistic missile sales to Pakistan and Syria, and the alleged provision of nuclear-weapons technology to Algeria. China has denied these reports.[21] In March 1991, the United States initiated efforts to create a multilateral grouping, including the PRC, to control weapons exports to the Middle East, and to induce China to join the Missile Technology Control Regime to prevent ballistic missile proliferation. Beijing initially responded coolly to these efforts, calling on large arms-exporting countries to restrain their own arms sales, while maintaining that "China has adopted a serious and responsible attitude to its arms sales and sells only a very small number of arms."[22] In June 1991, however, China accepted US President George Bush's invitation to participate in a July 1991 conference of major weapons suppliers to discuss restrictions on future arms sales to the Middle East.[23]

THE deteriorating situation in the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war have presented new challenges to the Chinese in their efforts to reduce threats, the fourth component in China's security policy. In the 1980's, China was able to reduce threats primarily by pursuing détente with the Soviet Union. In 1990–91, the PRC has worked to consolidate its improved relations with the Soviet Union and India and to reduce tensions with Vietnam. Sino-Indian relations continue to improve; Beijing and New Delhi now engage in mutual confidence-building measures, and have recently agreed to resume cross-border trade after a hiatus of 31 years.[24]

Tensions with Vietnam have begun to ease with continued progress toward the UN Security Council–sponsored solution to the Cambodian civil war and the September 1990 secret meeting between top Chinese and Vietnamese leaders in Chengdu. The desire for closer economic ties and the renewed ideological affinity between the two communist parties following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe have also warmed Sino-Vietnamese relations.[25] In August 1990, China floated a proposal for joint economic development of the Nansha Islands, while temporarily shelving the question of sovereignty. How Beijing follows up on this proposal, and an Indonesian one to resolve claims in the South China Sea, will depend on continued amelioration of SRV-PRC ties; otherwise, the disputed islands could become a scene of conflict in the 1990's.[26]

Although the end of the cold war and Sino-Soviet rapprochement have freed China to reduce tensions with its erstwhile adversaries,

[17]"Fuelling Speculation," *FEER*, Feb. 21, 1991, p. 9; Tai Ming Cheung, "More Punch for the PLA," ibid., Apr. 11, 1991, p. 18. For more information on Sino-Iranian defense ties, see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, "New Directions on China's Arms for Exports Policy: An Analysis of China's Military Ties with Iran," *Asian Affairs* (Washington, DC), Spring 1990, pp. 15–29.

[18]"Chopper Offer," *FEER*, Apr. 18, 1991, p. 11.

[19]*Beijing Review*, Oct. 15–21, 1990, pp. 11–12; ibid., Jan. 21–27, 1991, pp. 26–28; ibid., June 10–16, 1991, pp. 12–14.

[20]*The Washington Post*, Aug. 6, 1990. Tai Ming Cheung, "Bending Rules," *FEER*. May 16, 1991, p. 15.

[21]*The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Apr. 5, 1991; *The Washington Post*, Apr. 6, and Apr. 20, 1991; Tai Ming Cheung, "Bending Rules," *FEER*, May 16, 1991, p. 15.

[22]*The Washington Post*, Mar. 13, and 23, 1991; Susumu Awanohara, "Unguided Missile," *FEER*, Apr. 4 1991, pp. 13–14; *Beijing Review*, Apr. 8–14, 1991, p. 14.

[23]*The Washington Post*, June 8, 1991.

[24]"India Tipped Off," *FEER*, Aug. 9, 1990, p. 6; "India, China to Resume Trade over Land Borders," ibid., Feb. 14, 1991, p. 14.

[25]*The Washington Post*, Sept. 16, 1990; Philip Bowring and Murray Hiebart, "Into a Wider World," *FEER*, Nov. 22, 1990, pp. 17–18.

[26]Nayan Chanda and Tai Ming Cheung, "Reef Knots," *FEER*, Aug. 30, 1990, p. 11; Michael Vatikiotis and Tai Ming Cheung, "Maritime Hegemony," ibid., Jan. 10, 1991, p. 11.

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long-standing geopolitical concerns and historical factors will assume greater importance in Chinese threat perceptions in the 1990's. Chinese leaders see new threats stemming from political, economic, and ethnic instability in the Soviet Union. They are concerned that chaos and civil war there could lead to two disturbing scenarios: the dissolution of the Soviet Union, or the restoration of order under military or civilian hardliners who would resort to pre-Gorbachev foreign and military policies. Beijing is also worried that if Soviet republics, especially those in Central Asia, became independent, then separatists in Xinjiang and Tibet would step up efforts to break away from the PRC. China's leaders also fear the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism and pan-Turkic nationalism in Xinjiang, which experienced a violent outbreak of unrest in April 1990.[27]

Chinese analysts consider the newly emerging post-bipolar world order to be unstable because the United States and the Soviet Union lack their previous capability to restrain their allies and contain regional conflicts. Chinese observers also view the shifting alignments of power in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as geographic, historical, and cultural factors, as unfavorable to the development of regional security arrangements. Thus, Beijing will continue its bilateral, diplomatically-oriented approach to reducing tensions and resolving conflicts, joining in multilateral arrangements only when it considers conditions to be favorable to its own interests.

Beijing's greatest worry about the emerging international order is that a United States withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific region, as well as future developments in the Soviet Union and on the Korean Peninsula might embolden Japan to rearm and reassert Japanese military power in Asia.[28] Beijing fears that the Persian Gulf war will encourage Tokyo to abandon its reluctance to participate in global affairs in favor of an activist diplomacy that would ultimately lead to its attaining big-power status on a par with the United States and Western Europe.[29] Nevertheless, China attaches great importance to maintaining good relations with Japan and has endeavored to ensure the further development of mutual economic ties and to minimize potential disputes, such as the one over the Diaoyutai Islands.[30] Sino-Japanese relations have now returned to normal after the lifting of sanctions imposed in the aftermath of the June 4 massacre.

FINALLY, the Tiananmen crisis adversely affected the fifth component of China's international security policy, military modernization. Since the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in 1989, the regime has attached great importance to eliminating internal threats stemming from the counterrevolutionary rebellion, bourgeois liberalization, and peaceful evolution in the military as well as in society in general.[31] Thus, the leadership has made political reliability the first priority in PLA affairs and reassigned the military a broadly defined internal-security mission.[32] In addition to using the PLA to implement martial law in Beijing, the regime placed the military on alert in December 1990 because of leadership jitters following the violent overthrow of the Ceauşescu regime in Romania.[33] In February 1990, the regime completely replaced the leadership of the People's Armed Police force with PLA general officers and transferred several division-sized ground force units to the PAP, as part of the effort to strengthen the ability of the internal-security apparatus to deal with future unrest.[34] Further transfers of military personnel to the PAP may occur if unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet becomes a problem. Military personnel have also been placed in what are now considered security related positions; for example, part of the civilian staffs on prominent newspapers have been replaced with military

[27]Robert Delfs, "A Two-Front Threat," ibid., Dec. 13, 1990, pp. 28, 30; idem., "Distant Smoke," ibid., Apr. 19, 1990, pp. 10–11; idem., "Islamic Call to Arms," ibid., May 3, 1990, pp. 10–11; and *The Washington Post*, Mar. 16, 1991.

[28]Robert Delfs, "A Two-Front Threat," *FEER*, Dec. 13, 1990, pp. 28, 30.

[29]Ibid.; *Beijing Review*, Apr. 22–28, 1991, pp. 9–11.

[30]China, Taiwan, and Japan all claim the island group; in 1972, China and Japan agreed to put aside the question of sovereignty. In October 1990, the Diaoyutai issue resurfaced when Japan's Maritime Safety Agency (coast guard) officially recognized a lighthouse built by Japanese right-wing groups on one of the islands, and then drove away Taiwanese boats trying to land on the island to stage a protest. China lodged a strong protest with the Japanese foreign ministry, and Japan withdrew recognition, which diffused the crisis. Tai Ming Cheung and Charles Smith, "Rocks of Contention," *FEER*, Nov. 1, 1990, pp. 19–20. For a detailed discussion of security aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, see Jonathan Pollack, "The Sino-Japanese Relationship and East Asian Security: Patterns and Implications," *China Quarterly* (London), December 1990, pp. 714–29.

[31]*Jifangjun Bao* editorial, Feb. 28, 1990, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC), Mar. 1, 1990, pp. 32–33.

[32]In his speech following his November 1989 resignation as chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, Deng Xiaoping stated that the PLA should remain loyal to the party, the state, socialism, and the people, and called on the military to push forward with the tasks of revolutionization, modernization, and regularization. Deng reversed the usual order of the three tasks of army-building, placing revolutionization first instead of last. *Beijing Review*, Nov. 27–Dec. 3, 1989, pp. 7–8.

[33]Martial law was lifted on January 11, 1990. *Beijing Review*, Jan. 15–21, 1990, p. 7; Tai Ming Cheung, "Haunted Dreams," *FEER*, Jan. 18, 1990, p. 16.

[34]Tai Ming Cheung, "Security Reshuffle," *FEER*, Mar. 1, 1990, p. 16; and *The New York Times*, Feb. 15, 1990.

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journalists, and military training courses for university students administered by military personnel have been expanded.[35]

Within the PLA, efforts to ensure political loyalty have led to a renewed emphasis on political indoctrination—up to 60 to 70 percent of training time is now spent on political rather than military training, and on ensuring the loyalty of the officer corps. Officers whose performance was politically suspect during the Tiananmen crisis have been investigated, and some have been removed from office. Political rectitude has made a comeback as a critical promotion criterion. During the spring 1990 rotation of senior PLA commanders, many of those promoted were considered to be protégés of the Yangs or efficient enforcers of the 1989 crackdown.[36]

The military's internal-security mission and the stress on political rectitude have undermined reforms to improve PLA combat efficiency by diverting personnel, military units, and resources away from military training and operational preparedness and by retreating from standards of professional competence. Tiananmen also has set back the modernization of the defense research and industrial base by contributing to the stagnation of the economic reform program on which the military depends. In specific terms, the 15.2 percent defense budget increase in 1990 went to improving living conditions and paying for the PLA's new internal-security role, rather than for weapons procurement.[37]

The Persian Gulf war, however, could reverse the post-Tiananmen trends undercutting military modernization. The rapid victory of the high-technology Allied forces will revive the debate over the proper role of men versus materiel, which has been ongoing in the PLA for decades. There already are signs of renewed emphasis on technical proficiency, training, and modern weaponry as well as indications that political reliability, or at least political indoctrination, is being deemphasized.[38] The first piece of evidence that the Gulf war has had an impact on the direction of military modernization came in the 1991 budget, which increased military expenditures by 12 percent to fund the modernization of PLA weapons and equipment.[39]

IN mid-1991, the basic components of China's international security policy remain intact, but that policy faces difficulties stemming from the transitional period in which the PRC now finds itself. Domestically, the contradictions between the leadership's desire to maintain tight political control and the need to proceed with the reform program have resulted in immobilism that has hampered China's ability to augment its national power through political stability, economic development, and military modernization. Internationally, although Sino-Western ties are returning to normal, the disappearance of the bipolar world has left Beijing adrift in the volatile international scene, fearful of instability in the Soviet Union, and unable to exploit the triangular US-USSR-PRC relationship. Beijing's global power pretensions have been undercut by its current political and economic weaknesses, and its leaders are faced with the prospect that new challengers for global prominence, such as Japan, may come to exercise more influence than China.

Nevertheless, given the economic exigencies it faces, China will continue its pragmatic international security policy, striving to maintain a peaceful environment for economic development, employing diplomacy to reduce threats to its security, and seeking to sustain the flow of external resources to assist modernization. New avenues to a major global role will be explored; strengthened ties with the Third World and cooperation with the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council may be the key to expanding China's international standing in the 1990's.

[35]Shao Huaze, PLA General Political Department Propaganda Department Director, took over as chief editor of *Renmin Ribao* after Tiananmen. Tai Ming Cheung, "Stroking the Tiger," *FEER*, July 6, 1989, p. 12. The military training courses for university students were political indoctrination courses designed to inculcate correct political attitudes. The courses included the year-long courses for Beijing University freshmen at the Shijiazhuang Army Academy and the eight-week course offered at 143 colleges and universities at various military and academic locations. *Beijing Review*, Oct. 30–Nov. 5, 1989, pp. 9–10.

[36]Tai Ming Cheung, "Basic Marxist Training," *FEER*, Aug. 23, 1990, pp. 46–47.

[37]Tai Ming Cheung, "Political Payoff," ibid., Apr. 5, 1990, pp. 28–29.

[38]Tai Ming Cheung, "Channels of Support," ibid., June 13, 1991, p. 15.

[39]*The Washington Post*, Mar. 27, 1991.

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Glasnost' and the History of Soviet Foreign Policy

Hugh Phillips

ZINOVIY SHEYNIS. *Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov: Revolyutsioner, diplomat, chelovek* (Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov: the Revolutionary, the Diplomat, the Man). Moscow, Politizdat, 1989.

ANDREI GROMYKO. *Memoirs*. Foreword by Henry A. Kissinger. Translated by Harold Shukman. New York, Doubleday, 1989.

VILNIS SIPOLS. *Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1936–1939 gg.* (The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 1936–1939). Moscow, Nauka, 1987.

IT is hardly a revelation that the writing of history in the Soviet Union is a highly politicized discipline. "History is the politics of the present projected onto the past" is a line I heard many times from Soviet academics and students. And within the general field of historical writing, the historiography of Soviet foreign policy has been as unbalanced and shamelessly polemical as any other.

However, since the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev, we have been hearing a great deal about the need for *glasnost'* not only regarding contemporary problems but also regarding the "blank spots" of Soviet history. How much has actually changed as far as Soviet writers on Soviet foreign policy are concerned? This essay considers three works on Soviet foreign policy published since Gorbachev came to power—Zinoviy Sheynis's popular biography of the well-known diplomat Maksim Litvinov, the memoirs of long-time foreign minister Andrey Gromyko, and Vilnis Sipols's scholarly work on Soviet foreign policy in the years immediately preceding World War II. I am sorry to report that the treatment of the past found in these works shows that little, if anything, has changed in the interpretation of Soviet foreign policy.

DURING the Stalin years, the study of Soviet foreign policy hit rock bottom. Even published "documentary" collections were appallingly barren; typical is *Soviet Foreign Policy during the Great Patriotic War: Documents and Materials.*[1] This work is a convenient source for public speeches and declarations. But what historians really want and need are records of meetings among policy-makers in order to determine what their assumptions and attitudes were, how policy was formulated, and what the nature of the policy was. In this regard, the material offered in *Soviet Foreign Policy during the Great Patriotic War* fails completely. A typical entry reads as follows: "On July 8, 1941, J. V. Stalin . . . received the British Ambassador, Sir Stafford Cripps. The conversation lasted over an hour."[2]

After Stalin's death, the picture slowly began to improve. Most important, in 1959, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched its series *Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR* (Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR). The majority of these documents are from the foreign ministry's archive, and hence must be used with caution and in conjunction with other Western archives readily available to scholars, especially the British Public Record Office. Nevertheless, this is easily the most complete Soviet publica-

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[1]Translated by Andrew Rothstein, London, Hutchinson and Co., n.d.
[2]Vol. 1, p. 76.

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tion to date of foreign policy materials. As of spring 1991, the foreign ministry had issued 21 volumes, covering October 1917 to the end of 1938.

New ground was also broken with the publication of Ivan Maisky's *Vospominaniya sovetskogo posla* (Memoirs of a Soviet Envoy).[3] Maisky's reminiscences are hardly objective or fully reliable, but at least he took a step in the right direction by giving an insider's interpretation of Soviet policy.

Writing by professional Soviet historians on Soviet foreign policy exhibited a marked improvement with the appearance in 1977 of Valeriy Shishkin's *V. I. Lenin i vneshneekonomicheskaya politika Sovetskogo gosudarstva, 1917–1923 gg.* (V. I. Lenin and the Foreign Economic Policy of the Soviet Government, 1917–1923).[4] Shishkin not only enjoyed extensive archival access, but, more important, he actually explored the processes by which Soviet foreign policy was made, outlining the different positions of various members of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Narkomindel).[5] Because he apparently lost much of his access to Soviet archives, Shishkin's later work is of a lesser quality.[6]

In Shishkin's work the typical "us versus them" attitude remains very much in evidence. This is partly understandable in view of the undeniably adversarial relationship that prevailed between Soviet Russia and the West in the early years of the Bolshevik regime. But Shishkin, like his predecessors, holds the West solely responsible for the poor state of these relations. Indeed, this continues to be a central problem in Soviet writing on Soviet foreign policy —we are asked to believe that Moscow is always right and everyone else is always wrong.

THE most interesting aspect of Zinoviy Sheynis's *Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov: Revolyutsioner, diplomat, chelovek* (Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov: the Revolutionary, the Diplomat, the Man) is the story behind its publication. In the early 1960's, Sheynis, a party *mezhdunarodnik* (a specialist on international affairs), signed a contract with Politizdat to write a popular biography of the former Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

In any circumstances, a biography of Litvinov would be a daunting task. Litvinov was a member of the Social Democratic Party from its founding and sided with Lenin in the Bolshevik-Menshevik schism of 1903. He spent several years in underground revolutionary work before arriving in Great Britain in 1908. With the October Revolution, Litvinov began a diplomatic career that lasted until 1946, the high point of which was his tenure as Commissar for Foreign Affairs from 1930 to 1939.

Sheynis set about his task by interviewing Litvinov's friends and family and searching through party archives at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Shortly thereafter, his articles on Litvinov began to appear in such diverse journals as *Novaya i Noveyshaya Istoriya* and *Nauka i Zhizn'*. In 1968, the late Yevgeniy Gnedin, a member of the Press Department of Narkomindel in the 1930's, wrote a short review article in *Novyy Mir* discussing Sheynis's publications and announcing that soon the complete biography of Litvinov would be available.

However, in August 1968, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. Almost immediately a brief if heroic protest occurred on Red Square; one of the demonstrators was Pavel Litvinov, grandson of the former Commissar. According to Pavel's father and his aunt, foreign minister Andrey Gromyko was furious. Never a Litvinov admirer, he ordered the suppression of Sheynis's biography of Litvinov.

One might well believe that this would have been the end of the matter. But Sheynis countered with a lawsuit, arguing that even though the book would not be published, he was still entitled to the royalties he could reasonably have expected if publication had occurred. Remarkably, the court decided in Sheynis's favor. He got his rubles, and Gromyko succeeded in blocking publication of the book.

Enter Gorbachev and *glasnost'*. Excerpts from the biography again began to appear in print, and in 1989, the manuscript, then more than 20 years old, was finally published in its entirety.[7]

The first thing any potential reader should realize is that this book is not a scholarly or critical biography. Sheynis does a competent job of depicting Litvinov's rather austere personality and simple lifestyle. But he comes up short in illuminating Litvinov's views on foreign policy, unless one finds significance in the assertion that Litvinov was a "diplomat of the Leninist school" (p. 3).

[3]Moscow, Nauka, 1964.

[4]Leningrad, Nauka, 1977.
Even Soviet specialists concede that only in the 1950's did Soviet academic writing on Soviet foreign policy rise above a purely polemical level. See A. O. Chubar'yan, *V. I. Lenin i formirovaniye sovetskoy vneshney politiki* (V. I. Lenin and the Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy), Leningrad, Nauka, 1972, p. 9.

[5]For example, see pp. 231–33 for a discussion of the conflicting Soviet attitudes toward the 1922 Genoa Conference.

[6]V. A. Shishkin, *"Polosa priznaniya" i vneshneekonomicheskaya politika SSSR, 1924–1928 gg.* (The "Period of Recognition" and the Foreign Economic Policy of the USSR, 1924–1928), Leningrad, Nauka, 1983.

[7]One can only speculate why Sheynis failed to take advantage of *glasnost'* to rework his manuscript. However, when I talked with him in Moscow in 1986, he indicated that he was quite satisfied with the book as it was. He also had new confidence that the book would be published in the not-too-distant future.

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The man that emerges from Sheynis's pages is little more than an obedient bureaucrat and, for the most part, one searches in vain for enlightenment on the making of Soviet foreign policy. There is one notable exception. Sheynis published a lengthy memo Litvinov wrote for the Politburo in 1922 in which he strongly urged a pro-British orientation for Soviet policy (pp. 190–91). But what the Politburo did with the memo is not explained. And beyond that point the quality of the book deteriorates rapidly. The most important part of Litvinov's career, his campaign to build a European collective-security system against Nazism from 1933 to 1939, receives less than 40 pages in a work of 431 pages. Surely Litvinov deserves better.

One episode of Litvinov's effort to build a collective-security system showed that he saw more clearly than most the enormity of the threat that Adolf Hitler posed to European and world peace. Speaking with French Ambassador Charles Alphand in September 1933, Litvinov "repeated . . . that he was persuaded that Germany will make war within two years."[8] On December 19, 1933, Litvinov was able to persuade the Politburo to have the Soviet Union participate in the construction of a collective-security system.[9] Litvinov then worked tirelessly with French foreign minister Louis Barthou to build a general system of collective security, which at first was to include Germany, that would isolate an aggressor. When that effort failed owing to the reluctance of other European states to participate, the two foreign ministers resorted to a bilateral mutual assistance pact—signed in May 1935—on the model of the Franco-Russian Pact of 1894.[10] Ultimately, Litvinov did not succeed in his efforts to build a collective-security system, but that is little reason for Sheynis to all but ignore such an important part of Litvinov's career.

It is possible that Sheynis is relatively quiet about Litvinov's campaign for a system of collective security because the Soviet leadership was divided on the issue. Vyacheslav Molotov openly admitted as much in March 1936, observing that there were two tendencies within the leadership—one held that Soviet and German interests were thoroughly irreconcilable, while the "chief tendency" considered an improvement in Soviet-German relations possible."[11] But "tendencies" are dangerously close to "factions," and every Soviet historian knows that factions were "banned" at the Tenth Party Congress in 1921. Therefore, it is best to avoid such explosive matters.[12]

More broadly speaking, the Litvinov who worked so hard and so long to integrate Soviet Russia into the international community as a traditional state, and who struggled in vain to overcome the revolutionary rhetoric of his bosses, is nowhere to be found in Sheynis's book. A spectacular example of Litvinov's efforts to downplay the role of the Comintern and the activities of foreign communists occurred in late 1929 in a conversation with British Ambassador Esmond Ovey. Litvinov suggested that London take its domestic communists and "hang them or burn them alive" if it so desired. The Comintern itself was "hopeless," and Litvinov added: "Why don't you take [the Comintern]? You are a free country."[13] Similarly, until relations with Germany soured after 1933, Litvinov assured Berlin that its treatment of the Communist Party of Germany was of no concern to Moscow.[14] As Litvinov's daughter, Tat'yana, insisted to me in a 1981 interview, her father had no sympathy with the idea of exporting revolution.

A more serious omission is that Sheynis's book gives no hint of what can only be termed as Litvinov's break with Stalinism after the war. Litvinov was disgusted with Stalin during World War II and considered defecting while serving as ambassador to the United States.[15] After the war, he washed his hands entirely of Soviet foreign policy. In a remarkable 1946 interview with American journalist Richard C. Hottelet, Litvinov drew blunt parallels between the expansionist foreign poli-

[8]Telegram of Alphand to Joseph Paul-Boncour, September 18, 1933, in Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, *Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1932–1939* (French Diplomatic Documents, 1932–1939), Series 1, Vol. 4, 1968, pp. 432–33.

[9]Proposal of Soviet government to French government, December 28, 1933, in *Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR* (Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR), Moscow, Politizdat, 1959, Vol. 16, pp. 876–77, note 321.

[10]These negotiations have been the subject of numerous outstanding works. For example, see Jonathan Haslam, *The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933–1939*, New York, St. Martin's, 1984; and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *La Décadence, 1932–1939* (The Decline, 1932–1939), Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1979.

[11]Jane Degas, Ed., *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, London, Oxford, 1953, Vol. 3, p. 184.

[12]In 1983, while on an IREX fellowship, I tried to discuss Molotov's remark with a Professor Belousov of Kiev State University, who specializes in the history of international relations. He angrily denied such a statement had ever been made, citing the Tenth Party Congress. I offered to show him my source, whereupon he announced that it was "time for lunch."

[13]Telegram of Ovey to the Foreign Office, Foreign Office Papers 371, 14860, N1404, 75, 38, London, Public Record Office. French Ambassador François Dejean also reported that Litvinov's foreign policy opponents included "members of the Comintern." Telegram of Dejean to Joseph Paul-Boncour, December 19, 1932, *Documents Diplomatiques Français*, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1966, Series 1, Vol. 2, pp. 283–84.

[14]E. H. Carr, *Twilight of the Comintern*, New York, Pantheon, 1982, pp. 80–81.

[15]Letter of Ivy Litvinov to Joseph Freeman, January 20, 1943, Joseph Freeman Papers, Box 175, Folder 1, Hoover Institution, Stanford, California.

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cies of Stalin and Hitler.[16] As William Taubman has observed, Litvinov thus became "the first major postwar dissident."[17]

It seems highly unlikely that Sheynis was ignorant of these matters. That he mentions none of them underscores the fact that as a party member he is not really concerned with writing an objective, critical biography of a leading Soviet official. Instead of describing the disillusionment Litvinov experienced, Sheynis emphasizes Litvinov's continued loyalty to the party after World War II (p. 427), although Sheynis does hint at Litvinov's anger with his lack of influence in his last years (p. 423). That, however, hardly tells the whole story.

ALTHOUGH Litvinov had broken entirely with Soviet foreign policy, the same can hardly be said for Andrey Gromyko. In surveying almost 50 years of Soviet foreign policy, Gromyko acknowledges only two errors. First, he states that the Soviet Union should have had a representative at the UN Security Council in 1950 in order to block the American-backed "aggression" of South Korea against North Korea (p. 102). And Nikita Khrushchev's famous shoe-banging incident at the UN was "a pity," but perhaps understandable because Khrushchev simply lost his temper (pp. 157–58).

Otherwise, this autobiography is an unbroken litany of praise for Soviet foreign policy and, by implication, for the author. Thus, the West encouraged Hitler's attack on the USSR (p. 313); the postwar regimes of Eastern Europe were democratic and certainly not imposed by Soviet arms (Hungary is discussed on p. 231 and East Germany on p. 317); the United States was solely responsible for the arms race and the cold war and launched these policies to satisfy "big business" (pp. 135–48); the introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba was purely defensive (p. 197); the construction of the Berlin Wall was an effort by the GDR to defend itself; the Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan were not invasions at all, but efforts to defend progressive friends (pp. 231–33, 240). Perhaps the most nonsensical assertion in the book is that Soviet policy in the Pacific region is designed to promote "universal peace and security, while studiously avoiding addressing the narrow interests of any one country" (p. 260). Does this mean that Soviet foreign policy does not seek to promote Soviet interests? Could Gromyko think anyone would believe such an absurdity?

If the reader seeks enlightenment on how Soviet policy is made, it would be best to look elsewhere. The author offers no substantive information on the policy-making process. This is really a pity because Gromyko was there and certainly knew the give and take that must have occurred in Politburo debates on foreign affairs. But he apparently took with him to the grave the really interesting and useful information.

By far the most engaging part of the book is the last chapter—entitled "More About Stalin"—if only because what comes before it is so trite. The reader will probably not be shocked to learn that Stalin was an evil man. But what concerns Gromyko most is how such a criminal came to lead the "party of Lenin," because he insists that there was no link whatsoever between Leninism and Stalinism (p. 379). He discusses the "burden of Russian history"—a tradition of submissiveness to strong monarchs. He bemoans the prostitution of the legal system and is especially harsh on Andrey Vyshinskiy (pp. 318–19), a man one would be hard put to defend. He asserts that most Soviet citizens were ignorant of Stalin's crimes, which facilitated their commission (p. 351), but several pages later he admits that in the 1930's, ordinary people lived in fear of their lives (p. 365). Perhaps most interestingly, Gromyko observes that contrary to Lenin's wishes, Stalin was not removed from his positions of power, especially the post of general secretary, because the post-Lenin leadership lacked the "requisite responsibility" to take a "principled stand" (p. 372). Rather than carry out Lenin's policy, they engaged in a struggle for personal power, and from that struggle Stalin emerged triumphant. But this must mean that the "party of Lenin" consisted only of Lenin, while the rest of the leaders were irresponsible, unprincipled men lusting for political power.

Finally, in criticizing Stalin so sharply and correctly, Gromyko fails to deal with the Great Leader's shortcomings in his foreign policy. The reader is asked with a straight face to believe that a hideously murderous regime at home was always correct, progressive, even enlightened in foreign affairs. Can the two spheres be so hermetically sealed? Or is it possible that the party's cynicism, mendacity, duplicity, and propensity for violence that obtained in domestic affairs may have spilled over into foreign affairs, especially after World War II. Gromyko clearly thinks not. The result is an incoherent book.

MANY of the problems found in Gromyko's memoirs also characterize the scholarly work under review here—Vilnis Sipols's *Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1936–1939 gg.* (The Foreign Policy of the

[16] *New York World Telegram and Sun*, Jan. 29, 1953. Hottelet discreetly waited until after Litvinov's death to publish his interview.

[17] William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War*, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1982, p. 133.

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Soviet Union, 1936–1939). Sipols is deputy chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Scientific Council on the History of International Relations and Foreign Policy Activity of the USSR. He has authored numerous books and articles and is widely recognized as a leading Soviet authority on Soviet prewar diplomacy.[18]

The work under consideration is Sipols's first since the advent of Gorbachev; it was sent to press in May 1987. The policy of *glasnost'* was then still in its earliest stages, but certainly scholars knew by that time that much of the old restraints had been discarded. In my own research, I have used Sipols's works a great deal, although with considerable caution too, and I confess I had high hopes for this work. Unfortunately, the book is indistinguishable in tone and emphasis from his earlier flawed books. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that anyone seriously interested in Soviet foreign policy in the 1930's must consult Sipols's writings, if only because he has enjoyed archival access denied to others and because of his impressive facility with foreign languages.

Sipols starts off sensibly enough, observing that the chief task of Soviet diplomacy was the "securing of peace on the Soviet borders and the security of the country" in order to facilitate the "construction of a socialist society" (p. 4). In the late 1930's, the principal threats to the USSR were Germany and Japan, and Moscow was anxious to cooperate with Britain, France, and the United States to contain the aggressive powers. But, according to Sipols, Soviet efforts at cooperation went unrewarded principally because, although some British officials were cognizant of the threat posed by Nazism, British reactionaries wanted "the annihilation of Soviet independence itself" (pp. 4–5) and thus conspired with Germany to direct Nazi aggression toward the east. In the mid-1930's, France briefly took seriously a Franco-Soviet alliance, but after the Rhineland crisis in 1936, Paris fell in line with London's appeasement policy. Echoing Gromyko, Sipols finds no fault whatsoever with Soviet policy and attributes all sorts of wickedness to the "capitalist" states.

Sipols makes a good case for the essentially peaceful nature of Soviet foreign policy before 1939. However, what the book sorely lacks is balance and a sense of the broader picture. For example, the author is sharply critical of the fact that the French largely viewed the 1935 Franco-Soviet Pact in a negative way: that is, it served simply to prevent a Soviet-German rapprochement (pp. 50–51). This was undoubtedly the case, as the French frequently told the British. But Sipols fails to note that the Kremlin took a similarly negative view of the pact. Indeed, in 1935, Litvinov told the Soviet leadership that one of the main advantages of the pact was that it would hinder a Franco-German agreement.[19] The Soviets had come to fear such a prospect since the summer of 1932, when German Chancellor Franz von Papen proposed a German-French alliance. Nothing came of von Papen's idea, but Moscow was badly, and understandably, shaken.[20]

Sipols deals with the crises in East Asia in a similar fashion. Again, the USSR vigorously advanced concrete proposals to stop Japanese aggression, most notably a Pacific Mutual Assistance Pact in spring 1935. Litvinov's idea, this arrangement envisioned the participation of the USSR, China, Japan, Britain, the United States, France, and Holland. According to Sipols, this proposal and other schemes for collective security failed to gain support, owing mainly to the negative position of the United States (pp. 94–95), which in turn was based on "class hatred toward the Soviet government by US ruling circles" (p. 123). There is not one word in Sipols's book on the Neutrality Laws and the American people's overwhelming support for a policy of isolationism. So one is left with the impression that American policy was actually quite active in Asia and aimed at using Japan to destroy Soviet power.[21]

On occasion, Sipols, a very dour individual and writer, can be downright hilarious. Thus he informs the reader that many in the West wrote off the Soviet Union as a military power because in the summer of 1937 "a number of Soviet military leaders were removed from their posts" (p. 154). Even Gromyko concedes that what happened to the Red Army at that time was a tragic "massacre" (p. 356), but Sipols's view is apparently so affected by his Stalinist biases that he is unable to make a similar admission. Instead, he writes that the whole affair was blown out of proportion be-

[18]Sipols's books include *Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1933–1935 gg.* (The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 1933–1935), Moscow, Nauka, 1980; and a more general survey of the diplomacy of the 1930's, *Diplomaticheskaya bor'ba nakanune vtoroy mirovoy voyny* (The Diplomatic Struggle on the Eve of the Second World War), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1979.

[19]Telegram of Litvinov to Narkomindel, April 18, 1935, *Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR*, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, Vol. 18, pp. 292–93.

[20]See, for example, Telegram of Lev Khinchuk to Narkomindel, June 27, 1932, ibid., Moscow, Politizdat, 1969, Vol. 15, p. 390.

[21]For an accurate account of just how tied Roosevelt's hands were in dealing with aggression in Asia, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History*, 2nd ed., New York, McGraw-Hill, 1990, pp. 132–36.

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cause of "class hatred" in the West toward the land of socialism (p. 154).

In discussing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Sipols fails to mention at all the secret protocol to the Pact. More recently, however, Sipols has devoted some attention to this matter. In an article published in the Soviet journal *International Affairs*, Sipols wrote that he has "no incontrovertible evidence to confirm or refute the authenticity of the text of the secret supplementary protocol." However, "all available data show that in signing the treaty, Germany was ready to take into account the security interests of the Soviet Union and assumed certain unilateral additional obligations which it had offered during the talks" between the two sides.[22] Thus, in a sort of backhanded fashion, Sipols has come to acknowledge that the Soviet Union and Germany divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence in the weeks before the German attack on Poland.

Finally, this book devotes scant attention to the formation of Soviet foreign policy. The discussions within the Politburo and its relationship with Narkomindel are matters Sipols leaves untouched. Ironically, however, at times he goes to great lengths in describing the nefarious moves and countermoves of various policy-makers in London.

One can agree with much of what he writes. The Soviet Union (or at least Maksim Litvinov) saw more clearly than others the danger the Nazis represented. Many of the diplomatic dispatches and speeches Sipols cites give eloquent testimony to that fact. And there is little to praise in British and French policy at that time. Still, Sipols's (and the other authors') diplomatic world is almost entirely black and white, without the nuances that make up the reality of historical truth.

WHY is there so little evidence of *glasnost'* or efforts to fill in blank pages in these recent writings on Soviet foreign policy? Of course the Sheynis book is 20 years old, but he could well have reworked it. Gromyko was "old thinking" personified, and it was probably too much to expect him to have changed in his last years. Sipols also represents "old thinking," having built quite a reputation for himself as a staunch defender of the Soviet regime during its worst years. In other words, all these men made their names and careers in the era before *glasnost'*. They have proved themselves unable to break with their past views, even after the regime loosened the reins on the writing of history and historians were able to gain unprecedented access to archival materials.

All this does not bode well for the historiography of Soviet foreign relations, at least in the near term. It takes a great deal of time and effort to produce competent, let alone exceptional, diplomatic history. And that is true under the best of academic conditions. Such hardly obtain in the USSR today. In the summer of 1990, I was affiliated with a language institute in Moscow while I did research on Soviet foreign policy. I talked with some of the social sciences faculty, including a foreign affairs specialist. I found them intellectually adrift and confused. All the old verities were gone, and, most disturbing to them, nothing had emerged to take their place. I tried to explain the concepts of academic freedom in the classroom and in research, but was met largely with uncomprehending stares.

It will take a long time, I believe, before a new, more objective mindset can emerge, one that values historical truth for its own sake. And only then can the long and expensive process of producing a new generation of Soviet diplomatic historians truly get under way.

[22]Vilnis Sipols, "A Few Months Before August 23, 1939," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 6, 1989, pp. 135–36.

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